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Abstract 
 
The thesis proposes an account of the means of scientific representation focused on 
similarity, or more specifically, on the notion of “creative similarity”. I first 
distinguish between two different questions regarding the problem of 
representation: the question about the constituents and the question about the means 
of representation (following Suárez 2003; van Fraassen 2008). I argue that, 
although similarity is not a good candidate for constituent of representation, it can 
satisfactorily answer the question about the means of representation if adequately 
characterized. To motivate this position, I dispute the main arguments offered 
against similarity as means of representation, namely the arguments from variety, 
vagueness, and misrepresentation, and contend that similarity plays a central 
epistemic role in practices of representing in science. The study of the role of 
similarity in scientific practice, I argue, requires the analysis of the uses of 
judgments of similarity in the construction of scientific models. I examine the cases 
of the Mississippi Basin Model and the San Francisco Bay Model to illustrate how 
judgments of similarity are directly involved in the production of epistemically 
fruitful models. Informed by the practical investigation developed throughout the 
thesis, I finally outline what I call the creative similarity account of the means of 
representation. The notion of “creative similarity” helps to capture the way in which 
similarity, as means of representation, intervenes in actual practices of 
representing, namely, in the form of a productive interplay of judgments of 
similarity and distortions (i.e. idealizations, abstractions, simplifications), which is 
employed by resourceful agents with the aim of understanding aspects of the 
natural world. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Parrhasius […] entered into a pictorial contest with Zeuxis, 
who represented some grapes, painted so naturally that the 
birds flew towards the spot where the picture was exhibited. 
Parrhasius, on the other hand, exhibited a curtain, drawn with 
such singular truthfulness, that Zeuxis, elated with the 
judgment which had been passed upon his work by the birds, 
haughtily demanded that the curtain should be drawn aside to 
let the picture be seen. Upon finding his mistake, with a great 
degree of ingenuous candour he admitted that he had been 
surpassed, for that whereas he himself had only deceived the 
birds, Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist.  
(Pliny. Natural History. Book XXXV, Chap. 36) 
 
The myth of Zeuxis and Parrahasius exemplifies an old and ingrained metaphor of 
representations as providing a mirror or perfect reflection of nature. Zeuxis ’s 
grapes were so lifelike that birds attempted to eat them. However, his artistic 
prowess was far surpassed by Parrhasius revealing that the curtain Zeuxis saw 
before him was itself a painting (Mansfield 2007: 26-7). Taking the copy for the 
real thing, the myth invites us to think, is irrefutable proof that a perfect 
representation has been achieved. Vestiges of this view on representation, 
philosophers such as Goodman (1968) and Rorty (1979) note, still permeate 
contemporary debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. For Goodman 
(1968), references to similarity in the debate of representation are evidence of the 
vigour of copy theories of representation. For Rorty (1979) the notion of 
representation itself should be rejected, as it is a remnant of the metaphor of the 
mirror of nature and the aspiration to achieve perfect knowledge of the world. This 
thesis is motivated by the rejection of the epistemological consequences that 
embracing the metaphor of the mirror of nature has. At the same time, it is 
motivated by the thought that the notions of representation and similarity are 
extremely valuable when addressing the problem of how humans comprehend the 
world around them, specifically through scientific representations.  
In recent philosophy of science, the debate on representation has been 
focused largely on how scientific models represent natural phenomena. Models are 
far from being, or attempting to be, exact copies of the world. They idealize, 
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simplify, abstract and distort the targets they attempt to represent. Nonetheless, 
many models succeed in providing epistemic access to numerous aspects of the 
world we are interested in. The central problem this thesis addresses is how 
epistemically successful representations are produced in science. I will adopt a 
framework of discussion that characterizes epistemic success in terms of 
understanding (Elgin 1996, 2017a). And I will defend that similarity, or more 
specifically “creative similarity”, is fundamentally involved in the construction of 
epistemically successful scientific models. My account, the creative similarity account 
of the means of representation, should be taken as an attempt to rehabilitate the 
significance of similarity in the debate of representation by means of the study of 
its role in actual modelling practices in science, while refusing to identify similarity 
with the old metaphor of the mirror of nature.   
The contents of the thesis are organized as follows. The starting point will 
be the distinction between two different questions about scientific representation: 
the question about the constituents and the question about the means of 
representation (following Suárez 2003, 2010). The question about the constituents 
asks ‘in virtue of what is something a representation of a target in the world?’, 
while the question about the means asks ‘in virtue of what is something an 
epistemically successful representation of a target in the world?’ There is 
agreement in philosophy of science that the question about the constituents 
demands a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for representation in response. 
Meanwhile, it has not been discussed sufficiently what exactly a response to the 
question about the means of representation requires. I will show throughout this 
thesis that proposing an account of the means of representation requires a 
systematic practical enquiry of the resources used in modelling practices. More 
specifically, it requires an analysis of the judgments scientists make during the 
design, construction, and evaluation of representations with regards to the targets 
they attempt to represent. 
Chapters 1 and 2 are an investigation into the various accounts in 
contemporary philosophy of science that have debated the general problem of 
representation and the role of similarity in it. In Chapter 1 I will discuss the 
possibility of considering similarity, or structural similarity, a constituent of 
representation. That is, a necessary (and usually jointly with denotation) sufficient 
condition for representation. Works that advocate this view include French (2003), 
Bartels (2006), and French and Bueno (2011), among others. I will present two 
compelling arguments that should dissuade us from regarding similarity as a 
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constituent of representation, namely Goodman’s (1968) logical argument against 
similarity and the argument from misrepresentation. However, this conclusion will 
not be a reason to abandon similarity altogether. 
In Chapter 2 I will examine the possibility of considering similarity the 
means (or a possible means) of representation. That is to say, I will discuss whether 
referring to the notion of similarity can help account for how epistemically 
successful representations are produced in science. Three arguments against 
similarity as a possible means of representation will be considered: the argument 
from variety, the argument from vagueness, and the argument from 
misrepresentation against the means. The conclusion this time will be that none of 
these arguments is conclusive enough to prevent us from offering an account of 
the means of representation focused on similarity. I will then consider some recent 
positions in the debate on representation that have been instrumental in 
rehabilitating similarity in an account of the means of representation, namely 
Suárez (2003, 2010), Contessa (2007a, 2011), Giere (2004, 2006), and van Fraassen 
(2008). One of the insights that will be gained from this analysis is that an account 
of similarity as means of representation should be framed in a triadic conception of 
representation that locates the use of representation by the relevant epistemic 
community at its centre. This approach stands in opposition to conceptions of  
similarity as two-term relations between a vehicle and a target, but also in 
opposition to triadic conceptions of  representation that define similarity as an 
intentional notion, depending merely on individuals’ purposes.  
Chapter 3 will have a more methodological character. I will argue that an 
account of the means of representation requires both a practical investigation of 
the use of representation, and a normative component, as any genuine philosophical 
analysis requires. The fields of Philosophy of Science in Practice (PSP) and 
integrated History and Philosophy of Science (iHPS) will offer some useful 
methodological tools to help frame such an account. The main contribution of this 
chapter will be the claim that the study of ‘judgments in scientific practice’ in 
general, and ‘judgments of similarity’ in particular, is central for the advancement 
of an account of the means of representation, as it links the descriptive and the 
normative components of the account. Epistemic agents make constant judgments 
of similarity in the process of designing, constructing, and testing a broad range 
of scientific models. The source of the normativity of an account of the means of 
representation should be the description of the uses of these judgments, and how 
they are entrenched, regulated, and translated into norms and standards within 
INTRODUCTION 
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the practice. The works of Weisberg (2013) and Sterrett (2009, 2017a) will help 
assess the role of judgments of similarity in scientific practices.  
The analysis of actual practices of representing is fundamental to support 
the arguments in this thesis. Chapter 4 offers a detailed historical study of two 
cases of modelling in engineering: the Mississippi Basin Model (1943) and the San 
Francisco Bay Model (1953). I will explore the connections between the uses of 
judgments of similarity in these cases and the epistemic success of the models 
obtained. The selection of two scale models as case studies is motivated by the fact 
that traditional literature in philosophy of science has frequently underrated the 
epistemic value of scale models, and linked it to the erroneous assumption that 
scale models are superficially and naïvely similar to their targets. I will show that 
scale models have a genuine epistemic value way beyond illustrative functions; that 
judgments of similarity used in their construction are in great part responsible for 
the epistemic success they have; and that those judgments of similarity are in 
constant interplay with judgments of dissimilarity and distortions. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will propose a specific account of the means of 
representation, the creative similarity account of the means of representation. This 
account advocates that ‘creative similarity’ is the means of representation in an 
epistemically relevant set of successful modelling practices in science, such as those 
I discuss throughout the thesis. The notion of ‘creative similarity’ is introduced to 
capture the way in which similarity intervenes in actual practices of representing, 
namely, in the form of a productive interplay of judgments of similarity and 
distortions that allows epistemic agents to produce fruitful representations that 
afford understanding of aspects of the world. 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
The Constituents and the Means  
of Representation  
Chapter 1: The Constituents and the Means of 
Representation  
 
The problem of representation has become a central topic of debate in 
contemporary philosophy of science. Although we can find isolated considerations 
of the notion of scientific representation since the late nineteenth century,1 it only 
started to be systematically discussed in philosophy of science in the 1960s. At that 
time, the advancement of the semantic view motivated the study of scientific 
models, and with it the question of how scientific models represent natural 
phenomena gained centrality in the debate in philosophy of science. Finding a 
satisfactory response to this question has been considered a central endeavour of 
philosophers of science since then, given that it ultimately revolves around the 
crucial epistemological concern of how we learn about the world. 
A ‘vehicle’, such as a scientific model, is used to represent a ‘target system’, 
such as the structure of DNA, the nucleus of the atom, the progression of a storm, 
the growth of carcinogenic cells, or the water flows in a bay, and make inferences 
about it. But what should a vehicle be like to perform such role? Watson and 
Crick’s model of the DNA structure consists of a set of interconnected aluminium 
templates and rods; scale models of water flows are usually an ensemble of artificial 
pumps and water tanks; and mice are commonly used as model-organisms to 
represent cancer growth in humans. Scientific models always present us with 
                                             
1 Hertz’s and Boltzmann’s respective conceptions of scientific theories as images (Bildtheorie) are 
considered ancestors of account of representation in philosophy of science, particularly of 
structuralist views of representation (in Hughes 1997: 333; and van Fraassen 2008: 190-192).  
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idealized, schematic, distorted, and partial images of the aspects of the world they 
represent. So a central challenge philosophers of science face is to explain not only 
how artefacts like these models represent their targets, but more importantly, how 
they do so successfully, in a way that allows them to make fruitful inferences and 
predictions about the world. The subject of study of this thesis is the production of 
successful representations in science. I take successful representations to be those 
that, for the specific purposes at hand, are able to afford understanding of the 
world, despite, and frequently thanks to, the idealizations and distortions they 
involve (Elgin 2004, 2017a).  
Scientific models are not the only vehicles used to make inferences about 
the world. Maps, pictures, photographs, narratives, and diagrams are also 
employed across the sciences, the arts, and other realms of everyday life to 
represent objects and states of affairs. Some philosophers have established 
comparisons between scientific representations and maps (Giere 1999; Contessa 
2007a; Frigg and Nguyen 2017a), caricatures (van Fraassen 2008) and artworks 
(Suárez 2003, 2004; French 2003; Downes 2009; Elgin 2002, 2010, 2011, 2017b; 
Chakravartty 2010a; Ambrosio 2013) in an attempt to explore the specific ways in 
which scientific models work. Other philosophers of science have explicitly 
addressed the issue of whether or not there is special problem of scientific 
representation, different from artistic, mental, or linguistic representation. 
Callender and Cohen (2006) have, for instance, questioned the genuineness of the 
problem of scientific representation and urged philosophers to examine it in the 
context of wider debates in philosophy. This thesis does not directly address the 
problem of the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific representations. 
Nonetheless, I subscribe to the idea that philosophers of science have a good deal 
to learn from historical and contemporary debates in aesthetics, philosophy of 
language, and philosophy of mind, fields in which the problem of representation 
has a much longer tradition of discussion. In the last chapter of this thesis, I will 
specifically endorse the view that understanding is a central aim of both the 
practice of representing in science and in art (following Goodman 1968; Goodman 
and Elgin 1988), a reason for incorporating examples from artistic practices in an 
attempt to illustrate and support my own account of scientific representation. 
In this first chapter, I begin (Section 1.1) by offering a brief overview of the 
changes that took place in contemporary philosophy of science regarding the 
debate on representation. The transition from the syntactic to the semantic view 
in the 1960s, and the flourishing of studies on scientific models defined how the 
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problem of representation has been addressed until today. In Section 1.2, I start 
analysing the specific implications that the problem of scientific representation has. 
I particularly distinguish between two central questions about representation – 
both involved in the broader abovementioned question of how scientific models 
represent natural phenomena: namely, the question about the constituents and the 
question about the means of representation (Suárez 2003; 2010; van Fraassen 2008). 
The distinction between these two questions will be a guiding point of reference 
throughout this thesis. Without this distinction, I argue, the role of similarity in 
scientific representation would remain problematically opaque.  
Returning to the concept of similarity, and its structural variants 
isomorphism, partial isomorphism, or homomorphism, has been a common way of 
addressing the problem of representation in philosophy of science, such as in the 
accounts of Giere (2004), French (2003), French and Bueno (2011), Bartels (2006), 
van Fraassen (2008), Contessa (2007a, 2011), and Weisberg (2013). The common 
intuition underlying all these varied accounts is that the fact that a scientific model 
represents a specific target in the world is somehow related to the fact that the 
model is question is similar to that target. Yet, positions regarding exactly how 
representation and similarity are related to each other can greatly vary. In Section 
1.3, I will discuss a specific subgroup of accounts that hold a common view 
concerning the specific relation between representation and similarity, namely, 
accounts that consider similarity a constituent of representation. That is to say, I 
will examine accounts that claim that something (a vehicle) is a scientific 
representation of something else (a target system in the world) in virtue of a 
relation of similarity between them. I will then present two arguments against the 
view that similarity is a constituent of representation, namely Goodman’s (1968; 
1972) argument against similarity and the argument from misrepresentation. I will 
conclude that we should refrain from considering similarity, in any of its versions, 
a constituent of representation.  
There are other subgroups of accounts that hold a different view of the 
specific relation between representation and similarity. Later, in Chapter 2, I will 
examine accounts that consider similarity a means of representation, that is, 
accounts that defend the central role of similarity in the production of accurate or 
successful scientific representations. In this case, I will also present three central 
arguments against similarity as means of representation, namely the argument 
from variety, the argument from vagueness, and the argument from 
misrepresentation against the means. But on this occasion, the conclusion will be 
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different: if adequately characterized, similarity is a satisfactory concept to offer an 
account of the means of representation. 
 
 
1.1. From syntactic to semantic to pragmatic: models in philosophy 
of science 
In the syntactic view of theories, or “the received view”, as it was called, reflecting 
its dominance during the first half of the twentieth century, the primary 
manifestation of scientific knowledge was scientific theories. Theories are defined 
in the received view as sets of axioms in a formal language that are truth-apt; that 
is, that can be individually evaluated as true or false. The role of scientific models 
in this conception was either completely disregarded or relegated to a merely 
illustrative or pedagogical one. Among the core group of logical positivists who 
endorsed this view, Carnap (1939: 68) famously claimed that “the discovery of a 
model has no more than an aesthetic or didactic or at best a heuristic value, but is 
not at all essential for a successful application of the physical theory”. Maxwell’s 
equations could, for instance, be presented in an “intuitive” manner, following 
Carnap (1939), by producing a model that involved visible known macro-processes. 
But such a model would be at best an illustration of the true axioms about 
electromagnetism that Maxwell’s equations already contained (ibid.: 67). A similar 
view was previously held by Duhem ([1914] 1954: 32), who claimed that models 
are parasitic on the fully-formed theoretical units that carry genuine descriptions 
of physical phenomena. In short, models are in the syntactic view appendices to 
theories, mostly redundant, and with no crucial role in scientific development (in 
Bailer-Jones 1999: 24-25).  
In the 1960s, the syntactic view experienced a phase of decay at the same 
time as the programme known as the semantic view of theories emerged. The 
origins of the semantic view can be traced back to Suppes (1960), with further 
developments by van Fraassen (1980), Giere (1988), and Suppe (1989). From the 
1980s onward, the semantic view gained such wide acceptance in the philosophy 
of science that it became the orthodox view on models and theories, or “the new 
received view” (Frigg 2006: 51; Contessa 2006). In contrast to the syntactic view, 
advocates of the semantic view define scientific theories as families of models. 
Scientific models are objects and not linguistic entities, and as such they cannot be 
evaluated as true or false in the literal sense in which sentences can. Models can at 
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best be expressible in statements about the empirical world whose truth or falsity 
can be then assessed (Bailer-Jones 2003: 60). It is precisely under this conception 
that the question of how models represent natural phenomena arises. To explain 
how models represent their targets, philosophers in the semantic view appeal to 
the set-theoretic structures of models: models represent certain phenomena if they 
share the same structure. Sharing the same structure has been described in terms 
of similarity, embedding, isomorphism, and partial isomorphism (van Fraassen 
1980; French 2003; French and Bueno 2011).  
The problem of scientific representation is hence historically linked to the 
shift from the syntactic to the semantic view as well as to the rise of the study of 
models in science. Despite the wide endorsement of the semantic view in 
contemporary philosophy of science, there have been some detractors. Halvorson 
(2012: 184) has, for instance, opposed the default definition of scientific theories 
that the semantic view provides, given that they are treated only as collections of 
models. His proposal can be seen as a partial rehabilitation of the syntactic view.2 
Frigg (2006: 62) argues along the same lines. He affirms that the development of 
the semantic view has evolved into a state where language per se seems to be 
irrelevant to the analysis of scientific theories and models, while actually scientific 
representations involve an intricate mixture of linguistic and non-linguistic 
elements.  
From a different perspective, and with a stronger repercussion for the 
current debate on representation, there has been an increasing number of 
detractors of the semantic view who argue that, in fact, the syntactic and the 
semantic view are not so different from each other. A shortcoming that the two 
programmes share concerns how they address the use of models in scientific 
practice (Morgan and Morrison 1999; Cartwright et al. 1995; Cartwright and 
Suárez 2008; Contessa 2006). If models are dispensable tools in the syntactic view, 
they are just set-theoretic structures in the semantic view. None of these views 
allows us to account for the richness of roles that models, as objects that can be 
deployed, manipulated, and applied, perform in scientific research. For instance, 
the way in which the semantic view characterizes models cannot elucidate how 
many models are constructed with relative independence from a theory. Successful 
                                             
2 See Halvorson (2012: 184): “Regrettably, philosophers have been too quick to jump onto the 
semantic bandwagon, and they have failed to test the semantic view as severely as they tested the 
received view […] In particular […] the semantic view makes incorrect pronouncements about 
the identity of theories, as well as about relations between theories”. 
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model building is frequently non-theory driven (Cartwright and Suárez 2008: 64). 
The London model of superconductivity is an example of that. It was constructed 
counting on the help of some background theory, but that doesn’t mean that the 
model was already contained in the theory, waiting to be extracted from it, as the 
customary approach in the semantic view would claim (ibid.: 63). Additionally, 
when models are identified with set-theoretic structures that aim to be isomorphic 
to target systems in the world, the possibility of models misrepresenting those 
targets becomes a central challenge for philosophers in the semantic view. Yet, it 
is widely recognized among philosophers of science that the possibility of 
misrepresentation, via abstraction, approximation, and idealization, is a 
fundamental feature of how models are used by scientists (Suárez 2003: 233-235; 
Contessa 2006: 372-5; Frigg 2006: 51; van Fraassen 2008: 13-15). I discuss the 
problem of misrepresentation in more detail in Section 1.3.2.  
These criticisms of the semantic view are connected to a relatively 
independent shift that also took place in the debate on representation in the 1960s 
and 1970s. A progressive transition from formal accounts to pragmatic and 
functional accounts of models took place at this time (Bailer-Jones 1999: 32-35). 
The exploration of actual modelling practices was an interest of some of the 
subscribers of the semantic view, but not of the view as a whole. This explains, 
following Bailer-Jones (1999), the varieties of accounts within the semantic view, 
some much more practice-oriented than other, as well as the numerous works on 
modelling practices that did not endorse the rationale of the semantic view. Suppes 
(1960), first and principal promoter of the semantic view, endorsed a formal type 
of account of models, his main concern being how to systematically accommodate 
the relation between models and theories (in Bailer-Jones 1999: 32). Giere’s (1988, 
2008) work is a case in point. He has always identified himself with the semantic 
view, but recognizes that it took him many years to realize that his understanding 
of models was not the same as Suppes’s (in Giere 2008: 10n). While Suppes’s 
models are “instantial” or “interpretational”, for Giere (ibid.), models are primarily 
representational, as they provide above all tools for representing the world and not 
tools for interpreting formal systems.  
Meanwhile, other philosophers, like Hesse (1966) and Morgan and 
Morrison (1999), more openly favoured characterizations of models supported by 
scientific practice, emphasizing their role in scientific discovery (in Bailer-Jones 
1999: 34). A particularly influential functional type of account of models, that 
detached itself from the semantic view, was advanced in Models as Mediators 
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(Morgan and Morrison 1999). The central claim of the book was, as the title 
suggests, that models mediate between theory and phenomena, not because they 
are dependent on theory, but precisely because they function as autonomous 
objects (ibid.: 43). The tension between formal and functional accounts of models 
made evident that the more philosophers tried to grasp the varieties of roles models 
played in practice, the harder it was to provide a systematic and single definition 
of model (Bailer-Jones 1999: 35). And vice versa, the more the emphasis was on a 
general definition of model and on the formalization of the mapping between 
models and phenomena, the harder it was to account for the variety of formats and 
functions models in practice played.  
Along with these debates, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians of 
science were also resolved to get into the muddy waters of everyday scientific 
practices in the 1960s and 1970s. A considerable number of scholars in these fields 
were committed to challenge the too whig, clean and theoretical accounts of science 
offered by the previous generations. Bloor (1976), Collins (1981), Knorr-Cetina 
(1981), and Lynch and Woolgar (1990), from the sociology of science; and Kuhn 
(1962; 1977), Shapin (1982), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), and Pickering (1984), from 
the new historiographies of science, influenced the debate on scientific 
representation with their various practice-sensitive accounts. Their studies 
stressed that an important part of everyday scientific work consists in the design 
and manipulation of representations, either as physical models, computer 
simulations, graphs, or diagrams, reinforcing the idea that the notion of 
representation should be first and foremost understood as ‘activity of 
representing’, instead of as ‘finished product’ obtained at the end of that activity. 
Some of these scholars even went inside laboratories to observe the progressive 
construction of representations, from the work in the field, to the collection of data, 
the design of experiments, and the final publication of papers in journals (see 
Latour and Woolgar 1979 for a classic account of the ethnographies of the 
laboratory). Philosophers of science like Giere (2006: 7-13) and van Fraassen 
(2008: 376 n17) have openly recognized the influence of these works in the 
pragmatic turn that their own accounts of representation experienced. It is worth 
drawing attention to the fact that the study of scientific practices was a project that 
went way beyond the interests of a group of philosophers in or outside the semantic 
view.  
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1.2. Two questions about representation 
The increasing attention to scientific models and the transition to the semantic 
view brought to the fore of the debate the so-called problem of scientific 
representation. However, in more recent years, a group of philosophers started to 
suspect that the problem of representation involved slightly different, conflating 
issues (Suárez 2004, 2010, 2015; Frigg 2006; Hughes 1997; Contessa 2011). When 
asking how scientific models represent natural phenomena, we might be interested 
in elucidating the conditions for scientific representation. That is, we might want 
to address the question of “in virtue of what is something a scientific representation 
of something else?” I will abbreviate this first question about representation to R1. 
Alternatively, we might be interested in discussing the problem of the accuracy or 
success of scientific representations; that is, we might want to address the question 
of “in virtue of what is something an accurate or successful scientific representation 
of something else?” I will abbreviate this second question to R2. Some philosophers 
of science have conflated R1 and R2 in the past. Fortunately, Suárez (2010: 93) 
claims, this is no longer the case, and nowadays representation is carefully 
distinguished from true, accurate or faithful representation. One reason that it is 
important to differentiate the two questions is to be able to properly address the 
role of similarity in representation, as I will further explain in Section 1.3 and 
Chapter 2. Another reason is that the distinction between R1 and R2 helps make 
sense of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. If we want to explain why a certain 
model is, for instance, not a good representation of a target, we have to accept first 
that the model in question is a representation of that target. Only then we can 
discuss the reasons for its inaccuracy. In other words, misrepresentation is a 
species of representation after all (van Fraassen 2008: 13). 
Regarding the first question, R1, we could say that it demands a close, 
universal type of answer in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
representation. A standard answer to R1 would have the form: “Something (a 
vehicle) is a scientific representation of something else (a target) if and only 
if_____” (Frigg and Nguyen: 2016). R1 has also been characterized in other ways: 
as “the constitutional question”, as it seeks to elucidate what constitutes the 
relation of representation (Suárez 2010: 92; Callender and Cohen 2006: 2); as the 
problem of “mere representation” (van Fraassen and Sigman 1993; Bolinska 2013); 
and as the problem of “representation simpliciter” (Contessa 2007b: 50). In addition, 
Suárez (2010: 94-95) characterizes all the accounts that affirm that it is possible to 
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respond to R1 with a close set of necessary and sufficient conditions as “substantive 
accounts” of representation. Defenders of substantive accounts agree that 
representation is a robust relation between a source and target that can be further 
analyzed in terms of something else.3  
Meanwhile, R2 has been defined as a question that concerns the accuracy or 
faithfulness of representation (Suárez 2004; Contessa 2007b), the “standards of 
accuracy” of representation (Frigg and Nguyen 2016), and the “normative issue of 
what it is for a representation to be correct” (Callender and Cohen 2006: 3). The 
answers to R2 admit of degrees, as representations can be more or less accurate, 
more or less faithful, unlike R1, which demands conditions that are either satisfied 
or not satisfied. In addition, van Fraassen (2008: 15) identifies R2 with the question 
of “how does a representation represent?”, since only when we take for granted that 
something (a picture, a model) is a representation can we enquire how it can 
“correctly represent, misrepresent, caricature, flatter, or revile its subject”. Frigg 
(2006: 50) points out a distinction between two variants of the how-question, or 
the problem of style, as he also calls it, the descriptive and the normative variants. 
There are different styles of representation in science, from mathematical models 
to physical models, images, and graphs. The descriptive variant would entail a 
taxonomy or portrayal of how different models represent in different ways, while 
the normative variant would involve the search for rules or standards of 
correctness, that is, of the acceptable and unacceptable styles of representing 
(ibid.). 
The terminology I will follow more closely to identify the set of issues 
involved in R1 and R2 is Suárez’s (2003: 229-230) distinction between the 
constituents and the means of representation. The study of the constituents requires 
a type of investigation that Suárez calls an ‘analytical inquiry’, and the study of the 
means requires a ‘practical inquiry’ (2010: 91-2). This is because the constituents 
are unique and universal relations between a target and a vehicle, while the means 
are sensitive to the particular context in which representations are actively 
employed by epistemic agents to draw inferences from a vehicle about a target 
(ibid: 93). We could apply Frigg’s (2006) distinction here, and claim that there are 
two possible variants of an account of the means of representation. A descriptive 
                                             
3 More precisely, Suárez (2010: 95) specifies that substantive accounts of representation can be 
primitivist and reductive. But since substantive accounts are more naturally reductive, and that is 
the case among the contemporary proposals of representation I am going to refer too, I will take 
substantive accounts as being reductive as well.  
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variant of an account of the means of representation would typically entail a type 
of work done on a case-by-case basis, and it might advance some kind of taxonomy 
of possible means of representation (Suárez 2010: 93; Frigg 2006). A normative 
variant of the problem of the means of representation would alternatively, or 
additionally, judge how different means are able to provide more or less accurate 
representations. Later in this thesis, I will argue that the two variants are 
important for the development of a comprehensive account of the means of 
representation, and expand on the original definition of means that Suárez (2003; 
2010) offered. 
Even though I will follow the distinction between R1 and R2 (or between 
the constituents and the means of representation) throughout this thesis, it is worth 
taking into account two considerations. First, when we adopt a practice-based 
perspective on the problem of representation, separating issues concerning the 
mere conditions for representation and issues concerning the epistemic success of 
representation is somewhat an imposed, analytical type of exercise, as practices of 
representing do not divorce these matters, but typically address them together. In 
other words, practices of representing directly aim at constructing successful 
enough representations of the target under investigation. Still, Suárez (2010) 
stresses, when conceptual analysis of the problem of representation is required, to 
make sense (among other issues) of the phenomenon of misrepresentation, “puzzles 
regarding the notion of representation are prior to and independent of issues of 
accuracy” (2010: 93). 
Second, if we incorporate the notion of epistemic representation into the 
debate, as for instance Contessa (2007b) and Bolinska (2013) do in their accounts, 
the distinction between R1 and R2 to some extent blurs, but, I believe, for justified 
reasons. Bolinska (2013) claims that “the concept of epistemic representation 
applies both to cases of mere and of faithful representation” (2013: 222). She seems 
to be conflating R1 (or the problem of mere representation) and R2 (or the problem 
of faithful representation), arguing that both are equally cases of epistemic 
representation. However, what is at stake here is that Bolinska (2013) is not really 
addressing the very general, abstract formulation of the constitutional question, or 
R1, in the terms in which Suárez (2003; 2010) defines it. She is concerned with 
actual uses of representations, which have to be in practice at least minimally 
accurate, or in her terms “minimally informative” about a target, to be able to allow 
scientists to perform inferences with them (2013: 226-7). She clarifies that we 
might perform false inferences using an epistemic representation. But it is difficult 
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to believe that with an epistemic representation, which in her definition is at least 
minimally informative, all inferences made are wrong (ibid.). The distinction 
between R1 and R2 blurs in Bolinska’s (2013) account because mere 
representations have to be at least minimally accurate or successful. 
Contessa (2007a) seems to follow the same line of argument. He rephrases 
questions R1 and R2 as three possible questions about representation: one 
concerning denotation, one concerning epistemic representation, and one concerning 
faithful epistemic representation (2007a: 52). Leaving the particularities of denotation 
aside, Contessa identifies epistemic representation with the problem of R1, and faithful 
epistemic representation with the problem of R2, as formulated by Suárez (2003). 
However, it seems that for Contessa (2007a: 52-53) epistemic representations 
require some degree of accuracy, in the sense that epistemic representations have 
to have the right kind of features to allow epistemic agents to perform (actually or 
potentially) surrogative inferences about a target with them. Like Bolinska (2013), 
Contessa (2007a) is also blurring the distinction between R1 and R2, due to the 
fact that he is not directly addressing the more abstract, constitutional question 
that seeks universal conditions for representation.  
A closely related discussion in the debate over scientific representation is 
whether R1 is in fact a relevant epistemological question that is worth addressing. 
We find, on the one hand, philosophers like Suárez (2015), van Fraassen (2008), 
and earlier on Hughes (1997), who explicitly reject the pertinence of searching for 
conditions of representation, and defend deflationary accounts of representation. 
On the other hand, philosophers like French (2003), French and Bueno (2011), and 
Frigg (2006) have argued in favour of the value of asking the constitutional 
question of representation.4 Deflationary accounts argue that we shouldn’t try to 
explain representation in terms of something more elementary than itself, such as 
denotation, similarity, or instantiation. At best, they claim, we can assert that a 
scientific representation is whatever is used as such by epistemic agents; and maybe 
also they would agree that scientific representations might typically have certain 
features in common.  
Van Fraassen (2008), whose work has noticeably transitioned into 
pragmatics recently, offers a Hauptsatz of representation in strong deflationary 
terms: “there is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, 
                                             
4 In a more recent version of Frigg’s (2006) account, Frigg and Nguyen (2016; 2017a) clarify that 
the problem they are addressing is in fact the problem of epistemic representation, and not exactly 
the problem of the constituents representation (R1) as formulated by Suárez (2003; 2010). 
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made, or taken, to represent some things as thus and so” (2008: 23). Introducing 
the term Hauptsatz in this context is precisely a way of avoiding the claim that he 
is offering a “definition” of representation, as definitions are normally close sets of 
necessary conditions, whereas van Fraassen is (merely) calling attention to the fact 
that the use made of representations is the only distinctive feature that they have 
in common. Suárez’s (2003; 2004; 2015) deflationary view is very close to van 
Fraassen’s (2008), especially in his version of deflationism, which he calls “use-
based” (2015: 45). A use-based deflationary account of representation identifies a 
representation essentially by the features of its use in practice; that is to say, it 
identifies the constituents of a representation with its means (Suárez 2015: 45).5 
Previous to these accounts, Hughes’s (1997) DDI account can be considered an 
early deflationary approach to the problem of representation.6 For Hughes (1997), 
even if it is problematic to search for conditions of representation, it is still possible 
to point out some general symptoms of scientific representation. The DDI account 
stands for denotation, demonstration and interpretation, the three main symptoms 
of scientific representation that Hughes’s (1997) identifies. He clarifies this point 
as follows: 
 
Let me forestall possible misunderstandings. I am not arguing that 
denotation, demonstration, and interpretation constitute a set of speech acts 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an act of theoretical 
representation to take place. I am making the more modest suggestion that, 
if we examine a theoretical model with these three activities in mind, we 
shall achieve some insight into the kind of representation that it provides 
(Hughes 1997: 329). 
 
Hughes (1997) depicts a situation in which we already accept something as a 
“theoretical model”. Hence, if we examine that model while having in mind the 
activities of denotation, demonstration, and interpretation, we can gain further 
insight into the kind of representation it is, namely a scientific representation. The 
three symptoms Hughes (1997) suggests should not be taken as jointly sufficient 
conditions for representation, but as the main activities involved in the production 
                                             
5 Meanwhile, the "no-theory" version of Suárez’s (2015) deflationary account claims that 
representation has no constituents, only means; that is, it accepts the possibility of pointing out 
general features of representation while refusing to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for 
it. Lastly, the "abstract minimalist" version of Suárez’s deflationary account postulates that 
representation is abstractly constituted by representational force and inferential capacity (ibid.: 45). 
6 In particular, Hughes’s (1997) deflationist position coincides with the "no-theory" version of 
deflationism that Suárez (2015) describes. 
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of scientific models. Notwithstanding, Suárez (2015: 43) is justified in arguing that, 
among the three activities that Hughes mentions, demonstration and 
interpretation are indeed terms commonly understood as activities performed by 
epistemic agents. This is not the case for denotation, which is usually taken as a 
substantive relation between a vehicle and a target, and not as an activity. Thus, 
we might want to question the strength of Hughes’s (1997) commitment to 
deflationism, despite his explicit rejection to offering conditions of representation. 
Or alternatively, we could reinterpret denotation in this context, as Suárez (ibid.: 
44) proposes, as “denotative function”. In this way, denotation will more clearly 
describe an activity performed by epistemic agents trying to establish that a model 
denotes a target, or using a vehicle as a denotative tool even when it doesn’t denote 
any specific target in the world (ibid.).  
I will not explicitly commit to a particular view in the debate of whether it 
is convenient or not to adopt a deflationary account of representation. The main 
reason for that is that I will concentrate on advancing an account of the means of 
representation, and not of the constituents of representation. Moreover, the 
specific account of the means of representation I will propose in Chapter 5, which 
adopts a perspective in philosophy of science in practice (PSP), could be in principle 
adopted by deflationary and by substantive accounts of representation. At any rate, 
I am especially sympathetic to the perspectives on representation that the 
aforementioned deflationary accounts endorse (Hughes 1997; van Fraassen 2008; 
Suárez 2015), given that they have helped shift much of the attention in philosophy 
of science from the problem of the constituents of representation to the (possibly 
more enlightening in epistemological terms) problem of how accurate or successful 
scientific representations are produced. In the next section, I will start to examine 
the role of similarity in scientific representation. I will specifically argue that 
similarity is not a good candidate to be a constituent of representation, despite 
various attempts to defend this idea in the recent literature in philosophy of science. 
Later, in Chapter 2, I will further contend that this is not a reason to reject 
similarity altogether, and advocate the possibility of investigating its role within 
an account of the means of representation. 
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1.3. Constituents of representation and similarity 
Considerations of similarity as a necessary and/or sufficient condition for 
representation concern, for reasons previously exposed, only substantive accounts 
of representation that attempt to respond to R1, and not deflationary accounts of 
representation. Some substantive accounts of representation, such as those of 
French (2003), French and Bueno (2011), and Bartels (2006), claim that similarity, 
or more specifically a version of structural similarity, is a constituent of 
representation. Other substantive accounts of representation, such as Frigg’s 
(2006), reject similarity in any form as a constituent of representation. Still other 
substantive accounts, such as Contessa’s (2007a; 2011), reject similarity as a 
constituent of representation but attempt to offer a general account of accurate 
representation based on similarity.  
I treat the case of Giere’s (2004, 2008, 2010) account as a special one. Giere 
has not always been completely clear about the exact role that similarity plays in 
his account of representation, although it visibly plays a fundamental role. He 
doesn’t explicitly consider the distinction between what I call R1 and R2, nor does 
he refer to the distinction between the constituents and the means of 
representation. Sometimes he seems to defend a substantive account of 
representation based on similarity, for which he has been repeatedly criticized (see 
Frigg 2006; Elgin 2010). An example of this is found when Giere claims that 
similarity is “the basic relationship between models and the world” (2010: 269). 
Some other times, however, Giere (2004) openly argues that similarity does not 
constitute the relation of representation: “I am not saying that the model itself 
represents an aspect of the world because it is similar to that aspect. There is no 
such representational relationship” (ibid: 747). Here, similarity is not taken as a 
condition of representation, but as a response to the problem of accurate 
representation or R2. I will assume from now on that the second position, that 
Giere (2004, 2008) more openly expresses, is the correct way of interpreting his 
account. Thus, I refer back to Giere’s views in Chapter 2, when I focus on 
similarity-based accounts of the means of representation. 
In the rest of this chapter, I address the various difficulties of attempting to 
respond to the constitutional question by alluding to the relation of similarity 
between a vehicle and a target. First, I discuss Goodman’s (1968; 1972) logical 
argument against similarity. Although Goodman doesn’t explicitly refer to 
morphisms or structural similarities, his argument applies to the project of 
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responding to R1 appealing to similarity in any form, including structural accounts 
like those of French (2003), French and Bueno (2011), and Bartels (2006). Second, 
I introduce the argument from misrepresentation to, again, cast doubts on 
substantive accounts of representation based on similarity or structural similarity. 
I conclude by claiming that the legitimate intuition that similarity is involved in 
representational practices should be addressed in the debate concerning the 
epistemic success or the means of representation. 
 
 
1.3.1 Goodman’s argument against similarity  
The argument against similarity presented by Goodman in Languages of Art (1968) 
and “Seven strictures of similarity” (1972) has been followed by numerous 
contemporary philosophers of science, such as van Fraassen (2008), Suárez (2003), 
Hughes (1997), Contessa (2007a), Frigg (2006), and Toon (2012) as a starting 
point to situate their own accounts of scientific representation. Goodman (1968) 
opens Languages of Art with this assertion:  
 
The most naïve view of representation might perhaps be put something like 
this: ‘A represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B’. Vestiges of 
this view, with assorted refinements, persist in most writing on 
representation. Yet more error could hardly be compressed into so short a 
formula (Goodman 1968: 3-4). 
 
The “most naïve view of representation” consists for Goodman in reducing 
representation to a relation of similarity. Which accounts is Goodman specifically 
reacting to here? There isn’t to my knowledge any account in modern aesthetics 
or philosophy of science that supports a purely naïve view of representation as 
defined by Goodman. That is, there are no accounts that sustain that similarity on 
its own is the necessary and sufficient condition for representation. Since Goodman 
(1968, 1972) doesn’t offer the names of his opponents, his argument should be 
taken more as a general criticism of all the watered-down or “vestiges of [the naïve 
view that], with assorted refinements, persist in most writing on representation” 
(1968: 3-4). A “watered-down or innocuous-looking” view of similarity would for 
instance be one that takes similarity to be the key to distinguish representation 
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from other types of symbolization (1968: 5-6).7 Goodman believes that both the 
naïve and the watered-down views are fundamentally mistaken. Vestiges of these 
views are found, among other places, in substantive accounts of representation 
based on similarity in philosophy of science, including those that sustain that 
structural similarity (homomorphism, partial isomorphism) is a necessary, and 
jointly with denotation, sufficient, condition for scientific representation (French 
2003; Bartels 2006). 
To reject these views, Goodman (1968) proposes the so-called ‘logical 
argument’ against accounts of representation based on similarity. The main claim 
of this argument is that similarity cannot constitute the relation of representation 
because while similarity entails symmetrical, reflexive and transitive relations, 
representation entails asymmetrical, non-reflexive and non-necessarily-transitive 
relations. A is as much like B as B is like A, Goodman (1968: 4) argues, but the fact 
that a painting represents the Duke of Wellington doesn’t imply that the Duke of 
Wellington represents the painting. Similarity is symmetrical, while 
representation is not. Likewise, an object resembles itself to the maximum degree 
but rarely represents itself; resemblance, unlike representation, is reflexive (ibid.). 
Also, if object A is similar to object B, and object B is similar to object C, we would 
claim that A and C are similar to each other as well. In contrast, if A represents B 
and B represents C, there is not necessarily a representational relation between A 
and C (ibid.: 4-5). For instance, Diego Velázquez’s Portrait of Innocent X (1650) was 
a representation of Pope Innocent X. There is also a series of canvases painted by 
Francis Bacon in 1953 under the title of Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope 
Innocent X, about which we would claim that they represented Velázquez’s 
painting. However, it would be inadequate to claim that Bacon’s painting 
represents Pope Innocent X (Suárez 2015: 449). Similarity entails transitivity 
relations while representation does not necessarily. The consequence of 
Goodman’s logical argument is that representation cannot be explained in terms 
of similarity.  
There are some accounts that have tried to undermine Goodman’s logical 
argument by claiming that similarity actually does not always entail symmetrical, 
reflexive and transitive relations. Tversky (1977), from the perspective of 
                                             
7 Goodman (1968: 4 n1) understands the term representation as “pictorial representation, 
depiction, and the comparable representation that may occur in the other arts”, such as paintings 
and sculptures. Symbolization is the term Goodman uses for all varieties of representation, 
including pictorial, but also verbal, and any other type of non-pictorial representation. 
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experimental psychology, argued that it is contentious to make such general claims 
about similarity without considering how individuals actually make judgments of 
similarity about everyday objects. To support this idea Tversky and Gati (1982) 
conducted various experiments in which a group of subjects judged similarity 
relations between countries, figures, letters and signals (Tversky 1977: 333-336; 
Tversky and Gati 1982). The results showed that experimental subjects would 
usually claim things like “an ellipse is similar to a circle”, but not “a circle is similar 
to an ellipse”, or they would say that “North Korea is like Red China” but not that 
“Red China is like North Korea” (Tversky 1977: 328). In other words, when 
looking at actual judgments, similarity does not necessarily involve symmetrical 
relations. Equivalent counterexamples were offered by Tversky (1977) to question 
the supposed transitivity of similarity. Experimental subjects would for instance 
claim that while Jamaica is similar to Cuba (because of geographical proximity) and 
Cuba is similar to Russia (because of their political affinity), Jamaica and Russia are 
not similar at all (1977: 329). Examples like this, Tversky argues, cast doubt on 
the general assertion that transitivity is a cornerstone of a definition of similarity 
(ibid.). 
Goodman (1968) must have been aware of potential counterexamples like 
these regarding the symmetry and transitivity of similarity. That is probably why 
instead of giving specific examples of symmetrical similarity relations, he uses the 
much more abstract, undefined expression “if A is similar to B, then B is similar to 
A…” (1968: 4), where A and B appear to be interchangeable for almost anything. 
But then, when Goodman describes the asymmetry of representation immediately 
afterward, he offers a real, concrete, and unambiguous example: “while a painting 
may represent the Duke of Wellington, the Duke doesn’t represent the painting” 
(1968: 4). If one substitutes the A and B in the first sentence for actual examples 
though, as Goodman does in the second sentence with the example of the Duke of 
Wellington, the claim that similarity is always symmetrical is much less 
convincing. That is, if he had claimed that if a painting is similar to the Duke of 
Wellington, then the Duke of Wellington is similar to the painting, we would have 
had at least suspicions about the claim that similarity always establishes 
symmetrical relation, as we usually recognise a portray as being similar to the 
person that is portrayed, but rarely do it the other way around.  
Apart from symmetry and transitivity, Goodman (1968) argues that 
similarity establishes reflexive relations, while representation doesn’t. It is more 
difficult to find counterexamples to this point based on how subjects make 
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judgments of similarity. Something always resembles itself to a maximum degree, 
even if we shift the discussion to how judgments are made in practice. In some 
exceptional circumstances, we might want to claim that a picture represents itself, 
such as in the celebrated case of the “built-in reflexivity of Las Meninas”, a painting 
that represents, among other things, the act of its being painted (Suárez 2003: 233; 
on the reflexivity of Las Meninas see Foucault 1973: 3-18). Still, we would have to 
admit that exceptions like this do not suspend the general claim that something is 
always similar to itself while it rarely represents itself. There have been, 
nonetheless, attempts to undermine Goodman’s argument concerning reflexivity. 
Dipert (1996), for instance, argues that if we redefine the concept of similarity we 
could avoid the objection from reflexivity (ibid.: 382). His alternative definition of 
similarity, which he takes as synonym of resemblance in his argument, goes as 
follows:  
 
X resembles Y [to extent N with respect to P] iff: 
(1) X shares [N properties of type P] with Y, and  
(2) X is a distinct entity from Y: X is neither identical to Y, nor is X a 
constituent of Y, nor is Y a constituent of X (Dipert 1996: 382). 
 
Adding (2) to the definition involves including a clause such that similarity –or 
resemblance – always concerns the relation between two different objects and not 
between an object and itself. In this way, the principle of reflexivity wouldn’t apply 
to the definition of similarity. However, we might want to reply that this is too ad 
hoc a strategy to get around the objection of reflexivity. Dipert (1996: 382) argues 
that actually the most common meaning of similarity involves different objects, 
not objects being similar to themselves: “if asked as an exercise to go out into the 
world and remark upon some ‘resemblances’ in the world, I would not fixate upon, 
or even offer, the many cases in which things resemble themselves” (1996: 382n). 
Dipert’s (1996) reply is again supported by common judgments of similarity 
subjects would make. But since his argument requires a redefinition of similarity, 
which is not firmly justified apart from helping to elude the problem of reflexivity, 
we shouldn’t consider it a conclusive response to Goodman’s logical argument with 
respect to reflexivity. The stronger discrepancy between similarity and 
representation concerning reflexivity has been pointed out by Suárez (2003). He 
claims that “any theory of similarity must concede this: similarity comprises 
identity; identity is a limiting case of similarity. Here representation and similarity 
definitely depart, for the vast majority of representations patently do not represent 
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themselves” (ibid.: 239). Even if we are convinced by Tversky’s (1977) argument 
on the asymmetry and intransitivity of similarity, the point about reflexivity 
should restrain us from endorsing the naïve view on representation that Goodman 
(1968) attacks. 
In recent philosophy of science, some accounts of representation have tried 
to respond to Goodman’s (1968) logical argument using a strategy similar to 
Tversky’s (1977). French and Bueno (2011), for instance, defend a substantive 
account of representation based on partial isomorphism – their version of 
structural similarity. Their claim is that, indeed, partial isomorphism entails 
symmetrical relations between the structures of the vehicle and the target of the 
representation, but, French and Bueno (2011) argue, this is not a problem for 
defining scientific representation in terms of partial isomorphism because, if we 
consider the domain in which the representational process takes place as a whole, 
other factors such as the intended use of the representation break the symmetry of 
the relation vehicle-target (2011: 885). Their argument consists in stressing that 
epistemic agents eliminate the in abstracto symmetrical relationship of similarity 
between vehicle and target when they define which objects are similar.8 There is, 
nonetheless, something suspicious with how French and Bueno (2011) insert the 
role of epistemic agents and the “domain in which the representational process 
takes places as a whole” into their account. Pragmatic elements such as the 
intended use of representation only break the symmetry of the isomorphism 
relation if they also constitute (or are built into) the relation of representation. 
However, for French and Bueno (2011) the partial isomorphism between a vehicle 
and a target is what really constitutes the relation of representation, while 
intentions, uses, and other pragmatic elements are only external factors 
surrounding the mechanism of representation (2011: 886). They explicitly affirm 
that “building particular intentions into the representational mechanism has 
disastrous consequences for an account of representation” (ibid.). Far from being 
disastrous, I will argue through Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis that there are good 
reasons to think that an account of representation should be in agreement with 
actual representational practices, by seriously considering the purposes, uses, 
                                             
8 Giere (2008, 2010) presented a very similar argument, claiming that if we take into consideration 
the agents doing the representing and their intentions, the problem of the symmetry of similarity 
disappears (2008: 103; 2010: 274). The fact that Giere (2008, 2010) is responding to Goodman’s 
(1968) logical argument is, at any rate, a sign that on certain occasions he seems to sustain a 
substantive account of representation based on similarity, since an account of the means of 
representation would not need to defend itself from the logical argument.   
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contexts, and pragmatic judgments involved in the stabilization of successful 
relations of representation. The difficulty with French and Bueno’s (2011) account 
lies in the lack of clarity about how the symmetry of the isomorphism relation 
between vehicle and target can be broken if pragmatic elements are only accidental 
to the representational mechanism. 
More successful is Bartels’s (2006) account in this respect. He openly 
accepts Goodman’s (1968) criticism of similarity, and agrees that similarity lacks 
the logical properties to explain representation. But his account of homomorphism, 
Bartels (2006: 10-11) adds, is immune to such criticism since it incorporates a 
distinction between the reference and the content of a representation. The content is 
what should be explained in terms of similarity (homomorphism in his view), while 
the reference is independent from, and not explainable in terms of, similarity (2006: 
13-14). Both reference and content are requisites for representation: therefore 
Bartels is not adopting the naïve view that reduces the relation of representation 
to a relation of similarity. The important point is that homomorphism is a relation 
that occurs when the content of a vehicle entails a target, so homomorphism can 
only occur once the vehicle in question refers to the target thanks to a 
representational mechanism (2006: 13-14). That is to say, homomorphism does not 
involve a symmetrical relation between the structure of a vehicle and the structure 
of a target, because denotation, which goes only in one direction, from vehicle to 
target, is a prerequisite for homomorphism.  
Some limitations in Bartels’s (2006) account can be pointed out though. So 
far, I am treating accounts based on structural similarity (homomorphism, partial 
isomorphism) as particular cases of accounts based on similarity, and I argued that 
Goodman’s logical argument applies to all of them. Yet, Bartels (2006: 17) 
explicitly differentiates between his characterization of the concept of 
homomorphism and the concept of similarity that Goodman (1968) uses and 
criticizes. However, there is a sense in which, even if homomorphism does not 
entail symmetrical relations as Bartels argues, if A is homomorphic to B, then A 
and B have some structure in common, and are thus similar in that respect 
(Chakravartty 2010b: 199n). So Bartels would be somehow missing the point with 
his categorical distinction between similarity and homomorphism (ibid.). In 
addition, Bartels (2006) is not convincing when responding to the problem of 
reflexivity. He tries to defend that if we distinguish between potential and actual 
representations, the problem of reflexivity is not fatal (2006: 11). Homomorphism 
would only be reflexive in an in abstracto or potential representation, whereas in 
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actual representations, homomorphism would be non-reflexive, as it would 
concern the relation between two objects, a vehicle and a target. It remains to be 
seen if the distinction between potential and actual representation can offer a 
definitive solution to the problem, as the logical argument presented by Goodman 
(1968) principally concerns the analytic, conceptual definitions of representation 
and similarity in a potential or abstract sphere.   
At any rate, Goodman (1968, 1972) would have not accepted the type of 
refinement of the naïve view of representation that philosophers like Bartels (2006) 
propose. The reason for this goes beyond his logical argument against similarity. 
Even if one acknowledges the distinction between the content and the reference of 
a representation, as Bartels claims, we still need to know in what respect the 
content of a representation would be similar to the target. And, Goodman (1972) 
argues, 
 
When, in general, are two things similar? […] since every two things have 
some property in common, this will make similarity a universal hence 
useless relation. That a given two things are similar will hardly be notable 
news if there are no two things that are not similar. (Goodman 1972: 443) 
 
Anything can be similar to anything else in at least some respects. Therefore, if 
true, it would be trivial to consider similarity a necessary condition for 
representation. This difficulty appears unsolvable for Goodman, and philosophers 
like Bartels (2006) don’t offer explicit answers to it. Goodman (1972) is open to 
recognizing that some people may want to shift the discussion “from a categorical 
to a comparative formula” (Goodman 1972: 443). That is, they might want to say 
that even if it is useless to plainly say that two things are similar to each other, 
they can focus on the number of properties those things share, and on the 
importance of the properties they share, to claim that some objects are more similar 
to each other than other objects. This solution is for Goodman (1972) not 
satisfying either, insofar as determining the number of common properties and 
defining importance are “highly volatile matters” (ibid.: 443). I will come back to 
the issue of the importance of some similarities with respect to others, and to the 
problem of the “high volatility” of importance in Chapter 2, when I refer to the 
“argument from vagueness” against similarity and to Giere’s (2004, 2008) account 
of “similarity in respects and degrees”, which has been frequently criticized for its 
volatility or imprecision.  
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 I have tried to show that Tversky (1977), Dipert (1996), French and Bueno 
(2011), and Bartels (2006), among others, have advanced some noteworthy ideas 
in response to Goodman’s (1968, 1972) argument against similarity. Still, 
Goodman’s criticisms remain strong enough to prevent us from proposing a 
substantive account of representation based on similarity in the naïve version, but 
probably also in its watered-down, refined versions. Goodman (1968) was 
primarily trying to dispute analytical attempts to offer universal explanations of 
representation based on similarity. So the fact that practical judgments of 
similarity are not always symmetrical or transitive doesn’t really challenge the 
core of his criticism, since the move to judgments can be taken as a refocusing of 
the problems of representation and similarity more than as a solution. In addition, 
Goodman’s (1968) argument concerning reflexivity hasn’t been properly contested 
so far. We saw that Dipert’s (1996) and Bartels’s (2006) attempts to respond to it 
were not completely convincing, while French and Bueno (2011) didn’t address it 
directly. In short, trying to reduce the relation of representation to a more basic 
relation of similarity or structural similarity between a vehicle and a target hasn’t 
been very successful so far.  
Before concluding this subsection, I would like to point out two further 
lessons that Goodman’s work, especially Languages of Art (1968), can teach us 
about how to address the problem of representation, beyond his logical argument 
against similarity. The first is that we should reject the project of advancing a ‘copy 
theory of representation’ that assumes that representing is attempting to imitate 
reality. Copy theories involve the assumption that there is a clear, unambiguous 
reality to be imitated by our representations. To this, Goodman (1968) replies: 
 
The object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a 
fiddler, a friend, a fool, and much more. […] If all are ways the object is, 
then none is the way the object is […] What I am to copy then, it seems, is 
one such aspect, one of the ways the object is or looks. (Goodman 1968: 6)  
 
There is something suspicious with the very idea of copying, if copying an object 
can mean many different things. The copy theory of representation is undermined 
by its inability to specify what is to be copied (1968: 8). Moreover, there is no such 
a thing as an aseptic and innocent eye that can copy things objectively. How the 
eye sees and also what it sees is “regulated by need and prejudice. It selects, rejects, 
organizes, discriminates” (Goodman 1968: 7-8; see also Gombrich 1960). This first 
lesson does not only apply to substantive accounts of representation based on 
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similarity, but also to accounts of the means of representation that, like the one I 
aim to develop throughout this thesis, resort to the notion of similarity to explicate 
characterize the production of a series of epistemically successful representations 
in science. In Chapter 5 I propose the creative similarity account of the means of 
representation, which explicitly rejects the association of the concepts of 
representation and similarity with an attempt to “copy” or “imitate” nature. The 
creative similarity account is much closer to the spirit of Goodman’s account when 
he claims that representing an object is not copying but achieving a construal or 
interpretation (1968: 8). 
The second important lesson that Goodman’s (1968) work offers to the 
study of representation is the idea that representation always takes place in 
standardized systems of practices, which involve systems of symbols too. Goodman 
(1968) affirmed that “nothing is intrinsically a representation”, insofar as the status 
of something as a representation is relative to a symbol system (1968: 226). The 
evaluation of how correct a representation is depends upon how it relates to other 
symbols in the system it belongs to and to how it conveys information according 
to the rules of the system. In turn, the level of standardization of a symbol system 
in a historical moment will affect how subjects read representations in the system 
(1968: 38). In this context Goodman emphasizes that “we must beware of 
supposing that similarity constitutes any firm, invariant criterion of realism; for 
similarity is relative, variable, culture-dependent” (1972: 438). Even if Goodman 
made this claim to question the objectivity of the notion of similarity, I believe we 
can take it as a positive instance to develop an account of representation. A good 
starting point for an account of the means of representation focused on similarity 
is the definition of similarity as variable, culture-dependent, and closely related to 
how norms, standards, and social and symbolic conventions are recognised within 
systems of practice. Although the specific account of the means of representation 
that I will propose is focused on similarity, or more specifically on “creative 
similarity”, I will refer to the possibility of advancing various possible accounts of 
successful representation, focused for instance on convention, symbolization, or 
exemplification. These various accounts could complement and enrich each other 
regarding the general problem of how successful representations that afford 
understanding of the world are produced in science. 
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1.3.2 The argument from misrepresentation 
The other main argument against substantive accounts of representation based on 
similarity concerns misrepresentation. Scientific models idealize, abstract, simplify, 
and generalize to some extent the target systems they aim to represent. For the 
sake of simplicity, I will refer to all these features of scientific models (idealization, 
abstraction, simplification, generalization) as different types of distortions, and use 
the term misrepresentation to describe how distorted models represent their target 
systems. The claim that all models misrepresent their target to some extent should 
not be at odds with the claim that they are representations of that target. In other 
words, there is “no reason for fearing that the merely approximate status of a model 
impugns its capacity to represent” (Callender and Cohen 2006: 79): a 
misrepresentation is not the same as a non-representation (Frigg and Nguyen 
2016).  
If this is correct, an account of representation must be able to cope with the 
possibility of models to misrepresent, as all (or at least many) representations are 
in practice misrepresentations. A theory that makes “the phenomenon of 
misrepresentation mysterious or impossible must be inadequate” (Frigg 2006: 51). 
Such a theory, I would add, must also be able to explain the valuable epistemic role 
that many distortions play in scientific models. That is, an account of 
representation should not only accommodate the fact that models represent despite 
distorting. It should also be able to elucidate why distortions, which are frequently 
intentional, systematic, purposeful, and not errors to be corrected, are important 
components of the epistemic success of models. I will mention issues concerning 
the epistemic value of distortions in Chapters 3 to 5. In the rest of this section, I 
focus on the more general challenge of accounting for the phenomenon of 
misrepresentation in substantive accounts of representation based on similarity or 
structural similarity (such as those of French 2003; French and Bueno 2011; 
Bartels 2006). 
Isomorphism as a necessary condition for representation patently cannot 
accommodate the phenomenon of misrepresentation. Isomorphism requires a one-
to-one matching of elements, properties, and relations between vehicle and target. 
If we include isomorphism as a condition for something to be a representation, the 
only possibility of obtaining a representation would be to obtain a perfectly 
accurate representation. But most (or all) representations are not perfectly 
accurate. Thus, an account of representation that includes isomorphism as a 
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necessary condition will have to say that all cases of misrepresentation are cases of 
non-representation. No-one in the recent debate in philosophy of science seems to 
consider isomorphism the type of morphism that exists between models and target 
systems. The question is whether weaker versions (i.e. partial isomorphism, 
homomorphism) successfully respond to the argument from misrepresentation. 
French and Bueno (2011) have rejected the identification of their own proposal 
with isomorphism: 
 
[W]e are being tarred with the same brush as those who advocate 
isomorphisms despite our protests that our account is different in precisely 
this respect. With the introduction of partial isomorphism and 
homomorphism, no requirement is made that the structures that are used 
to represent other structures do so with perfect accuracy. (French and 
Bueno 2011: 888) 
 
The concept of partial isomorphism is suggested as an alternative to isomorphism 
that could successfully address the problem of misrepresentation (see also French 
2003; and French and Ladyman 1999). Partial isomorphism doesn’t require the 
total matching of properties and relations between vehicle and target, but only 
some degree of morphism. The question that follows is: what degree of morphism 
is required in this account to obtain a representation (not an accurate 
representation)? In other words, how partial must the partial isomorphism be? 
French and Ladyman (1999), French (2003), or French and Bueno (2011) don ’t 
offer much guidance on how to respond to this questions. One could assume that 
we need a very partial isomorphism to consider something a representation. One 
could alternatively assume that we need a high degree of accuracy in the matching 
to say that there is partial isomorphism between a vehicle and a target and hence 
that the vehicle is a representation of a target. Or one could assume that the 
requirement is open, and that any partial isomorphism is enough to obtain a 
representation, no matter how partial it is. The response we give is important 
because the separation between non-representation and misrepresentation depends 
on it. The third response is not feasible, however. Anything could be isomorphic 
to anything else to a minimal degree, just as Goodman (1968) claimed that 
anything is similar to anything else in at least one respect (assuming that structural 
similarity is a form of similarity, being isomorphism the identity limit of similarity 
of structure). If any partial isomorphism is valid to establish representation, then 
the requirement of partial isomorphism is trivial, in the sense that anything would 
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be at least minimally isomorphic to anything else. So there would be no way of 
distinguishing between a misrepresentation and a non-representation, all of them 
minimally isomorphic to a target in some way.   
As pointed out earlier, French and Bueno (2011: 886) explicitly reject that 
intentions and other pragmatic issues could be built into the relation of 
representation. So appealing to the subjects and their intentions wouldn’t be a way 
for them to define what a relevant partial isomorphism is to distinguish between a 
misrepresentation and a non-representation. What constitutes the relation of 
representation for them is the existing partial isomorphism between a vehicle and 
a target, which is already “there”, in the two objects of the representation. This 
attitude is illustrated in the following example from French (2003): 
 
Consider the […] case of the sea and wind carving the Lorentz 
transformations into the sand. Are we going to […] insist that such 
markings do not represent relativistic phenomena of some sort because the 
relevant intention is absent? […] we do not take the causal provenance of 
the markings themselves as having any bearing on the constitution of the 
theory as an object. The theory is ‘‘there’’ in the sand. (French 2003: 1473)  
 
If the relation of partial isomorphism is “there” already, recognizable in vehicle and 
target, in the markings on the sand and the Lorentz transformations, then subjects 
and intentions do not help define what a relevant partial isomorphism is. To make 
sense of partial isomorphism in French’s (2003) account, and to be able to claim 
that a representation of the Lorentz transformations is ‘there’ in the markings 
carved by the wind on the sand, we would expect the concept of partial 
isomorphism to demand a relatively high level of partiality of the morphism. That 
is, we would expect more than a minimal requirement of partial isomorphism. So 
the option has to be either the first (a low degree of partial isomorphism), the 
second (a high degree of accuracy in matching), or something else along the 
continuum. How do we decide where to we draw the line to distinguish between a 
non-representation and a misrepresentation?9 The question is in itself conflating 
the problem of representation (R1) with the problem of accurate or successful 
representation (R2). The conflation of R1 and R2 does not benefit French’s (2003) 
and French and Bueno’s (2011) accounts, since accuracy comes in degrees while 
something is either a representation or it is not. They would need to account for 
                                             
9 Also, an equivalent question would apply to how we draw a line between misrepresentation and 
representation, but we can concede that this is a less problematic question.  
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the phenomenon of misrepresentation by drawing a line between the cases where 
the level of partial isomorphism is good enough to consider something a 
misrepresentation (or representation) of a target, and the cases where the level of 
partial isomorphism is too low to consider something a representation (or 
misrepresentation) of a target. The latter would be cases of non-representation. In 
the absence of that line, and given the rejection of subjects’ intentions as 
constitutive of the relation of representation, it is not possible to claim that partial 
isomorphism is a good candidate for constituting representation.10 
 Substantive accounts of representation based on homomorphism (in 
Bartels’s [2006] version) are more successful at facing the challenges from 
misrepresentation. Bartels distinguishes, as I already mentioned, between the 
reference and the content of a representation (2006: 13-14). This distinction, he 
claims, is key to accommodate misrepresentation. Homomorphism is a relation that 
occurs when the content of a vehicle entails a target, and reference is a relation 
established between vehicle and target via a representational mechanism 
previously established by a relation of homomorphism (2006: 13-14). In this way, 
 
The homomorphism theory does not have problems to allow for 
misrepresentation. If B represents A, then B refers to A. There is also a 
content of that representation which is not necessarily identical with its 
reference. B misrepresents A just in case B refers to A but the 
representational content does not entail A. Intuitively this means that B is 
about A, but does not match A in what it says about A. Problems with 
misrepresentation arise because some theories of representation do not have 
the resources to identify reference and content independently. (Bartels 
2006: 13) 
 
A case of misrepresentation is in Bartels’s (2006) view simply a case in which a 
vehicle refers to a target, without homomorphism involved. Reference is the only 
necessary condition for misrepresentation. A case of representation, however, is 
one in which a vehicle refers to a target and the content of that vehicle entails the 
target. Bartels’s (2006) strategy gives us more resources than accounts based on 
isomorphism or partial isomorphism to account for cases of scientific models that 
distort their targets. But it is still not successful though. I mentioned earlier that 
                                             
10 More elaborate arguments against partial isomorphism, but compatible with that just 
presented, have been offered by Suárez (2003), Contessa (2007a), and Frigg (2006). A response to 
their critics regarding the problem of misrepresentation can be found in French and Bueno (2011: 
889). 
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in different degrees, respects, and modes, all representations are 
misrepresentations. Even our most correct examples of scientific models entail a 
narrow selection of features of the target systems. In some cases, misrepresentation 
also implies significant inaccuracy of (that narrow selection of) features; in others, 
misrepresentation implies inclusion of undesired errors. There can be different 
types of distortions involved too. For Suárez and Pero (2016: 3), abstraction would 
be the type of distortion that involves neglecting some of the features of the target 
system; pretence is a distortion that involves ascribing to the target system features 
it does not possess; and simulation involves both abstraction and pretence. Bartels 
(2006) characterizes cases of misrepresentation as those where the only necessary 
condition is that a vehicle refers to the target, while in the rest of cases, which are 
cases of representation, the vehicle needs to both refer to and be homomorphic to 
the target (2006: 13). But if it is difficult to point to representations that do not 
distort their targets in one way or another, then Bartels’s account would be saying 
that all cases of representation would only require reference (and not 
homomorphism) as a necessary condition. This is clearly not what Bartels is 
attempting to argue. Otherwise, what role would homomorphism be playing in his 
account?  
Without making the strong claim that all representations are cases of 
misrepresentation, as I did above, Suárez and Pero (2016) offer an equivalent 
argument to Bartels’s (2006) way of addressing the problem of misrepresentation: 
 
The issue here is […] whether homomorphism is doing much work in this 
account, as it seems that the morphism is not a necessary condition for 
representation in cases of misrepresentation. Reference only is what is 
establishing the misrepresentation relation. (Suárez and Pero 2016: 17) 
 
The best way to make sense of Bartels’s (2006) argument is to assume that with 
misrepresentation he is thinking about cases of flagrant erroneous representations, 
and not what I assumed above when I claimed that all models are 
misrepresentations in one way or another. In other words, Bartels (2006) seems to 
be treating misrepresentation as exceptional cases among the majority of scientific 
representations. It is implicit in the way he presents his argument that significantly 
erroneous models would be described as misrepresentations and not non-
representations, while other cases of relatively accurate models would be cases of 
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representation (and not misrepresentation or non-representation).11 What 
distinguishes a misrepresentation from a non-representation is that the former 
refers to a target, while the latter does not. Homomorphism is not involved in 
misrepresentation in Bartels’s (2006) account, which is a somewhat unsatisfactory 
way of dealing with the problem of misrepresentation from the perspective of a 
homomorphism account of representation. To use Suárez and Pero’s (2016) words: 
“Bartels does claim that homomorphism is necessary for representation or 
misrepresentation alike, yet his actual discussion of the role played by the 
representational mechanism seems prima facie to belie this claim”. In conclusion, 
following Bartels (2006), we can keep either homomorphism or misrepresentation 
in the very same account, but not both at the same time.  
A broader note on how misrepresentation is understood in accounts of 
representation might be worth considering. Almost all philosophers of science 
seem to agree that a theory of representation must accommodate (if not explain) 
misrepresentation. However, the specific reasons for why this should be the case 
are not completely the same across different accounts. Is it because representing is 
in practice a synonym for misrepresenting? Is it because some models occasionally 
contain errors and shortcomings that we should account for? The first option has 
stronger epistemological implications than the second (and includes the second). 
We have seen that, in the case of Bartels’s (2006) account, the adoption of one 
characterization of misrepresentation or another has consequences for the strength 
on the overall argument. Bartels’s (2006) homomorphism account is more robust 
if we adopt a characterization of misrepresentation as models containing occasional 
mistakes, than if we adopt the conception that all models in practice misrepresent.  
Another example in the literature where different characterizations of 
misrepresentation are at stake is found in Frigg (2006; 2010). In Frigg (2010), 
misrepresentation seems to be an issue that mainly concerns occasional (even 
unintentional) errors in representations. He gives the example of cartographers 
constructing a map and failing to correctly connect some of the dots and lines as a 
customary example of misrepresentation (2010: 129-130). Meanwhile, in Frigg 
(2006), the idea of misrepresentation has much broader implications. He claims: 
“misrepresentation is common in science. Some cases of misrepresentation are 
                                             
11 Suárez and Pero (2016) have analysed Bartels’s (2006) proposal in detail to finally conclude that 
he is unsuccessful at accommodating misrepresentation, even if understood in this way. They 
claim that Bartels (2006) can cope with some forms of misrepresentation like mistargeting and 
pretence, but not with others like abstraction. The full argument can be found in Suárez and Pero 
(2016: 14-17), and earlier versions of it in Suárez (2003: 240). 
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plain mistakes (e.g. ether models). But not all misrepresentations involve error. 
Many models are based on idealising assumptions of which we know that they are 
false” (2006: 51). In this case, misrepresentation is understood as widespread in 
science, not necessarily as the consequence of errors or limitations, but also as 
facilitating the construction of more explanatory models (through the exploitation 
of idealizations, generalizations, abstractions). My view is closer to the idea that 
all scientific models both involuntarily and purposely misrepresent, as will become 
clearer in Chapters 3 to 5 when discussing actual practices of representing. For the 
particular goals pursued in representational practice, idealizing, generalizing, and 
including other forms of distortion can be important resources to improve the 
fruitfulness of a scientific model.  
Analysis of some of the most well-known attempts to offer a substantive 
account of representation based on similarity, French’s (2003) and French and 
Bueno’s (2011) partial isomorphism accounts, and Bartels’s (2006) homomorphism 
account, has shown that they are not successful at accommodating the 
phenomenon of misrepresentation in a satisfactory way. The proposals I have 
discussed specifically adopt structural conceptions of similarity (partial 
isomorphism, homomorphism), which I have treated as particular cases of 
similarity-based accounts. It remains to be seen if an alternative account, based on 
a non-structural understanding of similarity, would be more successful in the 
endeavour of addressing the argument from misrepresentation. Giere’s (2004, 
2008, 2010) account has been commonly treated as an example of this type of 
proposal, as he adopts an intuitive understanding of similarity, closer to how we 
use the concept of similarity in everyday language. However, as I pointed out at 
the beginning, Giere (2004, 2008, 2010) is not really proposing a substantive 
account of representation based on similarity. A closer look at his strategy reveals 
that the role of similarity has shifted in his account, from responding to R1 to 
responding to R2 (Frigg and Nguyen 2016). In the process of facing the challenge 
of misrepresentation, Giere (2010) endorses an intentional account of 
representation, where similarities are defined by the epistemic agents of the 
practice. Thus, I will discuss Giere’s (2004, 2008, 2010) work in more detail in 
Chapter 2.  
From the two arguments presented in this section, Goodman’s (1968; 1972) 
logical argument against similarity, and the argument from misrepresentation, we 
should conclude that substantive accounts of representation should not be based 
on similarity. I remain neutral about what other elements or features would be 
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good candidates to support a substantive account of representation, or whether it 
would be adequate to adopt a deflationary view on scientific representation. The 
main point to emphasize is that rejecting similarity as constituent of representation 
doesn’t automatically mean that we should disregard the possible role of similarity 
in scientific representations. In the next chapter I will argue that the role of 
similarity can be satisfactorily incorporated into an account of the means of 
representation.  
 
 
1. 4. Conclusions 
In this first chapter, I distinguished between two questions contained in the so-
called problem of scientific representation: the question about the constituents and 
the question about the means of representation (following Suárez 2003; 2010; van 
Fraassen 2008). The question about the constituents can be formulated as “in 
virtue of what is something, a vehicle, a scientific representation of something else, 
a target?”, and it demands a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Meanwhile, 
the question about the means can be formulated as “in virtue of what is something, 
a vehicle, an accurate or successful scientific representation of something else, a 
target?” and, following accounts like those of Suárez (2010) and Frigg (2006), it 
demands a more practical type of enquiry into the problem of representation. 
Without the distinction between the two questions, it would be difficult to make 
sense of the claim that something can be an “inaccurate” or “unsuccessful” 
representation.  
Then, I developed a specific examination of the question concerning the 
constituents of representation, and the possibility of considering similarity a 
constituent of the relation of representation. My own view was located in 
opposition to substantive accounts of representation based on similarity, such as 
those of French (2006), French and Bueno (2011), and Bartels (2006), who 
specifically sustain structural version of similarity. The arguments presented to 
show why it is ultimately problematic to consider similarity a constituent of 
representation were Goodman’s (1968, 1972) logical argument against similarity 
and the argument from misrepresentation. In Chapter 2, I will start building the 
premises to defend the idea that similarity can be, on the contrary, satisfactorily 
incorporated into an account of the means of representation.  
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Similarity as Means of Representation 
Chapter 2: Similarity as Means of 
Representation 
 
In Chapter 1, I presented some common criticisms of the idea of similarity as an 
answer to the question of what constitutes representation. I also suggested that 
these criticisms are not a reason to abandon similarity altogether. In this chapter, 
I explore some positions that have been instrumental in rehabilitating the role of 
similarity in connection to the problem of the epistemic success of representation 
(Suárez 2003, 2010; Contessa 2007a, 2011; Giere 2004, 2006; van Fraassen 2008). 
The starting point of these positions is the intuition that, despite not exhausting 
the relation of representation, similarity still plays a role in a broad range of 
modelling practices. Many philosophers and non-philosophers alike would 
probably agree that an orrery representing the solar system is similar in some 
relevant respects to the actual solar system; that a computer simulation of the 
development of a tornado is similar in a pertinent way to the advancement of a real 
tornado; that model organisms like NOD mice (non-obese diabetic mice) are 
relevantly similar to humans with respect to how type 1 diabetes develops; or that 
a hydraulic model of a river shares important similarities with the river represented 
(Maki 2009; Parker 2009; Pincock 2012; Ankeny 2001; Weisberg 2013). I believe 
that we should not disregard these intuitions, usually originating in the 
observation of practitioners’ work with models, but consider them seriously when 
tackling the arguments against the involvement of similarity in the construction 
of successful scientific representation. 
It might be the case that some philosophers of science claim that they don’t 
actually have the intuition that relevant similarities are involved in an orrery 
representing the solar system, a computer simulation representing a tornado, or a 
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model organism representing a human illness. There is not much that could 
convince them otherwise. Perhaps closer acquaintance with highly abstract or 
mathematical models prevents them from recognizing (literally or in a stronger 
epistemological sense) the visual, functional, and dynamic similarities that other 
philosophers patently see in many scientific representations. I will not focus on 
practices of representing that involve purely mathematical models in this thesis, 
but even in those cases, there are accounts that have defended the idea that the 
epistemic success of highly abstract and mathematical models can also be 
characterized appealing to the role of structural similarities (van Fraassen 2008; 
Contessa 2011; Pincock 2012). The methodology proposed in Chapter 3 and 
illustrated with a case study in Chapter 4 could be also extended to the analysis of 
cases where mathematical models are the object of study.  
The position that Frigg and Nguyen (2017a) maintain, for instance, of 
rebutting the role of similarity in representation, is not meant to apply exclusively 
to cases of highly abstract or mathematical models. They also attempt to describe 
types of representation traditionally characterized as appealing to the role of 
similarity (such as maps or analogical models) in a way that principally invokes 
conventions and avoids references to similarity, structural or otherwise. I take 
accounts like this to be insightful to the extent that they help advance a better 
understanding of how systems of symbols participate in scientific practices, in the 
tradition of Goodman’s (1968) work. However, avoiding references to similarity at 
all costs can be highly counterintuitive to explain how representations like maps 
or analogical models are in practice constructed and how they afford 
understanding of the targets represented. In Chapter 3 I argue that in numerous 
practices of representing, judgments of similarity indeed play a role in the 
construction of fruitful scientific models. Then, in Chapters 5, I defend that if 
similarity is adequately characterized to fit those actual uses of judgments of 
similarity in practice, it is then a useful notion to explicate the epistemic success of 
a relevant set of representational practices in science. If this argument is correct, I 
will be offering good reasons to resist the general rebuttal of the role of similarity 
in representation, and defining specific limits to characterize its exact role in 
modelling practices.  
The previous chapter concluded with the claim that similarity should not 
be considered a constituent of the relation of representation. This conclusion didn’t 
entail that similarity is irrelevant for representation, however. Even Goodman 
(1968; 1972) recognizes that similarity “has its place and its uses, but is more often 
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found where it does not belong, professing powers it does not possess” (1972: 437). 
One place where “it does not belong” seems to be a substantive account of 
representation, but one of the “places and uses” where the value of similarity can 
be rehabilitated is as means of representation. I have claimed that the “means” 
concern the epistemic success or accuracy of scientific representations. Now a more 
precise characterization of the means of representation is required. In its original 
definition, Suárez (2003; 2010; 2015) defines the means as follows: 
 
Means: For any source–target pair (S, T) at a given time and in a given 
context: R’ is the means of the representation of T by S if some user of the 
model employs R’ (at that time and in that context) to draw inferences about 
T from S (Suárez 2010: 93). 
 
In this definition of means, there is no mention of the accuracy or epistemic success 
of representation, but this is implied. The means are defined as the context-
dependent relation that, at a given time, is actively employed by the users or 
epistemic agents of the representational practice to draw inferences about a target 
(ibid.: 93). The difference with the constituents is clear, as the constituents are 
unique and universal relations between two objects, a vehicle and a target, while 
the means are the relations actively employed in particular circumstances. The 
problem of the means concerns the accuracy or epistemic success of representation, 
because practices of representing are practices of trying to construct epistemically 
successful models with which to perform epistemically successful inferences. 
Possible means of representation are, following Suárez (2003: 229), similarity, 
isomorphism, exemplification, and convention. We need a practical type of enquiry 
to study the means of representation, since it is in particular practices that we can 
observe how agents actively employ relations between vehicles and targets to 
make inferences about the latter (ibid.). Moreover, a scientific model obtained at 
the end of  a practice might not manifest its means of  representation conspicuously. 
A careful study of  representational practices is necessary to discern, and in some 
cases unravel, what the means of  representation are and how they function. As 
Suárez (2003: 229) points out, “the means of  representation are not exactly 
transparent: no source wears its means of  representation ‘on its sleeve’. In many 
cases the actual means of  a representation may be opaque to the uninitiated”. In 
Chapter 5, I will suggest that the definition of means, as originally proposed by 
Suárez (2003), should be expanded further: in order to identify the relations that 
agents actively employ to make inferences about a target, we have to pay attention 
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to the resources used throughout the practice of representing that will define what 
particular relations are employed at the end of the practice to make inferences 
about that target.  
The project of attempting to develop an account of the means of 
representation is probably messier and slipperier than characterizing the 
constituents of representation, precisely because studying the means requires 
thorough attention to actual practices where those means are employed. And 
practices are inherently intricate, complex, difficult to grasp from a single 
viewpoint. I take this to be an important challenge of the project of advancing 
specific accounts of the means of representation, including one focused on 
similarity like the one I attempt to advance. Nonetheless, this does not make the 
attempt worthless. Although messier, an account of the means of representation 
could be more insightful epistemologically than an account of the constituents of 
representation. There is a sense in which the conditions for representation “come 
cheap”, as it doesn’t take much for someone to adopt an interpretation of a vehicle 
in terms of the target (Contessa 2007a: 127).12 What does not “come cheap” and 
deserves a well-developed enquiry is the problem of how accurate or epistemically 
successful models can be obtained (ibid.). Philosophers of science like Frigg (2006) 
and French (2003) would most probably disagree with this claim, as they engage 
with the task of identifying what the constituents of representation are. But others, 
especially proponents of deflationary views of representation, would certainly 
agree. For deflationary views, the main work that needs to be done with regards 
to the problem of representation is the characterization of the means that render 
representations epistemically successful. Chapters 3 and 4 will attempt to develop 
a practical type of enquiry on the role of similarity in representation. I specifically 
suggest that such an enquiry should be framed within the projects of PSP 
(Philosophy of Science in Practice) or iHPS (integrated History and Philosophy of 
Science). From there, I will extract some conclusions to give support to a particular 
account of the means of representation in Chapter 5.  
The kind of general claim that an account of the means of representation 
focused on similarity would want to make could have the following forms: “the 
similarity between a vehicle and a target is what distinguishes a representation 
from a faithful representation” (this is approximately what Contessa 2007a argues); 
                                             
12 Interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target, together with denotation, are for Contessa the 
necessary conditions for representation (2007a: 127). 
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or “the most important way scientists use models to successfully represent aspects 
of the world is by exploiting similarities between them” (approximately what Giere 
2004 argues); or “similarity is the relation actively employed by epistemic agents 
to make inferences about a target from a vehicle” (this is Suárez’s formulation in 
2003, 2010).13 In Chapter 5 I will discuss in detail what type of claim the account 
that I propose, the creative similarity account of the means of representation, specifically 
makes. But, to advance some important ideas, the creative similarity account seeks to 
have a restricted scope: that is, it neither makes a universal claim about similarity 
being the means of representation in all cases of successful representation, nor does 
it make a very limited claim about similarity being the means of representation in 
one or two specific cases of representation. It commits to some level of generality, 
as it tries to offer insight about various representational practices, and proposes to 
explore further practices using the creative similarity account as a framework. But it 
also recognizes that there might be a plurality of means of representation that 
allow us to construct successful representations in different modelling practices.  
In any case, affirming that the notion of similarity can help address the 
problem of the epistemic success of representation has generated opposed 
responses in the debate in philosophy of science. The challenges that an account of 
successful representation focused on similarity faces are different from the 
challenges that a substantive account of representation based on similarity faces. 
In Section 2.1 I discuss the three main opposing responses to the idea that 
similarity is the means of representation: the argument from variety, the argument 
from vagueness, and the argument from misrepresentation against the means (that 
is, a second version of the argument from misrepresentation presented in Chapter 
1). I conclude that none of these arguments is decisive enough to reject the 
possibility of advancing an account of the means of representation focused on 
similarity, provided that the notion of similarity is adequately characterized. Then, 
in Section 2.2, I explore the most constructive attempts in philosophy of science to 
discuss similarity in the context of advancing an explanation of how epistemically 
successful representations are produced. I describe the specific contributions of 
Contessa (2007a, 2011), Giere (2004, 2006), and van Fraassen (2008), and point 
out which elements from their accounts I incorporate into mine, presented in 
Chapter 5. 
                                             
13 In fact Suárez’s (2003, 2010) claim is much weaker than this. He doesn’t argue that similarity is 
the relation actively employed in general between vehicles and targets. He considers similarity 
one among other possible means of representation, as will become clearer in Section 2.1. 
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2.1. Three strictures on similarity as means of representation 
The three main criticisms of the project of developing an account of the means of 
representation focused on similarity are the arguments from variety, vagueness, 
and misrepresentation against the means. I discuss and respond to them in turn. 
To clarify, the term “means” is proposed and exclusively used by Suárez (2003; 
2010; 2015) in the debate of scientific representation.14 However, for the sake of 
simplicity, I refer to all the accounts that have addressed versions of the question 
R2 of representation, as defined in Chapter 1, as concerning the means of 
representation (i.e. accounts focused on the problem of accurate representation, 
faithful representation, epistemically successful representation, or the problem of 
the styles of representation). Later on, I include some clarifications about the 
different implications that these versions of the R2 question have. 
 
 
2.1.1 The argument from variety 
The argument from variety against similarity as the means of representation has 
been formulated, among others, by Frigg (2006). He contends that similarity is not 
a good candidate to be the means of representation – or to respond to the problem 
of style in his version– because there is a huge variety of styles of scientific 
representation, and similarity is at best one among these (2006: 50). The only way 
we can approach the problem of style, Frigg adds, would be by offering a taxonomy 
of all the different styles used in scientific representation (ibid.).15 I certainly agree 
that the practice of representing is complex and encompasses a variety of resources 
and techniques. However, the use of the term “style” in this context is rather 
ambiguous, and, I would like to claim, it doesn’t give strength to the argument 
from variety against similarity. At some point, Frigg (2006: 5) affirms that 
mathematical models, physical models, and graphs are examples of different styles 
                                             
14 Later, I will specify that van Fraassen (2008) also uses the term “means” occasionally, but with 
slightly different implications. 
15 Earlier I claimed that Frigg (2006) also proposes a second variant of a response to R2 or the 
problem of style, namely, a normative variant that establishes how scientific representations must 
be constructed to be successful. Since this second variant is not affected by the argument from 
variety as Frigg (2006) presents it, I focus on the descriptive variant here. 
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in which representations are constructed. At another point, he seems to endorse a 
slightly different meaning of the term style, and affirms that apart from similarity, 
isomorphism might be a style of representation, partial isomorphism another, 
embedding another, and he adds that there are “many other possibilities” (2006: 
59-60). But there is no mention of what the many other possibilities are, and those 
he mentions seem very closely related to the general idea of similarity. So, so far, 
there is not enough reason to believe that the argument from variety seriously 
questions similarity as means of representation. Frigg then (2006: 50) gives 
concrete examples of scientific models constructed in different styles, and here the 
term style seems to refer to the very specific way in which individual models are 
uniquely constructed:  
 
An ink drawing, a wood cut, a pointillist painting, or a geometrical 
abstraction can represent the same scene in very different ways. This 
pluralism is not a prerogative of the fine arts. The representations used in 
the sciences are not all of the same kind either. Bill Phillips’ hydraulic 
machine and Hicks’ mathematical models both represent a Keynesian 
economy but they use very different devices to do so; and Weizsäcker’s 
liquid drop model represents the nucleus of an atom in a manner that is very 
different from the one in the shell model. As in painting, there seems to be 
a variety of representational styles in science (Frigg 2006: 50).  
 
From this quote, one style would be the use of a hydraulic machine to represent an 
economy; another style would be the use of a mathematical model to represent an 
economy; and another would be the use of an analogical model of a liquid drop. It 
is difficult to tell if similarity would be a style used in some of these cases (for 
instance, in the analogical model of the liquid drop), or if each of these cases entails 
a unique style. The comparison with the pictorial arts does not help much, since 
Frigg (2006) combines references to material techniques used in the visual arts, 
such as ink or wood cut, with what in the history of art is commonly considered a 
pictorial style, such as pointillism or abstraction. In a more recent work, the list of 
possible styles Frigg and Nguyen (2016) suggest gets even larger: 
 
An X-ray photograph represents an ankle joint in a different way than a 
biomechanical model, a mercury thermometer represents the temperature 
of gas in a different way than statistical mechanics does, and chemical theory 
represents a C60 fullerene in different way that an electron-microscope 
image of the molecule. Even when restricting attention to the same kind of 
representation, there are important differences: […] an electric circuit 
model represents the brain function in a different way than a neural network 
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model. In brief, there seem to be different representational styles. […] 
There is no expectation that a complete list of styles be provided in 
response. Indeed, it is unlikely that such a list can ever be drawn up, and 
new styles will be invented as science progresses (Frigg and Nguyen 2016). 
 
It is clear here that the concept of style refers to an unending list of particular 
possibilities when constructing models. If this is the case, the problem of style is 
ungraspable in its descriptive variant, always opened to further extension. In this 
context it is certainly problematic to consider similarity a solution to the problem 
of style, given the endless variety of styles. I believe, however, that even if 
similarity might not offer a solution to every possible case of successful 
representation, past and future, the argument from variety is not as fatal as Frigg 
(2006) and Frigg and Nguyen (2016) present it. In history of art, the term style is 
useful precisely because it groups individual instances into relatively unified 
clusters. Particularities of specific artworks fit within categories defined by 
historical periods, techniques, skills, and consolidated systems of practices. If one 
wanted to keep the discussion about styles of representing, the point would be to 
provide classifications that allowed philosophers to make comparisons and 
generalizations about the means commonly used in practice, as well as to define 
standards of successful ways of constructing models. I would like to argue that the 
concept of similarity, if adequately characterized, can offer that kind of generic 
insight about how a wide range of scientific practices are constructed and achieve 
successful results.   
Along these lines, a narrower way of formulating the argument from variety 
is found in Suárez (2003: 231), who originally gave it that name. Suárez (2003) 
recognizes similarity and isomorphism as the two most common means of 
representation, but not the only ones (ibid.). Other means, “such as exemplification, 
instantiation, convention, truth” are also possibilities (ibid.: 229). In contrast to 
Frigg (2006), this is not a postulation of an endless variety of individual means or 
styles of representation. It is a more concise list that in principle would allow us to 
make generalizations and comparisons between common ways in which epistemic 
agents employ relations between models and target to make successful inferences. 
As I advanced, my aim in this thesis is not to argue that similarity is the only means 
of representation: in fact, what I will defend is that creative similarity is the means 
of representation in a relevant set of epistemically successful representations, not 
similarity in general. There might be a plurality of other means of representation, 
like the ones Suárez (2003) refers to, provided that alternative accounts of the 
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means of representation can explain how those means enable the construction of 
successful representations. The idea I would like to defend is that, even in a 
situation where we have proposed and accepted the validity of various accounts of 
the means of representation, the argument from variety is not fatal. Each of those 
accounts can make insightful generalizations about recurrent ways of producing 
fruitful, adequate, useful scientific representations, maybe concerning specific 
disciplines, specific contexts, or throughout a diversity of modelling practices. 
Suárez (2003) presents the argument from variety in more limited, 
manageable terms than Frigg (2006) and Frigg and Nguyen (2016), as for him it 
is not about an endless list of possibilities but a few common means that frequently 
appear in scientific practices. Still, Suárez (2003) advances the argument to criticize 
attempts to provide an account of the means of representation focused on 
similarity, probably assuming that advancing such an account would involve 
making universal claims about similarity. But if my reasons are justified, and we 
accept the value of providing insightful generalizations about the problem of 
successful representation, then trying to advance a similarity-based account of the 
means of representation that doesn’t have a universal character or the form of 
necessary conditions is well motivated. The argument from variety has been 
advanced to obstruct the debate about similarity as responsible for the success of 
(a series of) scientific representations. However, it can be taken as motivation to 
continue investigating the concrete functions and limits of the role of similarity as 
means of representation. 
Let us briefly discuss the other possible means of representation that Suárez 
(2003) mentions, and how they could in principle be complementary to each other. 
Although I will be focusing on similarity in the rest of the thesis, we should 
encourage the development of various other accounts of the means of 
representation, with the aim of enriching the general response to the problem of 
how epistemically successful representations are produced in science.  
Concerning isomorphism, one of the alternative means of representation 
that Suárez (2003) refers to, we could claim that it is possible to integrate it into a 
similarity-based type of account of the means of representation, since isomorphism 
can be considered a structural type of similarity. Suárez himself recognizes that “it 
is possible in general to understand isomorphism as a form of similarity” (ibid.: 
228). If A and B are isomorphic, then they are similar with respect to at least one 
property: their relational framework. Perhaps an advantage of taking similarity as 
a better option than isomorphism to develop a more insightful, broader, more 
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encompassing, account of the means of representation is that similarity can apply 
to any sort of objects, while isomorphism (or homomorphism, partial isomorphism) 
only to objects that openly exhibit a mathematical structure. Being structurally 
similar is a way of being similar, while being similar cannot be reduced to being 
isomorphic. An account focused on isomorphism as means of representation would 
have to either be restricted to discussing the epistemic success of representations 
that concern mathematical objects or deal with the problem of explaining how non-
mathematical objects can instantiate structures (see Frigg 2006 and Contessa 
2007a for discussion of this point). Meanwhile, an account focused on similarity 
would be able to encompass the description of various ways in which similarities, 
including structural, are employed in modelling practices to produce successful 
results. Ideally, the contribution that this type of account should make is the 
identification of common dynamics generated by similarity as means of 
representation in different practices, whether it is defined as structural similarity 
or in other possible ways. In Chapter 3 I will argue that in order to identify those 
dynamics it is necessary to look at scientists’ formulation of judgments of similarity 
(including judgments of structural similarity), and how they crystalize into 
community standards that allow them to construct successful representations. 
Exemplification and instantiation are suggested by Suárez (2003) as other 
plausible means of representation. Exploring these means in specific accounts, 
complementing a similarity-based type account, seems to be beneficial when 
attempting to address the problem of the epistemic success of representation in a 
more comprehensive way. Instantiation is exhibition of the properties that an 
object possesses, so objects usually instantiate multiple properties. Exemplification 
requires instantiation, but also reference and interpretation (see Goodman 1968; 
and Elgin 2011).16 It is not clear, though, unless further clarification is provided 
(and Suárez (2003) doesn’t offer it) how instantiation could sustain an account of 
the means of representation. It is difficult to see how the mere exhibition of 
properties of an object can allow epistemic agents to construct successful 
representations and make inferences about a target with them. Exemplification 
seems a much more successful candidate: it consists in making manifest certain 
properties of an object that, via interpretation, epistemic agents relate to properties 
of a target. For instance, a swatch of herringbone tweed exemplifies herringbone 
tweed insofar as it instantiates herringbone tweed, refers to it, and relevant agents 
                                             
16 This is more specifically the terminology Elgin (2011) uses. Goodman (1968: 53-55) affirms 
that “exemplification is possession plus reference”. 
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interpret what properties, among the many that the swatch instantiates (i.e. being 
square, small, frayed around the edges, having certain colours and patterns), are to 
be exemplified (Elgin 2011: 400). It is easier to see how exemplification could be 
employed by epistemic agents to produce adequate scientific representations that 
allow inferences about a target to be made.  
A derived question that would be worth exploring is to what extent an 
account of the means of representation focused on similarity intersects with an 
account focused on exemplification. In some ways, similarity is closely connected 
to exemplification. Van Fraassen (2008: 17) has for instance argued that 
exemplification is the covert way in which Goodman (1968) inserts similarity or 
resemblance into the debate of representation: “One way in which Goodman did 
bring in resemblance was through the intricate notion of exemplification. […] 
Obviously the use [of colour swatches] is to represent to you what your wall or 
floor will look like if you choose the corresponding paint or carpet”. It is difficult 
not to see the participation of similarity in exemplification when we look at a 
swatch that exemplifies the colour of my proposed carpet. Certainly 
exemplification involves more than similarity. Relevant similarities must be 
selected and highlighted for an exemplification to be functioning (ibid.). So, 
especially if our conception of similarity as means of representation requires that 
similarity is taken as selective and highlighted by the relevant epistemic agents 
depending on the goals of the practice, then the connections between similarity 
and exemplification become stronger. This is the case for the account that I will 
advance in Chapter 5. There I characterize similarity as creative similarity in order 
to develop an account of the means of representation, where creative similarity is a 
notion that involves that similarity is selected, highlighted, and combined with 
relevant distortions for the purposes of the epistemic community. In any case, I do 
not try to argue that similarity should be taken as equivalent to exemplification. 
The development of separate accounts that analyse the functioning of these 
particular means must be stimulated. An interesting point would be to identify 
possible intersections of similarity and exemplification in practices of representing, 
and maybe offer some conclusions about the coexistence (or incompatibility) of 
different means in the same practices of representing. The source to sustain any of 
these accounts needs to be the empirical, historical study of practices of 
representing, where judgments of exemplification or similarity (among other 
possible judgments) are used by epistemic agents to produce successful 
representations. 
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Concerning convention, which Suárez (2003: 229) proposes as another 
possible means of representation, it would certainly be productive to explore the 
possibility of advancing an account of the means of representation focused on it. 
There are definitely conventional and symbolic elements involved in numerous 
representations, scientific or not. The London Underground Map, for instance, 
represents the transport system in London, and it includes among other things a 
blue line that conventionally stands for the Victoria Line, a red line that stands for 
the Central Line, and a black line that stands for the Northern Line (see Contessa 
2007a; Bolinska 2016; and Nguyen 2016 for different readings of the use of 
conventions in the case of the London Underground Map). The San Francisco Bay 
Model, which I discuss extensively in Chapter 4, also contains elements that 
involve symbolic associations, like signs that linguistically associate points along 
the water tanks of the model with locations on the actual Bay. Yet, the possibility 
of employing these conventions in the construction of successful representations 
shouldn’t be analysed independently from how the London Underground Map or 
the San Francisco Bay Model succeed as a whole in affording understanding of 
their targets. That is to say, the complete set of intersecting lines on the 
underground map is selectively, relevantly, manifestly similar to the London 
transport system with respect to the distribution of stations on the ground, and 
this fact played a fundamental role in the success of the map as a useful 
representation for its users. As I will show in Chapter 4, the San Francisco Bay 
Model was successfully constructed and calibrated thanks to scientists’ 
formulation of various judgments of similarity throughout modelling practices. 
Perhaps in these cases we could say that convention works as a kind of expedient 
to facilitate the highlighting, constraining and recognition of relevant similarities 
in particular practice of representing. Studying the roles of conventions could 
therefore enrich similarity-based accounts of the means of representations like the 
one I attempt to advance. Still, there might be cases of representational practices 
where we should rather identify convention as the means of representation, instead 
of as a complementary element or expedient. For those cases, developing a separate 
accounts of the means of representation focused on conventions and 
symbolizations will be particularly helpful.  
In reference to truth, the last alternative means of representation Suárez 
(2003) suggests, it is difficult to see how it can work as means of representation, 
strictly speaking. Can truth be actively employed by epistemic agents to make 
inferences about a target from a scientific model? The best way to make sense of 
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this idea is to think that truth is understood as ‘identity’ here. It is indeed possible 
that a vehicle of representation have some identical features to a target. Then, 
agents might be able to employ that relation of identity to make inferences about 
that target from the vehicle. In Chapter 4 I will describe the case of the San 
Francisco Bay Model, where there are in fact some identical features in the model 
with respect to the target, such as equal salinity levels. Although the relation of 
identity in this case can in principle be employed to perform inferences about the 
(salinity levels of the) target, I will argue that since the model works as a whole, 
which is far from identical to the target, identical salinity levels become a distortive 
element for the model, in a way that makes it difficult to make successful inferences 
about the San Francisco Bay employing that identity relation. It is better in this 
case to claim that relevant similarity is the means of representation, which allowed 
epistemic agents to design, construct, and calibrate the model as a whole, in 
comparison to the target represented. Identity would be in this case a limiting case 
of similarity that appears in very particular features of the model with respect to 
the target, but that would demand the interaction with the rest of (non-identical) 
features of the model to allow us to perform successful inferences. In short, unless 
more clarification is provided, it is hard to see how truth can be the means of 
representation in modelling practices. And if truth is understood as identity, we 
could either develop an account of the means of representation focused on identity, 
or probably more satisfactorily, take it as a limiting case of similarity and integrate 
it into a similarity-based account of the means of representation.  
The different means of representation that Suárez (2003) suggests, in 
addition to similarity, deserve careful study in the debate of representation in 
philosophy of science, probably with special attention to exemplification and 
convention. There is more to be said about how similarity could, for instance, be 
aided by conventions to perform an effective role as means of representation; or 
about how similarity works in the specific case of representation by 
exemplification. The argument from variety, in Suárez’s (2003) version, is less 
critical than it appeared at the beginning. It does not offer strong reasons to 
prevent us from attempting to offer an account of the means of representation 
focused on similarity that might characterize numerous cases of representational 
practices. The argument from variety in Frigg’s (2006) and Frigg and Nguyen’s 
(2016) versions is a stronger attempt to reject not only the possibility of offering 
an account of the means of representation focused solely on similarity, but any effort 
to make generalizations about the role of similarity in modelling practices alluding 
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to the singularities of individual practices. This version of the argument can be 
invalidated as soon as the development of a practical enquiry shows that similarity 
is commonly employed in the design, construction, and evaluation of models that 
we recognize for their epistemic achievements. 
 
 
2.1.2. The argument from vagueness 
In close connection to the argument from variety, the argument from vagueness 
points out that the concept of similarity is so poorly defined that it cannot 
characterize by itself an account of the means of representation. The problem here 
is not with the variety of scientific representations there are, but with the variety 
of meanings or connotations that the term similarity has. Chakravartty (2001: 336-
7) has advanced this type of criticism when he claims that “similarity is by itself 
hopelessly vague […] even when cashed out in terms of ‘respects’ and ‘degrees’”, 
which is the characterization of similarity that Giere (2004, 2005) offers. Frigg 
(2006) has also criticized the notion of similarity for its vagueness: 
 
An unqualified similarity claim is empty; relevant respects and degrees need 
to be specified to make a similarity claim meaningful. So what we need is an 
account of scientifically relevant kinds of similarity, the contexts in which 
they are used, and the cognitive claims they support. Before we have 
specifications of that sort at hand, we have not satisfactorily solved the 
problem of style. (Frigg 2006: 61) 
 
The criticism in this quote concerns the need to specify respects, degrees and 
contexts to render the concept of similarity meaningful. Moreover, Frigg (2006) 
would expect those respects and degrees to be “scientifically relevant”. What 
results from here, following Frigg, is not that searching for scientifically relevant 
applications of similarity is a worthy endeavour, but exactly the opposite. Since it 
is unfeasible to attain such standards or scientifically relevant specifications of 
similarity, Frigg (2006) argues, we should abandon the study of the problem of the 
means or styles of representation by reference to similarity. But would it be 
possible in this view to defend the value of similarity in cases where respects and 
degrees are precisely specified? Not really. Frigg and Nguyen (2016) have argued 
that even if we identify the relevant respects and degrees of similarity in particular 
situations, the notion of similarity is useless because what matters then are 
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precisely those very specific respects in which similarity is playing a role. In other 
words, the concept of similarity is empty, since as soon as we say that a model and 
a target are similar to each other with respect to a particular property, behaviour, 
relation, causal structure, what matters is that particular respect, and not the idea 
of similarity anymore.  
As advanced in Chapter 1, Goodman (1968) had also presented a version of 
the argument from vagueness. He claimed that, since anything is similar to 
anything else in some respect, important respects of similarity need to be identified 
to make sense of the concept. But, he follows, “importance is a highly volatile matter, 
varying with every shift of context and interest, and quite incapable of supporting 
the fixed distinctions that philosophers so often seek to rest upon it” (Goodman 
1972: 443). The difficulty of defining the importance of certain similarities with 
precision appears both as an unavoidable and as a fatal fact here. However, the fact 
that similarity cannot offer the kind of “fixed distinctions that philosophers seek”, 
I would like to argue, might be unavoidable, but doesn’t need to be fatal. Studying 
the uses of similarity in practices of representing in science can provide useful 
generalizations about how similarity is frequently understood in practice, and how 
it regularly varies “with every shift of context and interest”, to use Goodman’s 
words (ibid.). The lack of a permanent, universal definition of similarity doesn ’t 
mean that some uses of similarities are not more entrenched than others. Those 
that are more entrenched are more prone to be employed in practices of 
representing, and eventually will be considered more ‘important’ or ‘relevant’ types 
of similarity.17 In Chapter 3 I develop a discussion on judgments of similarity, the 
concrete manifestations of the use of similarity in practice of representing. The 
entrenchment of certain similarity judgments depends on the past frequency of 
their use, the usefulness that those judgments prove to have, and the fact that they 
do not conflict with other entrenched judgments (following Goodman 1983: 97). I 
then identify in Chapter 4 a particular type of judgment of similarity, which I call 
“standardized judgments of similarity” that exemplifies this point well. 
Standardized judgments of similarity are judgments that have evolved into the 
consolidation of norms and standards given their demonstrated efficacy to 
construct epistemically successful representations. 
                                             
17 Precisely Goodman (1972, 1983) offers a type of solution (or comfort) to the problem of 
induction based on the idea of entrenchment. Although it is not possible to know how exactly things 
in the future will be like the past, we refer to the future as similar to the past with respect to 
certain entrenched predicates. A predicate is better entrenched than another if we have projected 
more hypotheses with it and if it proves to be more useful (1983: 59-83).   
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A different type of counterargument can be offered to respond to the 
argument from vagueness. The goal of obtaining a “scientifically relevant” 
definition of similarity, as Frigg (2006) demands, or “fixed distinctions” between 
important and unimportant similarities, as Goodman (1968) demands, might not 
be that desirable after all, so we can abandon it. Giere (2004; 2005) and Teller 
(2001) have offered this type of reply to the argument from vagueness. Instead of 
attempting to articulate what exactly important or scientifically relevant similarity 
is, Giere (2004) has tried to convince philosophers of science that representing does 
not require the existence of an objective measure of similarity. Moreover, the lack 
of such a measure does not introduce an undesirable amount of relativity in claims 
of similarity between a model and a real system (2004: 748). It is sufficient in his 
view to have a reasonable, even if  not unique, measure of  similarity that can be 
successfully applied to particular cases (2006: 65). Giere replies to his critics:  
 
Commentators have criticized this characterization [of similarity in 
respects and degrees] as ‘‘hopelessly vague’’ and some have insisted that 
without an ‘‘objective’’ measure of similarity, the view is excessively 
relativistic (Chakravartty 2001). My view is that there is no such thing as 
an objective measure of similarity that is completely general, but this does 
not matter because no such measure is needed. Once the experimental set-
up and the model have been specified, the context provides whatever 
measures of similarity are required. (Giere 2005: 8) 
 
We should resign ourselves to a general, neutral criterion of  similarity. The point 
is that the lack of context-independent parameters of similarity doesn’t entail the 
elimination of the concept. If there is evidence that uses of similarity, in the form 
of judgments of similarity in scientific practice, are involved in the construction of 
epistemically successful representation, there are good reasons to keep it in the 
debate about the means of representation. Then, we should perhaps discuss if 
between the idea of an objective, context-independent definition of similarity, and 
the idea that similarity is defined in each individual circumstance, there are 
possibilities of arriving at informative, relatively general characterizations of 
similarities. Looking at common uses of certain judgments of similarity, and at how 
in some fields standards concerning relevant similarities are stabilized and even 
transferred to other fields, gives good evidence that it is possible to identify stable 
and “contextually-objective” definitions of similarity. 
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2.1.3. Argument from misrepresentation against the means 
I argued in Chapter 1 that a substantive account of representation should be able 
to account for the fact that scientific models misrepresent the aspects of the world 
they represent, by idealizing, abstracting, simplifying, and otherwise distorting 
them. The proposals of French (2003), French and Bueno (2011) and Bartels 
(2006), I argued, have not successfully accommodated misrepresentation. Now, we 
are dealing with the problem of the means of representation, but a new version of 
the argument from misrepresentation (“argument from misrepresentation against 
the means”) remains. The question in this case is how we can accommodate the 
claim that similarity is the means of representation, which allows us to make 
successful inferences about a target in the world, and the claim that distortions are 
fundamentally involved in successful representations. In other words, does the 
presence of distortions undermine the idea that similarity is a good candidate for 
means of representation?  
Nguyen (2016) has presented an argument against similarity along these 
lines. He doubts that similarity can be the means (or a predominant style) of 
representation because distortions are an integral part of many scientific models.  
 
Additional problems for using the notion of similarity as a universal 
condition on accurate representation […] occur when, as in some cases of 
epistemic representation, distortions play a vital role in allowing us to use 
representational vehicles to learn about their targets […] In taking 
proposed similarity as a universal style of representation, and thereby actual 
similarity as a universal standard of accurate representation, we seem 
committed to the idea that models have to be copies of their targets (even if 
only in the relevant respects to the appropriate degree) in order to be 
accurate. (Nguyen 2016: 60) 
 
There is no doubt that when we discuss the problem of the means (or styles) of 
representation, we need to consider the distortions and inaccuracies included in 
many scientific models. The problem, following Nguyen (2016), is that when we 
take similarity as the means of representation, models wouldn’t admit the presence 
of inaccuracies or idealizations. Or, if one alternatively tries to accommodate 
distortions within a similarity framework, the notion of similarity that drops out 
becomes too flexible and unhelpful (ibid.: 60-1). I agree that an account of the 
means of representation should seriously consider the distortions involved in 
successful representations, as will become clearer in Chapter 5, when I present my 
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own view. I also agree that similarity (including structural similarity) might not 
be the only means of representation. However, I disagree with the assumption that 
similarity as means of representation is incapable of accommodating distortions 
without losing its significance or common meaning. There are two possible ways 
of responding to this formulation of the argument from misrepresentation against 
the means, which I discuss in turn. 
The first response would be to say that we can elude the problem by 
claiming that, despite the distortions scientific models involve, similarity could be 
still the means employed in a variety of models to make some accurate inferences 
about a target. So, similarity and distortion might be indeed incompatible with 
each other, each pulling in a different direction, but still similarity as means of 
representation might allow some inferences about aspects of the target that are not 
distorted by the model. This response tries to reject the clear-cut idea that if 
(relevant) similarity between a vehicle and target is obtained, the representation is 
accurate, and if distortions are involved in the representation, it is inaccurate (see 
also Frigg and Nguyen 2016 for an analogous argument focused on structural 
similarity). There are, so the argument would go, various degrees of similarity, so 
the more distorted a model is, the less possible it would be to obtain successful 
results from it and the more difficult it would be to consider similarity the means 
of representation in that case. This type of response to the argument from 
misrepresentation against the means is implicit in accounts like Contessa’s (2007a, 
2011), which I discuss in more detail in the next section. However, this is not the 
response to the argument that I would like to opt for.  
The second possible way of responding to the argument from 
misrepresentation against the means is to claim that the assumption that similarity 
and distortion are incompatible is misguided. The most plausible reason for 
adopting this misguided idea of similarity is that not enough attention is paid to 
the actual connotations that the notion of similarity acquires in practices of 
representing. Similarity is only incompatible with distortion when one 
understands similarity as an ideal of “pure” or “bare similarity”. In Chapter 5 I spell 
out these terms in detail, but briefly, pure or bare similarity is a conception of 
similarity that, in its limit version, could be identified with “perfect imitation”, 
“exact copy”, or “mirror image” of the target represented. Under this conception, 
which fits with the so-called “copy theories of representation” that Goodman 
(1968) referred to, saying that similarity is the means of representation is saying 
that models aspire to be as similar as possible to their targets, ideally perfect copies 
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of them. This assumption is for instance articulated by Nguyen (2016: 60) in the 
quote presented above, when he says that similarity-based accounts are “committed 
to the idea that models have to be copies of their targets”. So if for instance some 
models purposely idealize their target, even if with well-motivated epistemic 
purposes, we would have to claim that they are diverting from the aim of being 
perfectly similar to their target, and therefore diverting from being epistemically 
successful. I believe this is an inadequate understanding of what accounts of the 
means of representation focused on similarity, like those of Giere (2004, 2005) or 
van Fraassen (2008), attempt to do. These philosophers are well aware of the 
idealizations involved in scientific representation, and have defended the idea that 
similarity and distortion can be compatible components of the same practices of 
constructing successful models (van Fraassen 2008: 13-5). My own proposal tries 
to defend this point even more explicitly and with the support of the empirical 
study of the meaning of similarity that emerges from representational practices. 
The observation of actual uses of judgments of similarity in practices of 
representing shows that similarity doesn’t involve “bare”, “pure” similarity when 
it is employed by epistemic agents. It involves relevant approximations, useful 
limits, and a balanced combination with well-reasoned idealizations and 
simplifications. This approach opposes Nguyen’s (2016) conclusions about 
similarity as means of representation, but also the first type of response to the 
argument from misrepresentation against the means. The first response entailed 
that similarity might be the means of representation in some cases despite the 
distortions involved in those representations, while this second response states 
that similarity as means of representation should not be understood as “bare” or 
“pure” similarity because in actual practices it does not involve an ideal of perfect 
copy of a target but is intertwined and compatible with distortions. 
 
 
 
2.2. Compatible views of similarity as means of representation 
The problem of the means of representation – or of accurate or epistemically 
successful representation – hasn’t been systematically addressed in contemporary 
philosophy of science in the way the problem of the constituents has. There are 
nevertheless some notable proposals that have contributed to the advancement of 
the discussion about the means of representation. In the first place, Suárez (2003, 
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2010) proposed the use of the concept of means in contrast to the constituents of 
representation. Although he didn’t advance any specific account of the means of 
representation, he suggested various possible means of representation, and 
emphasized the need to develop practical enquiries to study them (2010: 91-2). In 
this section, I would like to leave aside the project of advancing different possible 
accounts of the means of representation – focused on exemplification or convention 
among other possibilities – and concentrate on three proposals in contemporary 
philosophy of science that have specifically tried to address the problem of the 
accuracy of representation appealing to similarity, namely those of Contessa 
(2007a, 2011), Giere (2004, 2005), and van Fraassen (2008). I consider the most 
insightful and most critical aspects of their respective proposals, and how I believe 
we should incorporate some of those aspects into a satisfactory account of the 
means of representation focused on similarity. Later, in Chapters 3 and 4, I will 
also consider the recent proposal that Weisberg (2013) has advanced, as well as 
the work on the role of similarity in specialized practices of modelling that Sterrett 
(2009, 2017a) developed. These works have been particularly important in terms 
of discussing similarity from a practice-based perspective, with special attention on 
the role of judgments of similarity in modelling practices in science. 
 
 
2.2.1. Contessa on structural similarity and faithful representation 
Contessa (2007a, 2007b, 2011) is one of the few contemporary philosophers of 
science who explicitly advances a distinctive account of the means of 
representation, or in his terms, of faithful representation, separately from an 
account of the constituents of representation. To have a full understanding of how 
models represent, Contessa argues, we have to offer guidance about what 
distinguishes a faithful from an unfaithful (or less faithful) representation (2007a: 
67-8). The constituents of representation are, for Contessa, denotation and the 
adoption of an interpretation of a vehicle in terms of a target (2007a: 176). 
Similarity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for representation. It is 
a “further condition that needs to obtain in addition to the conditions that make a 
vehicle an epistemic representation of the target if the vehicle is to be a faithful 
epistemic representation of it” (2007a: 89). We don’t have to adopt Contessa’s view 
on the conditions for epistemic representation to accept that similarity is that 
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“further condition” that needs to be met in order to obtain faithful epistemic 
representations. For instance, we could in principle defend a deflationary view on 
representation, and still follow Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) description of how 
similarity needs to obtain to achieve faithful representations. I take this general 
project of attempting to advance a specific characterization of the means or of 
faithful representation as a central point to incorporate from Contessa’s account.  
There are three particularities of Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) proposal that I 
would like to highlight. The first is the version of structural similarity that he 
defends. The second is the normative variant of an account of the means of 
representation that Contessa proposes, leaving the descriptive variant and the 
project of developing a practical enquiry as secondary. The third is the link 
Contessa establishes between similarity and faithfulness. I will not endorse 
Contessa’s specific views with respect to any of these three particularities in my 
account, but they comprise fundamental points of reference – and criticism – that 
any account of the means of representation focused on similarity should consider.  
Contessa (2007a, 2011) grounds his account of faithful representation in 
structural similarity. He believes that the notion of structural similarity is better 
than the broader or more intuitive notion of similarity to capture the specific sense 
in which a faithful scientific model is similar to its targets (2011: 127-8). The 
problem with the broader, more intuitive notion of similarity, Contessa argues, is 
that it is too permissive and could eventually include accidental similarities 
between vehicle and target that don’t have an epistemic role in the faithfulness of 
a representation (2011: 128). For instance: 
 
I might happen to employ a model that, on this particular occasion, happens 
to predict […] accurately, but does so in an entirely fortuitous manner (say, 
a model based on some wacky theory […]). Would such an accidental 
similarity be sufficient to make the model into a faithful epistemic 
representation of the system for my purposes? This question, it would seem, 
should be answered negatively […]. If accidental similarity was sufficient 
for faithfulness, then even tarots would sometimes be faithful epistemic 
representations of their targets. (Contessa 2011: 128) 
 
A general concern about the intrusion of accidental similarities is justified. What 
doesn’t seem justified is the claim that relying on structural similarity 
automatically resolves the problem of accidental similarities. Contessa (2011) is 
reacting to accounts like Giere’s (2004), which endorse the idea of “similarity in 
respects and degrees”. For Contessa, this concept of similarity is not systematic 
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enough because we don’t know “how similar is sufficiently similar” (2011: 128). 
However, his own idea of structural similarity is not without analogous difficulties. 
A representation is perfectly faithful in Contessa’s account if all the inferences that 
can be made from a vehicle about a target are sound, that is, both valid and true, 
and partially faithful if only some of the inferences are sound (2007b: 55). The 
problem is that a specific morphism needs to be defined before proceeding to 
evaluate the soundness of the inferences we can make from a vehicle about a target. 
And to define a morphism, agents have to define what a relevant structure is and 
what exactly is going to count as better (or a higher degree of) structural 
similarity. Contessa (2007a) appeals to the role of interpretation to explain how 
the relevant structures of vehicle and target are reconstructed by epistemic agents 
(ibid.: 107). But this is not less ambiguous than the specification of relevant respects 
and degrees that Giere (2005) postulates. Invoking the notion of structural 
similarity might be after all a “case of misplaced precision”, Giere (2005: 8) claims, 
as “similarity has just the flexibility required”. 
Another reason Contessa (2011) defends the notion of structural similarity 
is that it can capture (better than the notion of similarity) the more abstract sense 
in which a vehicle needs to be similar to a target (ibid.: 128). The similarity that 
commonly exists between vehicles and targets in scientific representation is not 
visually immediate, as in the case of a painted portrait, but more abstract, as in the 
case of the London Underground Map (2007a: 100-102). The London 
Underground Map and the actual transport network are, following Contessa 
(ibid.), not similar “in the intuitive sense of the word”. One is a piece of glossy paper 
with names, small circles and coloured lines printed on it; the other is a system of 
trains, tracks, platforms, escalators, and so on (ibid.: 100-1). If the map and the 
network are similar, “they are similar at a very abstract level”. Thus the notion of 
similarity does not afford the technical resources to capture this abstract sense of 
similarity (ibid.: 102).  
In response, one could claim two things. One, that Contessa would have to 
recognize that for cases in which the intuitive or visual sense of similarity applies, 
the notion of similarity would be more explanatory than the notion of structural 
similarity. This is the case for portraits, but also for multiple examples of scientific 
representations in science that take the format of pictures, photographs, and 
material models. Two, it is not completely clear, except in the cases of purely 
mathematical models, why the best way to account for relatively abstract cases of 
similarity is by referring to the shared structures of models and phenomena. The 
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London Underground Map is similar to the transport network in some very 
specific respects, namely the interconnection between stations. Meanwhile, the 
map is not similar to its target in many other respects, such as the relative distance 
between stations on the ground, the size of the stations, etc. Adopting a structural 
account of similarity to explain the faithfulness of the London Underground Map 
doesn’t resolve the problem of, using Contessa’s words again, comparing “a piece 
of glossy paper with coloured lines” with an “intricate system of trains, tunnels, 
rails and platforms” (2011:123). The identification of the relevant respects is what 
really matters in the process of constructing a successful epistemic representation, 
and this applies also for structural similarity. 
I do not attempt to reject the possibility of referring to structural similarity 
as the means of representation in particular practices of representing. In the 
previous section, I mentioned that structural similarity can be taken as a form of 
similarity. Morphisms are relations between set-theoretic structures, and the 
targets of representations in science are expected to be, at least in part, non-
mathematical objects. So if we decide to appeal to the notion of structural similarity 
for a general account of the means of representation, as Contessa (2007a) does, we 
would have to endorse additional assumptions about how non-mathematical 
objects could instantiate structures (ibid.: 107). My suggestion in section 2.1 was 
that an account of the means of representation focused on similarity could in 
principle encompass cases where structural similarities are involved. In this way, 
the account would be able to provide broader conclusions and more enlightening 
comparisons between different practices where similarity is the means of 
representation, including those concerning mathematical objects that exhibit a 
structure. In summary, the first point that I extract from the discussion of 
Contessa’s proposal is that an account of the means of representation focused on a 
broadly understood notion of similarity, that is concretized in particular cases, can 
help advance a more comprehensive account than one focused merely on structural 
similarity. Besides that, Contessa (2007a) attempts to offer a universal type of 
account of the means of representation based on structural similarity, a project that 
I explicitly reject. I have so far defended the idea that we should encourage the 
development of various co-existent accounts of the means of representation, each 
focused on a different means employed in a relevant set of practices of representing. 
This conclusion connects with the second particularity of Contessa’s (2007a, 
2011) account that I would like to consider. A look into scientific practices could 
have offered Contessa fundamental insight about how similarity or structural 
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similarity play a role in the construction of faithful representations. Empirical and 
historical work is key to support the idea that certain means of representation are 
those employed in a series of scientific models. Contessa (2007a) doesn’t directly 
engage with the analysis of scientific practices, however. His account is more a 
rational reconstruction of scientific modelling than an account sustained, at least 
in part, on the development of a practical enquiry (in Frigg and Nguyen 2016). 
Quite commonly, accounts of the constituents of representation have dedicated 
little space to the study of actual scientific practices. For accounts of the means of 
representation, not relying on the study of practices is particularly problematic, as 
the means do not concern universal relations between a vehicle and target but the 
active employment of relations between vehicles and targets by the relevant 
epistemic community (Suárez 2010: 93).  
In Chapter 1 I mentioned two variants of an account of the means of 
representation: a descriptive and a normative variant (Frigg 2006: 50). Contessa’s 
(2007a) account has a predominant normative character, consisting in the 
postulation of one way in which faithful representation is to be obtained, namely 
structural similarity. My aim is not exactly to argue that, to the contrary, a purely 
descriptive variant is desirable to address the problem of the means of 
representation. A purely descriptive variant could only have the form of a 
taxonomy of types of models ever constructed, a project that I rejected above as 
epistemically uninteresting in terms of addressing the problem of the epistemic 
success of representation (Frigg 2006). The main claim that I would like to make 
is that an account of the means of representation needs to be both descriptive and 
normative. More specifically, the source of the normativity of an account of the 
means of representation should be the description of norms identified in actual 
practices of representing. It is in practices that standards and guiding criteria are 
established to direct the construction and the evaluation of subsequent successful 
representations. So the description of those norms and standards should support 
the normative component of an account of the means. I will show in Chapters 3 
and 4 that it is possible to localize uses of judgments of similarity in practices of 
representing. So the normative component of an account of the means of 
representation should explain how to build a characterization of similarity as 
means of representation from the observation of the standardizations and 
regulations of judgments of similarity in practice. The second point I extract from 
Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) proposal is that an account of the means of similarity 
should entail both a descriptive and a normative component, instead of being a 
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pure rational reconstruction of practices. The source of the normativity of the 
account should be the description of regulated uses, established norms, and 
standards in actual practices.  
The third particularity of Contessa’s account that I would like to discuss 
concerns the association he establishes between structural similarity and the 
“faithfulness” of scientific representation. So far in this thesis I have taken the 
expressions “an account of the means of representation”, “an account of accurate 
representation”, “an account of epistemically successful representation”, and “an 
account of faithful representation” as equivalent. But in fact, claiming that 
similarity as means of representation concerns the accuracy, the epistemic success, 
or the faithfulness of scientific representation has different implications.  
Let us first see how Contessa (2011) situates his own account. He starts by 
acknowledging that faithfulness and successfulness should be separated: 
“faithfulness and successfulness need not go hand in hand, since a less faithful 
model of a certain system can be predictively or explanatorily as successful as a 
more faithful one” (2011: 130-1). Someone might be able to construct a very faithful 
model of, Contessa adds, “my daughters tobogganing down the hill” (ibid.). That 
model would take into consideration, among other things, the air friction and the 
gravitational pull of the Moon. Alternatively, one could use a basic inclined plane 
model to describe Contessa’s daughters tobogganing down the hill. This one would 
be a less faithful model as far as it wouldn’t consider the gravitational pull of the 
Moon or the air friction (ibid.). The point of the example is to stress that, for the 
purpose at hand (to roughly predict whether the toboggan will go too fast) the two 
models would be equally successful (ibid.). I think we can unproblematically accept 
this conclusion. Moreover, one would usually prefer the less faithful model because 
it is easier to produce, simpler, and serves the same goal.  
However, there are some undesirable consequences derived from the 
distinction between faithfulness and success that Contessa (2007a, 2011) makes. 
The main issue is that what Contessa (2007a, 2011) is really interested in is the 
characterization of the faithfulness of a model, which is what he associates with the 
degree of structural similarity between the model and the target. The fact that 
Contessa also considers the success of representations is a way of introducing some 
pragmatic elements in the picture, so that the intentions of the epistemic agents 
can play a role in the selection of one scientific model over another (2011: 130-1). 
But those models from which epistemic agents select which one to use are already 
and objectively more faithful or less faithful to the target, depending on the degree 
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of structural similarity they have with it. Even if Contessa (2007b: 53n) argues that 
his conception of representation is triadic, that is, that epistemic agents are a 
constitutive part of the relation of representation together with vehicle and target, 
it is difficult to see how his characterization of faithfulness, and accordingly of 
similarity, can include the epistemic agents in the representation in a fundamental 
way. He certainly refers to how the relevant structures of vehicle and target have 
to be previously reconstructed by epistemic agents (2007a: 107). But, once 
reconstructed, Contessa explicitly claims that similarity concerns the overall 
faithfulness of the representation, that is, the relation (of co-instantiation of 
structures) between a vehicle and a target, as opposed to a specific kind of 
faithfulness that would involve the particular purposes of the agents (2007a: 171). 
If this is correct, I believe that Contessa’s (2007a) account is not really 
characterizing the relations epistemic agents actively employ to make successful 
inferences about a target from a model, which is the definition of means given by 
Suárez (2003, 2010). The epistemic agents decide whether they want to use the 
more faithful or less faithful model depending on their intentions. But structural 
similarity in Contessa’s account simply exists between a vehicle and a target. 
Contrary to this view, I would like to defend the idea that similarity as means of 
representation should be explicitly framed in a triadic conception of representation. 
A consequence of this is that similarity should be more adequately related to the 
epistemic success of a scientific representation, which depends on the goals of the 
particular practice, rather than the overall faithfulness of a representation. I will 
return to this point in Chapter 5, where I defend that a similarity-based account of 
the means of representation should not take faithfulness (or truthfulness) as the 
measure of the epistemic success of representations, but adopt instead a view where 
understanding is taken as the overarching aim of scientific practices of representing.  
 
 
2.2.2. Giere on similarity “in respects and degrees” 
The work of Giere (2004, 2008, 2010) is a central point of reference when studying 
the role of similarity in scientific representation. Although his account has been 
occasionally treated as a substantive account of representation based on similarity, 
if carefully analysed, it contains insightful tools to help advance an account of the 
means of representation. Probably the two main contributions of Giere’s (2004, 
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2008) work in this respect are his understanding of similarity as an intentional 
notion, instead of the sharing of properties between the vehicle and the target of 
the representation; and his understanding of similarity as an intuitive, common 
sense concept, which needs to be specified “in respects and degrees” depending on 
the particular scientific practice. These two points contrast with, and help amend, 
the three aspects of Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) account that I pointed out above.  
Giere (2010) defines his own view as an intentional conception of 
representation. This means that epistemic agents and their intentions are built into 
the definition of representation. 
 
I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that 
requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So 
the formula is: Agents (1) intend (2) to use models, M; (3) to represent a part 
of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using 
similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world (Giere 
2010: 269). 
 
This presupposes at least a triadic conception of representation, where apart from 
a model and a target there are agents leading the activity of representing. An 
intentional conception of representation might well have the slogan: “no 
representation without representers” (Giere 2008: 102). This is not incompatible 
with the thought that there are similarities between vehicle and target of the 
representation, insofar as we understand that epistemic agents are those who use 
those similarity relations for particular purposes. The intentional character of 
similarity becomes particularly clear in the following quote: 
 
It is not the model that is doing the representing; it is the scientist using 
the model who is doing the representing. One way scientists do this is by 
picking out some specific features of the model that are then claimed to be 
similar to features of the designated real system to some (perhaps fairly 
loosely indicated) degree of fit. (Giere 2004: 747-48) 
 
Similarity here is by definition dependent on scientists’ actions and purposes. 
Epistemic agents are responsible for “doing the representing”, “picking out specific 
features of the model”, “claiming them to be similar to features of the real system”, 
and “using the model”. These actions are not secondary pragmatic additions to a 
substantive definition of representation, but built into the definition of 
representation. Almost any contemporary philosopher of science would recognize 
that scientists intervene in the construction of models, and that their actions are 
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necessary for representation to happen at all. Giere (2004) is making a stronger 
pragmatic claim than that. He is saying that a model is what agents decide to use 
as a model; that representation is the action of representing performed by 
scientists; and that similarity is what scientists decide to pick out as similar features 
(or loosely similar features) between a vehicle and a target.18 I take the intentional 
character of similarity to be a fundamental element in Giere’s work to incorporate 
into an account of the means of representation. Yet, in the next subsection, I refer 
to a limitation of the idea of intentional similarity and suggest a more satisfactory 
way of addressing the role of epistemic agents in representation, drawing on 
Fraassen’s (2008) account.  
The second fundamental feature of Giere’s proposal concerns his idea that 
similarity always comes “in respects and degrees” (2010: 273-4). When one claims 
that a vehicle and a target, or any two objects more broadly, are similar to each 
other in respects and degrees, we would probably want to ask “but in what respects 
and to what degree?” Let us consider the implications of the terms “in respects” 
and “in degrees” separately. The phrase “similarity in certain respects” suggests that 
a vehicle and a target are relevantly similar to each in relation to some very specific 
features that epistemic agents have determined. A map that represents a city is 
similar to the city only regarding very few specific respects that agents have 
selected for the purpose of the representational activity (Giere 1999: 4). A tourist 
map representing Mexico City would usually be similar to the city with respect to 
the distribution of the streets on the ground, but not with respect to the elevations 
of the terrain or the density of the population in the city. Of course we can find 
maps that are similar to the city with respect to these other aspects too. Moreover, 
the tourist map might only be similar to the distribution of some commonly 
considered historically interesting streets in the city centre – and not to the 
distribution of secondary streets, mews, or vehicular roads. The few respects in 
which a representation is similar to its target should not (or not only) be 
understood as a limitation of the representation but ultimately as an opportunity 
for its epistemic success. The fact that the tourist map of Mexico City is only 
similar to the city with respect to the distribution of some historical streets would 
benefit its success (i.e. its greater usefulness): the reduction of possibilities of where 
to go in the city would help tourists reduce the time consumed in planning their 
                                             
18 Here I am disregarding the ambiguities in Giere’s (2004, 2010) account, to which I referred in 
Chapter 1, and assume that his (predominant) thesis is that similarity is a means and not a 
constituent of representation.  
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visit. Representations such as maps, but also scientific models, are not similar to 
their targets in all respects, nor do they attempt to be, but concerning certain aspects 
relevant for the case at hand. 
The phrase “similarity to a certain degree” can more easily lead to 
misinterpretation. I take Giere’s (2010) use of the term degree not to concern the 
overall degree of similarity between a vehicle and a target either, as Contessa for 
instance would claim (2007a: 171), up to perfect similarity, but to the specific 
respects previously identified. That is to say, the respects to which vehicle and 
target are similar to each other only need to be “loosely similar”, and not identical 
or close to identical. Repeating Giere’s words quoted above, “features of the model 
[…] are claimed to be similar to features of the designated real system to some 
(perhaps fairly loosely indicated) degree of fit” (2004: 748). The tourist map of 
Mexico City represents the city with respect to the distribution of the main 
historical streets. Even considering only that particular respect, we wouldn’t say 
that the map and the city instantiate exactly the same features, but are only loosely 
similar features. The distribution of the historical streets on the map might be for 
instance idealized as to form a more regular grid than they actually form on the 
ground. The idealization of the grid, also in the degree that is adequate for the case 
at hand, might help tourists more efficiently visualize the general distribution of 
streets. An important point is that every time a decision is made about the degree 
of similarity that is adequate for a specific respect, it is at the expenses of the degree 
of similarity of other respects of the representation. The example Giere (2006: 78) 
offers makes the point clearer: Mercator’s map of the world from 1569 was 
constructed with navigational purposes, while other maps such as the much more 
recent projection by Peters in 1973 were constructed with geographical purposes. 
The consequence of this is that Mercator’s map is similar (or loosely similar) to the 
Earth with respect to the distance between points on the surface, while seriously 
distorting the areas occupied by the continents. Meanwhile, Peters’s map is similar 
to the Earth with respect to the size of the different areas, but at the cost of not 
preserving distances between points on the surface (2006: 78). In this sense, the 
expression “similarity to a certain degree” does not really involve a higher or lower 
level of similarity of the whole representation regarding an ideal of complete 
similarity. What is at stake is the particular way in which different aspects of 
vehicle and target are specifically, selectively similar to each other as to be able to 
achieve a representation that is epistemically successful.  
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These two contributions from Giere’s (2004, 2006, 2010) work can help 
amend the three aspects of Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) account that I described above 
as not completely satisfactory when discussing similarity as means of 
representation. Giere’s version of similarity “in respects and degrees” appears to 
be more suitable than Contessa’s structural similarity account, as it can better 
characterize the many cases of representations that do not involve objects with a 
mathematical structure, such as maps and cities. Also, Giere’s emphasis on 
similarity as specifically selected for the case at hand contrasts with Contessa ’s 
(2007a, 2011) assumed connection between similarity and overall faithfulness. An 
account of similarity as means of representation should connect similarity with the 
epistemic success of representation, not with overall faithfulness, because it is the 
search for epistemic success, specified in particular epistemic goals (and usually 
non-epistemic goals) in specific contexts, what defines the relevant aspects of 
similarity that are included in the representation at the expenses of other aspects. 
In addition, Giere’s intentional notion of similarity truly implies a triadic 
conception of representation, differently from Contessa’s (2007a, 2011), where 
similarity merely concerns the sharing of a structure between vehicle and a target. 
Understanding similarity both as intentional and in respects and degrees 
stimulates a move away from the abstract analysis of the notion of similarity to the 
development of a pragmatic account sustained on the study of uses of similarity in 
the practice of representing. This also contrasts with Contessa’s account, which 
was restricted to a normative, rational reconstruction of modelling practices that 
didn’t consider how similarity is actively employed to make inferences. Still, we 
can also say that Giere’s proposal is incomplete regarding the development of a 
practical enquiry on the problem of representation. Now, I discuss some 
particularities of van Fraassen’s (2008) account that help to expand and further 
adjust these points.   
 
 
2.2.3. van Fraassen on distortive similarity and use  
A central element of van Fraassen’s recent philosophical project is the defence of a 
strong pragmatic view on representation, which he develops with the aid of notions 
like “perspective”, “indexicality”, and “use”. In his book Scientific Representation 
(2008), van Fraassen offers an updated version of his antirealist position 
“constructive empiricism” (1980), which he now calls “empiricist structuralism” 
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(2008: 237) to make room for a more appropriate (i.e. pragmatic) concept of 
representation (in Suárez 2011: 428). The role of similarity in van Fraassen’s 
proposal should be therefore framed in the context of advancing both a pragmatic 
and a structural type of account of representation. 
It is important to emphasize that although van Fraassen specifies similarity 
in terms of the structural properties of models and targets, or as “embedding” 
(2008: 29; earlier in 1980), he is not claiming that structural similarity is a 
constituent of the relation of representation (differently to French 2003; Bartels 
2006). He defends a deflationary view on representation that draws on the idea that 
“there is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made, or 
taken, to represent some things as thus or so” (2008: 23). Endorsing this general 
view on representation implies assuming that the question about the constituents 
of representation is irrelevant or even misleading. The question about the means, 
though, remains a legitimate problem that demands the study of the products of 
science and, more importantly, the study of the intellectual and material processes 
that lead to those products (ibid.: 18). Also, van Fraassen’s idea of structural 
similarity openly rejects any kind of metaphysical realism about structures (2008: 
190), differently to French and Ladyman (1999), and French and Bueno (2011). His 
idea of structure is not about what nature is but about what science is, and all 
science is “at heart mathematical” (2008: 238-9). Structuralism in van Fraassen’s 
account is strongly supported by pragmatics: “I shall advocate a version, an 
empiricist version, of structuralism. Once again, the redeeming clues are to be 
found in pragmatics” (ibid.: 190).  
Throughout this thesis I have been treating structural similarity as a type 
of similarity, isomorphism being the identity limit of similarity of structure. 
Certainly, we should be careful not to conflate accounts where similarity 
specifically concerns the structures of objects with an account where it concerns 
the properties of objects in other various ways, since this distinction has been an 
object of disagreement between philosophers like Giere (1990, 2004, 2006) and van 
Fraassen (1980, 2008) for some time. However, it is worth noting that van 
Fraassen’s most recent proposal draws on a discussion about a common, everyday, 
more intuitive notion of similarity to then build up an account focused on structural 
similarity. I would like to refer to two important assumptions about similarity – 
understood in the broader, more intuitive sense – that van Fraassen incorporates 
into his account, as they can enrich the previous points discussed regarding Giere’s 
(2004, 2006) and Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) accounts. One, van Fraassen (2008: 23) 
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doesn’t refers to scientists’ intentions to characterize the role of similarity in 
representation, but to the use of representations. Two, he does not only refer to the 
selective character of similarity, as Giere (2004, 2006) mainly does with the idea of 
“similarity in respects and degrees”, but also to the possible distorted character of 
similarity. 
The centrality of the concepts of “use” and “usefulness” in van Fraassen’s 
account should not be taken as a reference to the practical applications of scientific 
representations, but more fundamentally to the “indexicality” of representations 
(2008: 59). That is to say, scientific models and theories, van Fraassen claims, 
cannot do anything for us unless we can locate ourselves with respect to their 
content (ibid.: 235). So it is indispensable that representations include an indexical 
judgment of the kind “from here we stand” in them, in the same way maps have a 
legend indicating that “you are here” (ibid.: 81). There might be circumstances 
where scientific models even lack content, as in the Cartesian coordinate system, 
but as scientific representations, van Fraassen argues, they cannot lack indexicality 
(2008: 66-69). Locating the “use” at the core of representation therefore clashes 
with two-term conceptions of representation that do not consider where subjects 
stand. But it also clashes with triadic conceptions of representation grounded 
merely in subjects’ intentions.  
We saw that Giere (2004, 2006) advances an intentional conception of 
representation, in which epistemic agents are responsible for selecting relevant 
similarities in each scientific context depending on the purposes at hand. The idea 
of intentions is too heavily loaded with an individualistic view on representation 
though, probably inherited from classic accounts of representation in the 
philosophy of mind (van Fraassen 2008: 23-27). In contrast, van Fraassen’s urge 
to understand representation in direct connection with the idea of “use” can be 
taken as an invitation to further explore communal activities and social systems of 
practice in which representational activities take place. The idea of “use” might 
concern intentions and goals of the relevant epistemic agents, but encompasses 
also the coding conventions extant in the community, the reception of an audience 
or users, the particular display of the objects doing the representing, among other 
things (ibid.: 23). Van Fraassen doesn’t elaborate much on the communal 
implications that bringing the idea of use to the core of an account of representation 
has. But his acknowledgment of this point (in a footnote) invites to explore the 
consequences of his view in this direction: 
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The emphasis on use, as here understood, implies community: there is no 
such thing as essentially private representation any more than private 
language, except in the sense in which private uses can exist as derived from 
or parasitic on communal practices. (van Fraassen 2008: 348n24) 
 
Representation is possible only in a context where certain systems of practice, 
developed skills, agreed standards, depicting conventions, symbol systems, 
“languages of art”, and other modes and activities concerning representation are 
already shared in a community. A significant difference between Giere’s (2004, 
2006) and van Fraassen’s (2008) views is that, although both endorse triadic 
conceptions of representation, they could be respectively characterized as 
“intentionality” and “intended-use” accounts of representation (Suárez 2011: 430). 
In the first case, representation is necessarily individual; it is located “in the head” 
so to speak, and sources and targets are determined by some intentional state of 
particular agents, regardless of community or practices (ibid.: 432). Meanwhile, an 
“intended-use” conception of representation, of the kind van Fraassen (2008) and 
Suárez (2011: 432) advocate, grounds representation in the social world. 
The move from an “intentional” to an “intended-use” conception of 
representation has consequences for the characterization of the role of similarity 
in representation. If for Giere (2004) similarities are selected by agents, depending 
on their intentions, in an “intended-use” conception, the role of similarity as means 
of representation should be at least partly explained by reference to the historical 
and social agreements of the scientific and extra-scientific communities. For 
instance, from a conception based on “use”, one could enquire about how certain 
similarities become relevant in specific historical moments and specific epistemic 
groups. One could also enquire about the processes of systematization of certain 
similarities that might help regulate practices of representing. This will be relevant 
for the case of the methodologies of physical similarity that I will discuss in 
Chapter 4. One could also ask about the role of similarity in the formation of so-
called “realistic styles” of representation, as for instance they have traditionally 
existed in the pictorial arts but also concerning the use of images in science (see 
Goodman 1968: 38). Or one could ask about the extent to which human perception 
plays a role in establishing agreements about relevant respects of similarity or not. 
I don’t attempt to respond to all these stimulating questions in the present thesis. 
Further research would be required to advance an exhaustive practice-based, 
historically and socially-engaged account of representation. For the more limited 
goals of this thesis, I would like to defend the notion that we should implement a 
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framework to study the problem of representation in direct connection to its “use”, 
precisely because this framework allows us to ask all those questions about 
similarity and take the responses seriously. I will make the specific suggestion in 
Chapter 3 that examining scientists’ use of various judgments concerning model-
target comparisons during modelling practices is a valuable source to study the 
agreements that conduct to the production of successful representations, including 
those concerning similarity.  
It might be true that van Fraassen (2008) doesn’t say much about how 
different systems of representation arise and eventually allow communities to 
produce fruitful types of representations. In Suárez’s words, Fraassen’s Hauptsatz 
is probably “very thin and provides little by way of understanding the relevant 
practices” involved in representation (2011: 240).19 Van Fraassen is aware of this 
limitation. He recognizes that philosophers of science have usually a vision of 
science “from above” (2008: 91). Their views focus on what is achieved when it has 
been achieved; that is, the products of science such as models or theories, instead 
of on the long journey from the initial research steps to the attainment of 
temporarily stable representations (ibid.). Still, we can agree that his move to a 
view based primarily on “use” is a step towards a thoroughly pragmatic, social, and 
historically-sensitive conception of scientific representation (Suárez 2011: 433). 
The second point in van Fraassen’s account that I would like to discuss is 
his understanding of similarity not only as selective but, more importantly, as 
compatible with the introduction of distortions in representational practices. We 
have seen that Giere (2004) emphasized the selective character of similarity in 
claims such as “using a model to represent some aspect of the world is being able 
to pick out the relevantly similar features” (2004: 747). Also van Fraassen (2008) 
refers to the selective character of similarity when he describes the activity of 
representing partly as a “technique for rendering a systematically selective 
likeness” (2008: 8), or when he claims that “likeness in contextually selective 
fashion is important to scientific practice” (ibid.: 9). However, van Fraassen (2008: 
13) points out that whenever there is selection of similarities, there is inclusion of 
distortions, infidelities, and lack of resemblance, all of them possibly crucial to the 
                                             
19 In a recent paper, Boesch (2017) suggests that the agential concepts – such as “use” – frequently 
incorporated into accounts of representation remain mostly unanalysed. To advance a 
comprehensive account of representation, something has to be said about the nature of the actions 
and agency embedded in the use of representation. And this is something that still remains to be 
done (Boesch 2017). 
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success of the same representations. The “use” determines the selection of 
likenesses that are involved in a representation; at the same time, that 
representation “trades equally on unlikeness, distortion, addition” (ibid.: 7). If we 
take similarity as the core of representation, as substantive accounts of 
representation like those of French (2003) or Bartels (2006) do, it would be 
puzzling to admit that distortion might be needed for effective representation. But, 
and this is the key of van Fraassen’s position, if resemblances are “means to an 
end”, and not the core of representation, there is no puzzle at all (2008: 15). 
Similarity is a means to achieve the epistemic goals of a practice of representing, 
and as such it can work in combination with distortion if doing so facilitates the 
attainment to those epistemic goals.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. “Enrique Peña Nieto and Justin Trudeau bridge gap over Donald 
Trump”. By Graeme MacKay. National Newswatch (June 29 2016). 
 
An illustrative example of this view on similarity is found in caricatures (van 
Fraassen 2008: 15). A caricature is a picture that contains identifiable relevant 
similarities with the target of the representation. For example, in Figure 1, there 
is a figure that bears identifiable similarities with Donald Trump. At the same time, 
the same figure considerably distorts that very same target, Donald Trump, as he 
is represented as something he is not, namely a creature made out of flames and 
smoke that hides under the ground. A caricature is a specific type of representation 
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characterized usually by its pictorial simplicity and the goal of conveying a critical 
message about a public figure or current affair. In this context, we would usually 
agree that the caricature in Figure 1 is a successful representation of Trump, in the 
very specific way in which caricatures are considered successful. Or more precisely, 
it is a successful representation of a specific event: the encounter of the heads of 
state of Canada and Mexico under Trump’s scrutiny. The aim of this particular 
caricature was to manifest the tension of the political encounter between Enrique 
Peña Nieto and Justin Trudeau, possibly given the threatening promises made by 
Trump about breaking the NAFTA.  
Selective similarities are introduced in the caricature to help achieve the 
particular goal of the representation. For instance, similarities with respects to the 
physiognomies of Trump, Peña Nieto, and Trudeau, as well as with respect to the 
shape of the geographical limits of the U.S. territory, are included. Van Fraassen 
(2008: 14) mentions two possible functions of these selected similarities. On the 
one hand, similarity may play “the function of being a vehicle of reference”: we 
recognize one of the characters in the caricature as Trump because of the 
resemblance in certain respects to Trump (shape of the face, hair, etc.). This doesn’t 
mean that reference needs similarity, as reference can occur through linguistic or 
other symbolic means. But it means that reference can be “effected by selective uses 
of resemblance and non-resemblance” (van Fraassen 2008: 14).20 On the other 
hand, similarity “may also be the means of attribution or misattribution of some 
characteristic” (ibid.). Similarities help us recognize Trump in the caricature, but 
also identify specific qualities attributed to Trump. Here it becomes evident that 
similarity and distortion go hand in hand. The physiognomic features that make 
Trump recognizable in the picture are the same features that are seriously 
distorted: his body is shapeless or has the diluted shape of flames, and his face and 
body have the colours of fire. These are commonly considered features 
iconographically associated with figures of demons or the devil.21 So the features 
that distort Trump in the caricature are the same features that make Trump similar 
to the devil in some respects. To put it in Goodmanian words, we know that this 
is a representation of Trump, not of the devil, but we also know, as pertinent 
                                             
20 The term “effected” should be understood as ‘permitting effective reference to occur’ in the 
representation. 
21 There is an additional level of discussion concerning the connection between similarities and 
symbolisms involved here. Fire and references to the centre of the Earth are traditional 
attributions to the devil. 
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audience of the image, that it represents Trump as thus or so, that is, as the devil 
(van Fraassen 2008: 14; following Goodman 1968: 27-31)22. In short, similarities 
work together with distortions in the task of achieving the goal of the 
representation. The likeness to the devil, which are unlikenesses to Trump, help 
highlight the hostile character of Trump’s policies and discourses. I shall refer to 
the distortive character of relevant similarities in more detail in Chapter 5, when I 
propose the notion of “creative similarity” precisely to address this features of 
similarity. 
The contributions that I extracted from van Fraassen’s (2008) account help 
complement the characterizations of similarity that Giere (2004, 2006) and 
Contessa (2007a, 2011) offered. The notion of similarity broadly understood is 
conceived by van Fraassen as compatible with distortion, the two working 
together towards the same epistemic end of representational practice. This opposes 
the thought that there are levels of similarity that correspond to an overall 
faithfulness of a representation (Contessa 2007a). The example of the caricature 
shows how it is not so pertinent to refer to the higher or lower levels of similarity 
of the image. Neither the inclusion of more similarities with respect to the target 
of the representation (more details about the political event, more features of the 
politicians represented), nor the use of a more realistic pictorial style of 
representing, would have necessarily rendered the caricature more successful. The 
specific goals of the representation are what determines the adequate combination 
of similarities and distortions employed. As van Fraassen (2008: 15) remarks, in a 
certain political context “a caricature may rightly be judged to be accurate, [while] 
in another misleading or blatantly false” (2008: 15); “much hinges here on what the 
criteria of success were when [a representation] was made” (ibid.: 13). It is possible 
to imagine a different context in which the caricature above would be unsuccessful 
(or bad, false, incomprehensible); for instance, one in which Trump was recognized 
for his ability to advance conciliatory foreign policies. A list of likenesses separated 
from the understanding of the use of the representation is not going to tell us how 
successful the caricature is. The main lessons I take from van Fraassen’s proposal 
are his strong pragmatic view on representation focused on the idea of “use”, which 
invites us to study the community agreements and social systems of practice in 
                                             
22 Of course Goodman (1968) would reject this description of the image in terms of similarity. In 
any case, van Fraassen (2008: 11) adopts Goodman’s (1968) distinction between “representation 
of” and “representation as” in the context of characterizing the role of similarity in representation 
in a way that does not contradict but is compatible with the introduction of distortions. 
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which representational practices take place; and his general characterization of the 
role of similarity in representation as compatible with the role of distortion. 
 
 
 
2.3. Conclusions 
This chapter attempted to establish some important premises to discuss what an 
account of the means of representation is, and what an account of the means of 
representation focused on similarity would sustain. I started arguing that there is 
a patent intuition among many philosophers of science that similarities are 
involved in numerous scientific models. But explaining what exactly that 
involvement is remains an open object of debate. The thought that similarity might 
be an effective means of representation seems to be a promising way of addressing 
the issue. The general claim that an account of the means of representation focused 
on similarity, like the one I intend to advance, would sustain could be expressed as 
follows: similarity is one of the common relations (or the relation, in a stronger 
version of it, which I rejected) actively employed by epistemic agents to perform 
successful inferences from a model about a target in the world (Suárez 2003, 2010). 
In other words, proposing an account of the means of representation focused on 
similarity can help describe how an epistemically relevant set of successful 
representations are produced in science. 
There are, however, a few arguments that should make us doubt whether 
similarity is actually a good candidate for means of representation. The argument 
from variety claims that, given the huge diversity of models there are, and the 
different ways in which epistemic agents can potentially employ relations between 
vehicle and target to make inferences, similarity could be at best one among many 
other means. To this I replied that similarity might not be the only means of 
representation. But this should not stop the project of attempting to develop a 
comprehensive and generic to some extent (although not universal) type of account 
focused on similarity, if there is evidence that in a plurality of modelling practices 
similarity works as effective means of representation. The argument from 
vagueness claims that similarity is an empty or utterly vague concept, given that 
its meaning has to be specified in every particular case. To this argument I replied 
that having an absolute, scientifically objective definition of similarity doesn’t seem 
achievable, but that it should not be an aspiration either. What we can do is study 
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how similarity works in practices of representing, where standards and general 
agreement about definitions of similarity are established. Lastly, the argument 
from misrepresentation against the means claims that, since scientific models 
distort, idealize, and abstract the targets they represent, similarity doesn’t seem a 
good candidate for means of representation. I replied to this argument that 
similarity and distortion, as they actually intervene in practices of representing, 
are not incompatible with each other but intertwined resources. Therefore, 
similarity, if it is not characterized as “bare similarity” (as I will define in Chapter 
5 in detail) can be still considered a means of representation in multiple cases of 
scientific models that contain distortions.  
Then, I discussed some constructive proposals in recent philosophy of 
science that can help to advance an account of the means of representation focused 
on similarity. Referring to Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) work helped me highlight that, 
first, the more intuitive and flexible notion of “similarity” seems more promising 
than a structural conception of similarity to advance a comprehensive account of 
the means of representation that encompasses a variety of practices. Second, 
developing an account of the means requires a practical enquiry into the uses of 
similarity in modelling practice, not only a purely normative approach to it. Third, 
the role of similarity should be more directly connected to epistemic success than 
to the overall faithfulness of representations. Looking at Giere’s (2004, 2006) 
account was particularly useful to emphasize that similarity as effective means of 
representation always comes in respects and degrees; and that within a triadic 
conception of representation, similarity is not a relation between vehicle and 
target, but it includes the epistemic agents and their intentions as well. Finally, 
from van Fraassen’s (2008) account I explicitly endorsed the idea that similarity is 
defined by the “use” of the representation, which concerns systems of practice and 
communal agreements. Also, the idea that similarities and distortions are 
compatible and mutually enriching in the practice of representing that van 
Fraassen (2008) defends will be fundamental to propose the notion of “creative 
similarity” later on in the thesis.  
The discussion in the following two chapters incorporates the various 
conclusions achieved in this chapter, both concerning the constraints to develop 
an account of the means of representation and the positive components that such 
an account should include. The direction that needs to be followed now is the more 
direct study of practices of representing, including the actual role of similarity in 
them. The development of a practical enquiry involves paying attention to 
CHAPTER 2: SIMILARITY AS MEANS OF REPRESENTATION 
76 
 
 
particular case studies and to scientists’ use of judgments concerning model-word 
comparisons during the construction of scientific models.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Judgments of Similarity in Scientific Practice 
Chapter 3: Judgments of Similarity in Scientific 
Practice 
 
In the previous chapter I examined some key proposals in recent philosophy of 
science that have contributed to the discussion about the means of representation. 
I discussed some accounts that have taken similarity as a possible means of 
representation (Suárez 2003, 2010; Contessa 2007a, 2011; Giere 2004, 2005; and 
van Fraassen 2008). An important conclusion was that advancing an account of 
the means of representation requires developing a practical type of enquiry, focused 
on the use of representation. A practical enquiry makes it possible to observe how 
certain relations are actively employed by epistemic agents to make inferences 
about a target in the world from the use of a model, which is the definition of means 
offered by Suárez (2003; 2010). There is, however, an important element that has 
not been sufficiently spelt out in accounts that address the problem of the means 
of representation: how do we specifically observe and reach conclusions about the 
relations actively employed by epistemic agents to make inferences about certain 
targets in the world? The goal of this chapter is to argue that the study of 
scientists’ judgments concerning model-target comparisons during modelling 
practices is crucial to develop a philosophical account of the means of 
representation supported on a systematic practical enquiry. I will focus on the 
formulation of judgments of similarity in modelling practices, as this will be the 
basis from which to advance a similarity-based account of the means of 
representation later on in the thesis. 
With the term “judgments of similarity” I try to encompass the various 
expressions containing the idea of similarity (and associated concepts like 
resemblance and similitude) that scientists make use of in representational 
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practices concerning model-target comparisons. In the process of designing, 
constructing, and evaluating scientific models, scientists and engineers use 
judgments of similarity regarding the features, behaviours, and relations involved 
in a particular model in comparison with features, behaviours and relations 
involved in the target of the representation. The attention to the uses of judgments 
of similarity in scientific practice offers valuable insight about how similarity plays 
a role in the production of epistemically successful representations. Records of the 
uses of judgments of similarity might be explicitly displayed in scientific reports, 
technical manuals, interviews, and published articles. In those cases, it is easier to 
track the involvement of particular judgments of similarity in the decisions and 
agreements relating to the construction of specific models. In other cases, there 
might not be explicit records of the judgments made. Still, if a comprehensive 
practice-based analysis of particular case studies is developed, it should be possible 
to identify some of the judgments involved in the actions scientists perform during 
representational practices, including judgments of similarity. In the present 
chapter I introduce several examples that illustrate the presence of judgments of 
similarity in a variety of practices of representing in science. Later, in Chapter 4, I 
develop a detailed analysis of a case study (of scale models in engineering) to show 
how specific judgments of similarity participate in the construction of epistemically 
successful representations. These analyses support the idea that similarity is a 
good candidate to develop an account of the means of representation, since it plays 
a significant role in the production of a variety of modelling practices that we 
recognize as epistemically successful. Moreover, these practice-based analyses of 
the actual role of judgments of similarity help resist the arguments in recent 
philosophy of science that claim similarity is unimportant for representation in 
general.  
First, this chapter begins by introducing some reflections on the projects of 
“Philosophy of Science in Practice” (PSP) and “integrated History and Philosophy 
of Science” (iHPS) in Section 3.1. These projects, or fields of study, offer ideal 
frameworks with which to develop a practical enquiry on the problem of the means 
of representation (Chang 2012; Schickore 2011; Dear 2012). An account of the 
means of representation would especially benefit from endorsing the rationale of 
PSP and iHPS because these fields offer methodological tools to reconcile, in a 
single account, the description of scientific practices and a normative view of 
philosophical problems like representation. In Section 3.2, I argue that studying 
the uses of judgments in scientific practice is fundamental to develop an account of 
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the means of representation framed within the projects of PSP or iHPS. I briefly 
discuss the implications of the notion of “judgments” and their role in science 
(Elgin 1996; Brown 1988; 2006; Siegel 2004; Tversky 1977; Giere 1988; Wimsatt 
2007). Lastly, in Section 3.3, I introduce the expression “judgments of similarity”, 
and characterize it with the help of some important contributions in recent 
philosophy of science (Weisberg 2013; Sterrett 2009, 2017a, 2017b); finally, I 
present some examples that illustrate the presence of judgments of similarity in a 
variety of modelling practices (Bengoetxea et al. 2014; Morgan 2012; Ankeny et 
al. 2014). 
 
 
 
3.1. Methodological lessons from PSP and iHPS 
The fields of Philosophy of Science in Practice (PSP) and integrated History and 
Philosophy of Science (iHPS) can be taken as particular manifestations of the wider 
project to naturalize philosophy of science, which in turn is a product of the wider 
project to naturalize epistemology that took place during the second half of the 
twentieth century (see Kuhn 1962; Quine 1969; Goldman 1986; Giere 1988; and 
Kornblith 1988, for influential works on the naturalization of  epistemology and 
philosophy of  science). Broadly speaking, naturalized epistemology aims to study 
the processes by which beliefs are produced, on the assumption that this would 
help determine which of  those beliefs constitute knowledge (Eraña 2007: 101). In 
philosophy of  science, naturalized approaches claim, with similar motivations, that 
scientific practices ought to be taken seriously into consideration as sources with 
which to evaluate scientific knowledge (Ankeny et al. 2011: 304). Various aspects 
of  scientific practices are emphasized in naturalized philosophy of  science, 
depending on the particular approach, from the psychological components of  
practices, to the biological, neurological, sociological, or historical aspects they 
entail. I would like to focus on the projects of  iHPS and PSP within this broader 
trend, as they address particularly relevant methodological issues that can help in 
the endeavour of advancing an account of the means of representation. Some well-
known examples among the varied works in iHPS and PSP are found in Shapin 
(1994), Hacking (1999), Chang (2004), Schickore and Steinle (2006), Daston and 
Galison (2007), and Dear (2012).  
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The most explicit characterization of the project of philosophy of science in 
practice has been formulated in the mission statement of the Society for Philosophy 
of Science in Practice (SPSP),23 and by some of its founding members in Ankeny et 
al. (2011). The SPSP was created in 2006 to advocate “a philosophy of scientific 
practice, based on an analytic framework that takes into consideration theory, 
practice and the world simultaneously” (the SPSP Mission Statement). To develop 
such a project, one of the first things its advocates had to do was to define scientific 
practices: 
 
Practice consists of organized or regulated activities aimed at the 
achievement of certain goals. Therefore, the epistemology of practice must 
elucidate what kinds of activities are required in generating knowledge. 
Traditional debates in epistemology (concerning truth, fact, belief, 
certainty, observation, explanation, justification, evidence, etc.) may be re-
framed with benefit in terms of activities. In a similar vein, practice-based 
treatments will also shed further light on questions about models, 
measurement, experimentation, etc., which have arisen with prominence in 
recent decades from considerations of actual scientific work. (SPSP Mission 
Statement) 
 
Practices here are not taken as the sum of individual actions, but as organized and 
regulated systems of actions that concern a community and their epistemic (and 
non-epistemic) goals. The mission statement also points out that the philosophy of 
science in practice is “concerned with not only the acquisition and validation of 
knowledge, but its use” (SPSP Mission Statement). I take this to imply that the 
study of practices is neither limited to the analysis of what has traditional been 
called the context of discovery – acquisition of knowledge – nor exclusively the 
context of justification – validation of knowledge – (distinction proposed by 
Reichenbach (1938). Studying practices concerns an analysis of the “use” of 
scientific knowledge, an idea that blurs the sharp distinction between the two 
contexts. The use, as I claimed in Chapter 2 when discussing van Fraassen’s (2008) 
proposal, involves not merely how pre-existing knowledge gets applied to practical 
ends but more importantly “how knowledge itself is fundamentally shaped by its 
intended use” (SPSP Mission Statement). An account of the means of 
representation fits with the rationale of PSP to the extent that it should assume 
that the study of the use of scientific representations will offer insights on how 
                                             
23 SPSP Website. Consulted 12 January 2018. http://www.philosophy-science-
practice.org/about/mission-statement  
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representations are fundamentally shaped, as well as how they are validated as 
successful or unsuccessful by the relevant epistemic communities.  
A suggestive distinction concerning the project of PSP can be helpful here. 
Dupré (2012: 9) differentiates between an account of “philosophy of science-in-
practice” and “philosophy-of-science in practice”. While an account of philosophy-
of-science in practice implies advancing a philosophical work that engages with 
scientists’ conceptions of philosophical problems, philosophy of science-in-practice 
is philosophy that analyses science in the making, engaging with the communities 
producing science (i.e. their various goals, tools and social structures). Suárez 
(2015) uses this distinction to suggest two possible approaches to the study of 
scientific representation from a deflationary perspective. An account of 
representation from the point of view of the philosophy of science-in-practice 
would take the study of the use of representation as indispensable to determine its 
content (ibid.: 47). Meanwhile, an account of representation from the point of view 
of philosophy-of-science in practice would imply that the analysis of the 
constitutive question on representation, even where feasible, cannot explain its use 
and conditions of application (ibid.). Whether one endorses a deflationary 
perspective on representation or not, the distinction between the two approaches 
of PSP is especially relevant as background against which to articulate an analysis 
of the problem of the means of representation.  
I would like to claim that both approaches to PSP should ideally be 
incorporated into a comprehensive account of the means of representation. Such 
an account should incorporate an approach in terms of philosophy of science-in-
practice because an investigation of the means of representation demands more 
than the study of the final products of science (theories, models, simulations). It 
requires the study of science-in-practice, of the use of scientific representation, and 
the paths to successful models and fruitful inferences. More specifically, the study 
of the means of representation should be primarily a study of the resources used in 
the practice of representing that, at the end of that practice, permit epistemic 
agents to actively employ relations between vehicle and target to make inferences, 
instead of mainly a study of those relations employed at the end of the practices of 
representing. The twofold understanding of the idea of means of representation as 
relations employed at the end of the practice and as resources used in the construction 
of representations will be reconsidered in Chapter 5. 
An account of the means of representation should also incorporate an 
approach to philosophy-of-science in practice, in the sense that it should adopt a 
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pragmatic or practice-based methodology in philosophy-of-science. This 
pragmatic methodology can be interpreted as one that facilitates the integration of 
a descriptive and a normative component within the same account of the means of 
representation. I would like to argue that the particular methodological tool that 
would allow the integration of the descriptive and the normative components is 
the study of the judgments formulated by epistemic agents concerning model-
target comparisons throughout representational practices. For instance, the 
systematic study of the use of judgments of similarity in modelling practices would 
allow us to support a similarity-based account of the means of representation. In 
other words, the description of actual uses of judgments of similarity in 
representational practices should be a source of normativity in an account of the 
means of representation focused on similarity. An alternative account of the means 
of representation, for instance focused on exemplification or convention, would 
have to be sustained on the uses of judgments of convention or exemplification in 
representational practices.  
The project of iHPS has similar motivations to PSP, although it pays 
particular attention to the idea that attention to scientific practices inevitably 
involves historical aspects of practices, and the communities, contexts, and rules 
that govern them at particular historical moments. Work in iHPS initiated in the 
1960s, stimulated by Kuhn’s (1962) work, and was profuse over the following 
decades.24 The field of iHPS faces particularly interesting methodological 
dilemmas, the main one of which is, of course, how to integrate philosophical and 
historical perspectives on science into a single account. More specifically, how do 
we gather historical evidence about particular circumstances to justify 
philosophical claims, which have a universal (and even ahistorical) character? How 
do we support general philosophical claims with a handful of singular events?25 
These problems resonate with the broader issue of how to develop an account that 
descriptive of the historically contingent scientific enterprise and, at the same time, 
keeps its normative character as a genuine philosophical discourse. I would like to 
refer to the responses that Schickore (2011) and Chang (2012), among others, have 
                                             
24 The volume Integrating History and Philosophy of Science. Problems and Prospects (Mauskopf and 
Schmaltz 2012) offers a good overview of the state of the field of iHPS after fifty years of debate. 
25 Whether philosophical claims have an ahistorical character or not is itself a point of discussion 
within iHPS. Authors like Kuukkanen (2015: 1) argue that philosophy and history entail 
incompatible metaphysics, i.e. essentialist versus historicist metaphysics, while others like Chang 
(2012) argue that it is possible to conceive philosophy as a historically-engaged endeavour.  
83 
 
 
offered to this challenge. From there I extract general methodological guidelines 
for the project of developing an account of the means of representation.  
The assumption that iHPS faces the problem of combining two perspectives, 
one historical and one philosophical, involves, following Schickore (2011) and 
Chang (2012), a confrontational model. A confrontational model is one in which 
frameworks from different fields are supposed to be contrasted with one another. 
If we accept the confrontational model of iHPS, Schickore (2011: 469) argues, there 
is the worry that the frameworks of philosophy and history of science appear so 
fundamentally different that we conclude that generalizations cannot be drawn 
from isolated instances or case studies. However, both Schickore (2011) and Chang 
(2012) reject the confrontational model. Philosophical reflection is above all an 
interpretive endeavour, consisting in an attempt to understand scientific concepts 
and practices by understanding how they came about (Schickore 2011: 455). In 
other words, the idea of “combining” history and philosophy is misguided from the 
outset, since the analysis of science involves “interpretation, clarification, and 
explication of scientific concepts and arguments” (ibid.: 471). In equivalent terms, 
Chang (2012: 110) vehemently rejects what he calls “the inductive view of the 
history-philosophy relation, which takes history as particular and philosophy as 
general”. His argument is that, when we extract abstract insights from concrete 
cases, that is not so much a process of generalization as an articulation of what was 
already put into the cases that we have somehow produced ourselves. That is why, 
instead of the notion of “case studies”, Chang (ibid.) prefers to use the term 
“historical episodes”. The idea of an episode makes more evident the abstract and 
analytical tools required to select and characterize what a relevant case study (or 
episode) is in the first place.  
From the proposals of Schickore (2011) and Chang (2012) we can conclude 
that the work in iHPS doesn’t have to proceed either “bottom-up” or “top-down”, 
as traditional discussions in the confrontational model claim (Schickore 2011: 472). 
An account in iHPS does not strictly proceed bottom-up because it is not merely a 
generalization from actual events, insofar as one needs preliminary concepts to 
examine historical records and distinguish between events (ibid.). It does not 
proceed strictly top-down either, because it is not an illustration or test of 
preconceived ideas about science. Examination of the historical record will affect 
the initial preconceived ideas as well (ibid.). This shouldn’t be taken as a 
shortcoming of the methodology of iHPS but as an acknowledgement of the stance 
that, as epistemic agents, we always act in medias res (Elgin 1996: 15). Preliminary 
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concepts are adjusted in the light of particular cases until a cogent interpretation 
is obtained, in such a way that all the elements we have are kept in a relation of 
“reflective equilibrium” (Schickore 2011: 472; Elgin 1996: 14; originally in Rawls 
1971). A system in reflective equilibrium maintains its elements in balance and 
coherence with each other. But more than coherence between the elements of a 
system is required. The system is also “reflective” because its components have to 
be reasonable in light of one another, and the system as a whole has to be 
reasonable in light of our previous tenable commitments (Elgin 1996: 107).  
Developing a practical enquiry on the problem of the means of 
representation requires examining particular case studies, which are typically 
historical cases. So the methodological reflections in iHPS just pointed out can 
assist in defining a framework to develop it. A case-study-based, historically-
engaged account of the means of representation would not work in a top-down or 
a bottom-up direction strictly speaking. The process is, as for any account in iHPS, 
interpretive. Preliminary ideas about what the means of representation are and 
how successful scientific representations are produced help the search for concrete 
examples and historical case studies. From the detailed examination of those 
examples and case studies we extract some conclusions that might lead to the 
revision of preliminary ideas. When an adequate equilibrium is achieved, even if it 
is a revisable one, we might be able to make some insightful generalizations about 
the functioning of certain means of representation and the dynamics of 
constructing successful representation.  
My own proposal exemplifies this methodological strategy. I draw on initial 
assumptions about similarity as a possible effective and prevalent means of 
representation in science. The selection of cases I introduce – of scale models in 
Chapter 4, as well as various examples of modelling practices later on in this 
chapter – is motivated by those initial assumptions. The analysis of particular cases 
helped me observe that similarity indeed plays a role in the construction of multiple 
successful representations, through the formulation of a variety of judgments of 
similarity, even beyond the initial expectations. Also, the observations made in the 
case studies led to the amendment of the initial assumptions: similarity is present 
in practices of representing under the form of judgments of similarity that are in 
constant combination with judgments of distortion, depending on the goals of the 
practice. This fact prevented me from proposing an account of the means of 
representation focused on similarity understood as “pure” or “bare similarity”. I 
will explain in Chapter 5 what precisely I mean with “bare similarity”, and defend 
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the idea that an account of the means of representation should be focused instead 
on the idea of “creative similarity”, which captures much better the dynamics of the 
interplay of judgments of similarity and distortion in representational practices. 
 
 
 
3.2. Judgments in scientific practice 
In this section, I discuss the idea of “judgments in scientific practice”, to then focus 
on “judgments of similarity” in the next. Some contemporary philosophers of 
science like Weisberg (2013: 138) have argued that an analysis of the problem of 
representation should reflect judgments that scientists actually make in practice. 
This is, I believe, an adequate starting point from which to develop an account of 
the means of representation. Yet, Weisberg (2013) does not specify what the idea 
of judgments exactly comprises, nor is it sufficiently spelt out to what extent his 
account relies on actual judgments that scientists make. My aim here is to 
articulate, in more detail than Weisberg (2013) does, what the idea of “judgments” 
would entail in the context of discussing scientific practices.  
Two clarifications, coming from debates outside philosophy of science, can 
help elucidate the implications of incorporating the term “judgments” in an account 
of the means of representation framed in PSP or iHPS. The first is that the term 
judgment can be used both to refer to an ability humans exercise (i.e. a process) 
and to the result of such an ability (i.e. a product with specific content). The second 
clarification is that the notion of judgment has been profusely discussed both in the 
fields of epistemology and experimental psychology in recent times, with slightly 
different implications in each field. I expand on these points, and specify what I 
take from each of them when using the notion of judgments in scientific practice.  
There are two possible meanings of the term ‘judgment’, as a process and 
as a product. The first entry of the Cambridge Dictionary for judgment defines it 
as an uncountable noun, the “ability to form valuable opinions and make good 
decisions”; the second defines it as a countable noun, the “decision or opinion about 
someone or something that you form after thinking carefully”. The distinction 
between the two meanings is relevant because some disagreements about what 
judgments are maybe caused by an emphasis on one or other meaning of the term. 
For instance, in debates in epistemology, Brown (1988) has prioritised the idea of 
judgment as a process, while Siegel (2004) rejects Brown’s proposal by arguing 
CHAPTER 3. JUDGMENTS OF SIMILARITY IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 
86 
 
 
that he does not address the specific content of judgments (judgment as product). 
I take the term “judgments in scientific practice” to involve the two senses of the 
term to some extent. Scientists employ their ability to make judgments concerning 
model-target comparisons throughout practices of representing in science. There 
are, at the same time, specific analysable contents in the judgments scientists 
formulate concerning the construction of representations. We should be wary of 
not reducing the ability to make judgments (and the processes and actions 
connected to that performed ability) to the propositional content of the judgments. 
One must avoid the “mistake of only paying attention to the propositional aspects 
of the scientific actions” (Chang 2014: 67). Scientific work consists of organized 
systems of physical, mental, material, and social actions. With the practice-turn in 
philosophy of science – which coincides with the booming of iHPS and later on 
PSP – the focus of attention changed from propositions to the study of those 
actions (ibid.). There is certainly propositional content in judgments formulated in 
scientific practices (including judgments of similarity). But our study of judgments 
concerning model-target comparisons should go beyond propositional analysis of 
them. It should also be a study of how and when scientists formulate those 
judgments in connection to different activities in representational practices 
(design, construction, evaluation of models), and how those judgments trigger 
certain actions, decisions and agreements, in an epistemic community. 
Moving to the second clarification, it is worth noting that the idea of 
judgment has been debated both by epistemologists and experimental 
psychologists in recent times. In epistemology, judgments are examined in relation 
to debates on rationality (Brown 1988; Govier 1999; Siegel 2004), while in 
psychology, the term judgment is used in the context of investigating individuals’ 
decision-making ability (Simon 1955; Tversky 1977; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
2011). Some particularities from each of these fields relevant to my argument are 
pointed out.  
In epistemology, recent views on the problem of rationality, like those of 
Brown (1988) and Govier (1999), defend the idea that rational claims should be 
understood in connection to the role of judgments. This is contrary to classical 
conceptions on rationality in epistemology, in which rational claims are a matter 
of conformity to explicit rules, such as logical, inductive, or evidential rules (Siegel 
2004: 598). The problem with the classical conception of rationality is that, even if 
rules are desirable operating principles, the process of deciding which rules to 
adopt, or when rules should be relaxed or reconsidered, takes us inevitably to 
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subjects’ judgments (Brown 2006: 649). So if we want to make sense of actual 
human exercises of rationality, we cannot exclude the role of judgments from our 
account. This position would move us closer to the definition of judgment as a 
process in which an ability is exercised. Notwithstanding this, the validity of 
specific judgments seems to be a matter of satisfying relevant criteria. And what 
are relevant criteria if not rules that are followed, consciously or not, by a relevant 
epistemic community? (Siegel 2004: 608-9). A good or normatively appropriate 
judgment is not independent of rules. This position puts us closer to (or at least 
not completely separate from) a definition of judgment in terms of the specific 
rational content of particular claims. There is ultimately agreement in the 
contemporary debate on rationality that both rules and judgments are part of what 
grounds rationality. But exactly how they are entangled is still an open debate. 
There is also a firm agreement, following from the idea that judgments are 
connected to some degree to rules, that judgments are not “mere opinions”. To put 
it Brown’s (2006) words:  
 
Exercising judgment is not the same as having an opinion. On my account, 
exercise of judgment is a skill that is subject-matter specific and one that we 
develop by mastering available information and techniques in a field. An 
individual may develop the ability to exercise, say, engineering judgment or 
medical judgment in much the same way as one develops the ability to write 
computer programs or construct proofs in logic (Brown 2006: 647). 
 
Judgments are not mere opinions because they are assessed by established rules, 
which in turn might be the product of previous tenable judgments. Brown (1988) 
in particular thinks that judgments need to be “submitted to the community of 
competent individuals for evaluation and criticism” (ibid.: viii; in Siegel 2004: 605). 
This might not require that I accept the consensus of the community or experts, 
only that I take their responses seriously as a means of enhancing the basis for my 
judgment (Brown 2006: 650). When we refer to judgments in scientific practice, it 
is patent that epistemic agents attempt to make tenable judgments according to 
the particular situation they are in. And, at the same time, they are following the 
rules governing their epistemic practice and relying on experts’ evaluations. I take 
the link between rules and judgments as essential when discussing what judgments 
in scientific practice are, and in particular what judgments of similarity are. 
Probably one of the most insightful accounts in contemporary epistemology 
that encompasses the discussions presented above is Elgin’s (1996, 2017a) study of 
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the role of judgments within complex epistemic systems. I take her views in 
Considered Judgment (1996) and the recent True Enough (2017a) as central points of 
reference when using the term “judgments in scientific practice”. The idea of 
“considered judgment” points to the commitments that are held within networks 
of interrelated values, standards, and norms, whether in science, art, or other social 
systems of practice. A key feature of judgments is that they must be revisable in 
the light of one another (1996: 12-3). We can sustain some initially tenable 
judgments if there are not strong reasons to discard them, but that is very different 
from claiming that some judgments are foundationally basic beliefs (ibid.: 110). If 
our considered judgments prove inadequate, we round them out by additional 
judgments; if they lead to untenable conclusions — for instance if they generate 
inadequate predictions — we “retrench, retool, and try again” (2017a: 12-13). This 
method of relying on considered judgments while rejecting foundationalism is 
risky, Elgin argues, as judgments can be the repository of ancient error (1996: 13). 
Still, it is a bearable risk, as judgments are not kept come what may. They are 
sanctioned by the intersubjective agreements of the community, which are 
authoritative and usually difficult to satisfy (ibid.: 14-15, and 82). Applying Elgin’s 
(1996, 2017a) view to the case of representation in science, we can also claim that 
judgments are formulated in accordance with networks of values, standards, and 
norms that have been agreed within the epistemic community. During modelling 
practices, some judgments might prove inadequate to construct a representation 
that accommodates the behaviour of the target represented, while other judgments 
might be disputed among scientists, and all of these have to be tested against the 
rules and standards of the scientific community.  
Moving to the approach in experimental psychology, the study of 
judgments in this field has been closely related to the analysis of human decision-
making ability. In the 1950s, Simon (1955), and in the 1970s Tversky (1977) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1976), famously examined and even conducted 
experiments on how individuals make everyday judgments, in particular 
judgments of similarity, concerning objects, shapes, situations and places. One of 
their conclusions was that agents employ certain strategies, which they call 
heuristics, to make judgments in circumstances of uncertainty (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1976: 1131). Heuristic strategies are considered rules of thumb used in 
problem-solving that improve the capacity of subjects to evaluate possible 
scenarios (see Simon 1955; in Hey 2006: 472-3). Heuristics might eventually lead 
to errors due to the biases they involve (as pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman 
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1976: 1131),26 but they are usually effective for their capacity to simplify complex 
processes such as those involving probabilities (see Gigerenzer 2000; Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier 2011; Hey 2006).  
These works in psychology, together with other research in the cognitive 
sciences, have had an impact in debates in philosophy of science, as part of the trend 
to naturalize philosophy of science referred to in Section 3.1. When philosophers 
of science like Giere (1988), Wimsatt (2007), and Weisberg (2013) refer to the 
judgments scientists make in modelling practices, they are usually endorsing some 
of the ideas proposed in psychology by Simon (1955) or Tversky (1977). For 
instance, Giere (1988) draws on Simon’s (1955) work when he argues that 
scientists do not follow a Bayesian model of decision-making when deciding what 
models to use and explore, but a model of bounded rationality in which agents have 
limited ability to gather and process information (Giere 1988: 158). Wimsatt (2007: 
76-7) has thoroughly investigated the heuristics strategies used in science, 
following both Simon (1955) and Tversky and Kahneman (1976). Heuristic 
strategies in science are cost-effective, well-adapted to specific contexts of  
research, checkable, and improvable (Wimsatt 2007: 76-7). They work very 
differently from truth-preserving algorithms, as they do not guarantee correct 
solutions to a problem if  correctly applied (ibid.: 346). Still, scientists’ judgments 
are guided by heuristics because they help them calibrate, correct, and increase the 
robustness of  their scientific products (ibid.: 345). Scientists need to “use what 
comes readily to hand, as quicker, cheaper, more convenient” given the complexities 
of  their objects of  study (ibid.: 354). Lastly, Weisberg (2013) has recently applied 
Tversky’s (1977) contrast account of similarity to formalize the judgments of 
similarity scientists make use of in practices of representing. I will refer back to 
Weisberg’s (2013) account in Section 3.3.  
From the research done in experimental psychology, we can incorporate 
some indications that help refining the notion of judgments in scientific practice. 
Judgments in the practice of constructing scientific models are not always the 
product of perfectly rational, truth-preserving, methodologies of decision-making. 
They are sometimes the result of applying rules of thumb and heuristic strategies. 
This is important when considering the role of judgments of similarity in achieving 
successful models in science. In Chapter 4 I will identify the use of various types of 
                                             
26 Tversky and Kahneman (1976, 1983) refer to three types of heuristic strategies that respectively 
involve three types of biases: representativeness, availability, and anchoring. 
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judgments of similarity in the case of the construction of scale models in 
engineering. Some of those judgments, I will argue, are less systematic or 
standardized, and have a more “intuitive” character. Still, they are grounded in 
previous skills and shared experiences of members of the epistemic community, 
and play a role in the phases of design and calibration of the models under 
construction. 
As the result of bringing the previous ideas together, we can now arrive at 
a positive characterization of the value of “judgments in scientific practice” for an 
account of the means of representation. Judgments formulated in representational 
practices have, on the one hand, a valuable propositional content because that 
content concerns model-target comparisons that are assumed, tested, and 
stabilized by a relevant epistemic community. On the other hand, a pragmatic 
perspective on the problem of  representation reminds us that we should not study 
the propositional content of  those judgments independently from consideration of  
the processes and actions that take place in the same representational practices. 
Studying judgments in scientific practices is also very valuable because we can 
observe that the formulation of  those judgments triggers actions such as decision-
making regarding the design of a model, the application of a methodology to 
construct certain parts of a model, the inclusion or exclusion of certain features in 
a model, the resolution of a disagreement about the most adequate model-target 
comparison, or the evaluation of the predictive results of a model. In addition, we 
can observe that both actions and judgments are partly determined by rules, 
standards, and values pre-existent in the community. Rules and standards should 
be understood as desirable operating principles that regulate epistemic systems of 
practice. Judgments might, in turn, lead to the consolidation of new rules if they 
prove to be tenable. For instance, if a particular judgment triggers a certain way 
of resolving a disagreement in a representational practice, which eventually proves 
to be an effective way of resolving it, that judgment might become a rule or 
recommendation that regulates how to resolve similar disagreements in the future. 
Additionally, new values (epistemic and non-epistemic) could motivate the 
adjustment of both rules and judgments existent in a system of practices.  
A study of judgments in scientific practice might comprise a variety of 
empirical and historical sources, such as the analysis of historical reports and 
memoirs of the construction of models, the direct observation of modelling 
practices (in the tradition of ethnographical work), interviews with scientists and 
engineers, textual analysis of scientific papers and manuals, etc. Philosophers of 
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science interested in practices have certainly looked at the reasoning behind some 
of the decisions scientists make during modelling activities (see Nersessian 1992; 
Magnani et al. 1999; Knuuttila 2009). Few of them, though, introduce explicit 
considerations to the uses of judgments of similarity, or to other types of 
judgments in representational practices. I believe that attending to recurrent uses 
of judgments regarding model-target comparisons during the construction of 
models is essential to shed light on the problem of the means of representation. 
The case studies in Chapter 4 show how identifying, classifying, and analysing a 
particular set of judgments in scientific practice, namely judgments of similarity in 
scale modelling, helps obtain illuminating conclusions about the means employed 
to construct successful representations. In the next section, before moving to these 
historical case studies, I describe some issues concerning judgments of similarity 
in particular. 
  
 
 
3.3. Judgments of similarity 
Following the previous characterization of judgments in scientific practice, we can 
now claim that the study of judgments of similarity is a valuable source of 
information to support an account of the means of representation focused on 
similarity, for two reasons. One, because judgments of similarity have a 
propositional content that concerns model-target comparison (in terms of 
similarity) that are assumed, tested and established by the relevant epistemic 
community; two, because the formulation of judgments of similarity triggers, 
motivates, and is connected to a variety of processes and actions taking place in 
representational practices. Sometimes judgments of similarity are introduced when 
discussing the design of a model in comparison with the target to be represented; 
sometimes they are used when deciding the materials, scales, and features to be 
used when building a model, considering relevant materials, dimensions, and 
features of the target; sometimes judgments of similarity are introduced when 
calibrating or correcting the functioning of a model; and sometimes they are used 
when assessing the adequacy of the results obtained from a model. I do not aim to 
offer a complete analysis of possible judgments of similarity in practices of 
representing. The aim here is more limited, to suggest, with the help of some 
examples and a case study in Chapter 4, that judgments of similarity are present 
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in various forms in a plurality of representational practices, performing an active 
epistemic role in the attainment of representations that we consider epistemically 
successful. Now, I discuss two proposals in recent philosophy of science that have 
explicitly referred to the formulation of judgments of similarity in particular 
modelling practices, namely Weisberg (2013) and Sterrett (2009, 2017a, 2017b). 
Then, I present various examples of practices of representing in which judgments 
of similarity play an effective role. 
 
 
3.3.1. Weisberg and Sterrett on judgments of similarity  
Weisberg (2013) and Sterrett (2009, 2017a, 2017b) have probably advanced the 
most noteworthy proposals in recent philosophy of science concerning the 
practical involvement of similarity in the construction of scientific representations. 
Earlier I mentioned that Weisberg (2013) introduces the idea that an analysis of 
the problem of representation should consider judgments that scientists actually 
make in practice, with special emphasis on judgments of similarity. In doing so, 
Weisberg (2013) situates his work in contrast to other contemporary literature 
that “has not fully explored the role of theorists’ intentions in all aspects of 
modeling, including the individuation of models, the coordination of models to 
real-world systems, and the evaluation of the goodness of fit between models and 
the world” (ibid.: 5). His central aim is to develop, in response to this literature, a 
comprehensive, practice-based account of scientific representation that considers 
all these aspects of modelling. In Chapter 4 I will refer to some of the particularities 
of Weisberg’s (2013) weighted feature-matching account of similarity when it is applied 
to the analysis of particular modelling practices. For now, I consider the role that 
judgments of similarity play in his proposal. 
Specific examples like Schelling’s model of segregation, the Lotka-Volterra 
model, and the San Francisco Bay Model help Weisberg (2013) argue for the 
importance of judgments of similarity when approaching the problem of 
representation. He claims: 
 
I think that an analysis of the model–world relationship should reflect 
judgments that scientists can actually make, as opposed to asserting that 
the relation holds between inaccessible, hidden features of models and 
targets. […] In many cases theorists won’t necessarily articulate the 
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grounds for the judgments of similarity – the judgments are just made. 
Nevertheless, when it matters, such as in cases of disagreement, theorists 
should be able to work out the grounds for their similarity judgment. 
(Weisberg 2013: 138) 
 
Phenomena have myriad properties, and modellers are not interested in studying 
the total states of phenomena, but rather some considered important subset of 
those properties related to the goal of the research (Weisberg 2013: 91-2). 
Judgments of similarity are, for Weisberg (2013), the way in which epistemic 
agents articulate the relevant elements of the model-world relation in particular 
representational practices. This idea stands in direct opposition to the assumption 
that similarity is an “inaccessible”, “hidden” relation between a model and a target 
(ibid.: 138). Even if Weisberg formalizes similarity as the sharing of features by 
vehicle and target of the representation, he makes explicit that those features are 
selected and weighted by the epistemic agents, not fixed before the 
representational activity. Moreover, judgments of similarity have to be 
“cognitively accessible” (ibid.: 301). So even when scientists do not reveal the 
reasons for their judgments, if disagreements arise it should be possible to track 
their grounds back to the practice of representing.  
I believe this last point is a noteworthy claim that we can expand further. 
Disagreements in science are made manifest through the articulation of opposed 
judgments in practices of representing. Sometimes the origin of a disagreement 
might be the existence of other competing judgments of similarity about an aspect 
of the representation. This idea is relevant for an account of the means of 
representation because exploring why some judgments acquire prevalence before 
others carries a good deal of information about the epistemic success (or failure) of 
particular models. If we for instance observe that certain judgments of similarity 
become entrenched and give rise to rules or standards, we have good reasons to 
believe that those judgments played a relevant role in the epistemic success of the 
model obtained. If we observe that a judgment of similarity relates to a particular 
action in the construction of a model that turns out to be irrelevant or 
counterproductive for the result, we should probably consider that particular 
judgment of similarity inadequate for the goals pursued in the practice. The cases 
of the San Francisco Bay Model and the Mississippi Basin Model, which I will 
describe in Chapter 4, illustrate this point.  
 I take one of the main contributions of Weisberg’s Simulation and Similarity 
(2013) to be the general thought that a debate on the role of similarity in scientific 
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representation should seriously consider judgments of similarity that scientists 
make. There are nonetheless two controversies around the use of the notion of 
judgments of similarity in his account. The first is that it is not completely clear 
what role judgments of similarity are playing in his account, as it is not completely 
clear what type of account he is proposing. Parker (2015: 271) has advanced this 
type of criticism. She points out that it is not obvious which of the three kinds of 
accounts Weisberg (2013) is advancing: (1) an account of successful representation; 
(2) an account of the general conditions for representation; (3) an account of what 
underlies scientists’ judgments concerning the extent to which models and targets 
are similar to each other. Parker (2015) seems to imply that considering the role 
of judgments of similarity would tie Weisberg to the type of account in (3), while 
he claims to be offering an account of (1) and (2) as well (2015: 300-1).  
I believe Parker (2015) is well justified in questioning the conflation of (1) 
and (2) in Weisberg’s account. I argued in the previous chapters that, while an 
account of (2) (equivalent to what I called R1 or the question about the constituents 
of representation) should not be based on similarity, an account of (1) (equivalent 
to an account of the means of representation) could be in principle focused on 
similarity, even if perhaps not conceiving similarity as the only, exclusive means 
of representation. Although Weisberg (2015: 300) insists that he is addressing the 
two issues, I take his account to be more comprehensive if understood as dealing 
with the problem in (1), the epistemic success of scientific representations. 
Concerning the role of judgments of similarity, I have defended at various points 
throughout this thesis that the types of accounts (1) and (3) do not need to be 
incompatible with each other, but can and should be complementary. That is to 
say, an account of successful representation would highly benefit from being 
supported on a practical enquiry that studies the uses of judgments in scientific 
practices. Thus, I do not believe that conflating (1) and (3) is a shortcoming of 
Weisberg’s (2013) account, as Parker (2015) seems to claim, but a fruitful move to 
approach the problem of the means of representation from a practice-based 
perspective.  
The second closely related controversy around Weisberg’s (2013) use of the 
notion of judgments of similarity concerns the psychological connotations that the 
term “judgments” has. This point has been also presented by Parker (2015), in close 
relation to the previous criticism, and in slightly different terms by Sterrett (2006, 
2009, 2017b). Parker (2015: 271) argues that trying to make sense of what 
underlies scientists’ judgments when they evaluate models as being more or less 
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similar to their targets is a valid psychological type of endeavour, but not what an 
account of representation is meant to be. Weisberg (2013) indeed takes the work 
in cognitive psychology that Tversky (1977) developed in the 1970s as a starting 
point for the formulation of his proposal.27 But he disagrees with Parker’s (2015) 
observation in the following way: 
 
Bring these psychological ideas to my account might look like a confusion, 
but I think it makes sense […as] even the most strictly metaphysical parts 
of my account have a substantial pragmatic element. This is because on my 
view, the relation between a model and a target depends, in part, on the 
scientific context (Weisberg 2015: 300-301). 
 
This reply makes evident Weisberg’s commitment to some degree or another with 
a practice-based approach to the problem of scientific representation. An account 
in naturalized philosophy of science would aim to incorporate insights from fields 
like psychology, sociology, and biology to illuminate problems traditionally 
addressed in philosophical accounts. Adopting a “psychologized” version of the 
idea of similarity, through consideration of scientists’ judgments, can help support 
a philosophical proposal on the problem of representation. Parker (2015: 271) 
seems to be concerned about the elimination of the normative component of a 
philosophical account on representation if the same account tries to “make sense of 
what underlies scientists’ judgments when they evaluate models as being more or 
less similar to their target”. I have argued though, endorsing the rationale of PSP 
and iHPS, that the systematic study of judgments in scientific practice is a tool to 
reconcile, in a single account, the description of practices and a normative view of 
the problem of scientific representation. 
At any rate, the criticism presented by Parker (2015) remains fairly valid, 
in that Weisberg (2013) never clarifies how exactly the study of what underlies 
scientists’ judgments helps sustain his account of successful representation. There 
is for instance no reference to the important methodological point that the study 
of judgments of similarity should be the empirical source of the normative 
component of an account of successful representation, given that agents already 
stabilize uses and define norms concerning similarity within the practice of 
representing. The characterization of the notion of judgments I have offered in this 
                                             
27 Also, Weisberg (2013: 144-5) follows other works in contemporary psychology, such as 
Goldstone, Medin, and Gentner (1991), to motivate aspects of his weighted feature-matching account 
of similarity, such as the distinction between the attributes and the mechanisms of a model. 
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chapter can help unpack the motivations that seem to underlie Weisberg’s (2013) 
recent work when he refers to the importance of judgments of similarity, but which 
are far from fleshed out in his account. 
At this point we can add the criticism offered by Sterrett (2006, 2009, 
2017b). She argues that the “psychologized” notion of judgments of similarity that 
Weisberg (2013) uses renders the concept of similarity subjective and dependent 
on scientists’ personal opinions.28 If we adopt Weisberg’s (2013) notion of 
judgments of similarity, what remains is a plurality of different, unreliable 
definitions of similarity that scientists and engineers could capriciously apply. This 
conception of similarity contrasts with the work that Sterrett (2002, 2006, 2009, 
2017b) herself has developed for years, where she studies the rigorous, 
mathematically-founded uses of similarity in scientific research. Her work 
examines practices of modelling in engineering and the physical sciences, where 
the methods of physical similarity have been established since at least the 
beginning of the twentieth century (2009: 5). It is indeed crucial to recognize that 
in specific modelling practices, such as the construction of scale models in 
engineering, the term similarity has precise definitions, in the form of geometric 
similarity, dynamic similarity, and methodologies of dimensional analysis. These 
definitions might be adapted to fit individual practices, but they can usually be 
transferred from practice to practice, and even from field to field, as it is the case 
when principles of dynamic similarity circulate from the engineering sciences to 
the geosciences (2017b). Against the argument from vagueness discussed in 
Chapter 2 that similarity is an empty and utterly vague notion, we should contend 
with Sterrett (2017a, 2017b) that, when applied in actual practices, similarity has 
explicit, unambiguous meanings. Furthermore, we should also contend that 
philosophers of science ought to pay more attention to the history of the methods 
of physical similarity, since the notion of similarity they introduce in their accounts 
of representation should not be at odds with the uses of the term in modelling 
practices (2009: 6-7).  
Nevertheless, I believe that it does not follow from Sterrett’s arguments 
that we should eliminate the notion of judgments of similarity from the discussion. 
I started claiming that both Weisberg (2013) and Sterrett (2009, 2017b) have 
advanced the most noteworthy proposals in recent philosophy of science regarding 
                                             
28 Thanks to Susan Sterrett for pointing out this argument against Weisberg’s (2013) notion of 
“judgments of similarity” in private correspondence, 8 September 2017. Cited with the author’s 
permission. 
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the role of judgments of similarity in representational practices. But then, I argued 
that Sterrett (2017) emphatically rejects the notion of judgments of similarity for 
its subjectivity, as I believe that Sterrett’s (2009, 2017b) work is compatible with, 
and even reinforces, the characterization of judgments of similarity that I have 
tried to offer so far. There are two reasons for this. One, the concept of judgment 
does not necessarily have those individualistic, subjective implications that Sterrett 
claims. There is agreement in epistemology that judgments are not mere opinions, 
but abilities that at least in part are regulated by norms and the agreement of the 
community. If we endorse the characterization of judgments in scientific practice 
sketched in Section 3.2, the problems with the aspects of subjectivity infiltrating 
the idea judgments of similarity largely vanish. Two, the type of proposal that 
Sterrett (2009, 2017b) has advanced is an exploration of the functioning, historical 
consolidation, and disagreements around a fundamental set of judgments of 
similarity employed in science. Her work has contributed to make the processes of 
standardization of the notion of similarity visible to philosophers of science. For 
that reason, I believe that this type of empirical and analytic work, in combination 
with other possible work done in fields where judgments of similarity have 
different standardized meanings, is fundamental to advance an informed account 
of epistemically successful modelling practices focused on similarity as means of 
representation.  
 
 
 
3.3.2. Some examples 
There is a variety of scientific practices in which judgments of similarity 
concerning model-target comparisons have an important presence, since epistemic 
agents employ them during the phases of design, construction, and evaluation of 
models. This should be, I have argued, an element in support of the advancement 
of an account of the means of representation focused on similarity. Philosophers of 
science have occasionally discussed case studies of modelling practices, making 
implicit or explicit references to the role that similarity plays in them. However, 
these works in philosophy of science are diverse, seldom in dialogue with each 
other, and not always directly concerning the problem of representation. By 
bringing some of them together here, I try to show that there is acknowledgement 
in philosophy of science of the presence and role of judgments of similarity in 
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multiple scientific fields and cases. By illustrating how these works can be in 
dialogue with each other more explicitly, I also show that they could influence the 
general debate on representation positively, by pointing to the possibility of a 
common, more encompassing account of the means of representation focused on 
similarity. I briefly refer to the accounts of Quine (1969), Bengoetxea et al. (2014), 
Morgan (2012), Ankeny and Leonelli (2011), and Ankeny et al. (2014), among 
others. 
Even Quine (1969: 117-135), who was an open detractor of the concept of 
similarity, along the same lines as Goodman (1968), recognized that scientists 
make constant judgments of similarity in the context of scientific research. He 
acknowledged that judgments of similarity are in practice crucial for learning, 
inductive generalization, and prediction, even if they do not involve objective 
measures of similarity but greatly depend on scientists’ theories (1969: 133-135). 
More specifically, Quine (1969: 121) postulated the existence of epistemic paths of 
scientific research, divided into phases, in all of which judgments of similarity 
would play a role some way or another, depending on the characteristics of the 
phase, and generally retaining some similarity standards along the whole process. 
This idea seems so far compatible with the study of judgments of similarity in 
scientific practice that I am discussing. However, the epistemic paths Quine 
describes are supposed to finish in the dissolution of all judgments of similarity (or 
all judgments really) as they would be substituted by formally sound notions when 
disciplines achieve maturity (ibid.: 121. In Bengoetxea et al. 2014: 219). In response 
to this idea, we could argue that, in mature disciplines, judgments of similarity 
seem to be usually employed. It would be inappropriate to “categorically state that 
scientists have to refrain from judgments of similarity” if they prove to be valuable 
in their research (Bengoetxea et al. 2014: 224). In organic chemistry, Bengoetxea 
et al. (2014) have for instance examined the uses of judgments of similarity and 
concluded that they are an integral part of representational practices in various 
ways and at different stages. Rouvray (1992) enumerates some of the ways in which 
similarity is fundamental in research in chemistry (in Figure 2), and Bengoetxea et 
al. (2014) discuss various functions of similarity in modelling in toxicology and 
synthetic chemistry:  
 
[E]xamples from chemistry and toxicology demonstrate how the similarity 
notion is used in scientific practice and why in many cases such practice 
would in fact be difficult to imagine without scientists’ recurring to 
similarity. […] The first example, from synthetic chemistry, shows that 
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the scientific analysis of organic molecules, as well as the generation of new 
molecules invariably recurs to similarity judgments about functional 
groups. The second example, from regulatory science [i.e. toxicology], 
demonstrates that the notion of similarity and its application is also 
crucially relevant in scientific practices oriented towards the taking of 
regulatory decisions that have direct consequences for people’s lives. 
(Bengoetxea et al. 2014: 226) 
 
Judgments of similarity are used in synthetic chemistry to analyse molecules, 
aiding scientists to satisfactorily represent their properties and chemical relations, 
while in toxicology judgments of similarity help assess whether different chemical 
substances are harmful or innocuous by comparing their biochemical activity 
(Bengoetxea et al. 2014: 225-9). If judgments of similarity can help scientists orient 
complex practices of representing, there are good reasons to think that they are 
worthy of serious philosophical analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Applications of similarity concepts in the chemical domain. Extracted 
from Rouvray (1992: 581) 
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There are also works in philosophy of science that have emphasized the importance 
of using judgments of similarity in the process of model-making in economics. 
Morgan (2012) has, for instance, pointed out the importance of subjects’ cognitive 
and practical abilities to recognize and exploit what they believe are relevant 
similarities between a model and a target. She offers the examples of Fisher ’s 
(1911) model of exchange between money and goods: 
 
Model-making, or giving form to a model, depends upon our cognitive 
abilities to recognise similarities and our creativity in exploring those 
similarities. Scientists choose models on the basis of similarities seen in the 
form, structure, content or properties between two fields and investigate 
these similarities in a systematic way. For example, Fisher (1911) chose a 
mechanical balance as a model for his economic “equation of exchange” 
between money and goods because he recognised the similarity between the 
elements and their relations (Morgan 2012: 23).  
 
Scientists can decide to pursue an investigation on certain type of model on the 
basis of the effectiveness of the judgments of similarity they can make about it in 
comparison with the target to be represented. Fisher (1911) exploited the 
consequences of making judgments of similarity concerning the design of a visual 
model of economic exchange that had the appearance of a mechanical balance (see 
Figure 3; in Morgan 2012: 22). This mechanical balance weighing loaves of  bread 
was an everyday object that came readily to hand for Fisher (1911), and was judged 
to be relevantly similar in some key respects to a complex, difficult-to-grasp 
phenomenon like economic exchange. Another good example of practice of 
representing in economics that Morgan (2012) mentions is the construction of 
Phillips’s (1954) hydraulic model of a Keynesian economy. There were decisive 
judgments of similarity involved in Phillips’s activity of designing the hydraulic 
model through consecutive sketches (like the early sketch shown in Figure 3; in 
Morgan 2012: 22), and later on, in the construction of several physical models. 
Phillips (1954) himself acknowledges the use of central judgments of similarity in 
the process of designing and building the model: 
 
There are certain formal similarities between the problems of devising 
policies for economic stabilisation and those of designing automatic control 
systems in engineering. […] Methods have recently been developed by 
engineers for analysing the dynamic properties of quite complex models 
[…] These methods and procedures can also be used for the analysis of 
dynamic process models in economics. (Phillips 1954 [2000]: 184) 
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The judgments of similarity mentioned here by Phillips (1954) concern the 
relevant functional, formal similarities between two activities, the activity of 
“devising policies for economic stabilisation” and the activity of “designing 
automatic control systems in engineering”. From there, Phillips (1954) resolves 
that the use of the method employed in the design of an engineering system might 
bring fruitful results if employed in the study of economic stabilisation. The 
method in question is the construction of a physical hydraulic model, and the object 
resulting from the process was a plumbing system with valves, tanks, and water 
flows representing the dynamics of market demands. Phillips’s model was 
conceived and built thanks in great part to the help of the formulation of judgments 
of similarity. The result was a model that allowed him to draw successful inferences 
from the specific behaviours of the hydraulic device (like the transfer of water from 
one tank to another, the closing and opening of valves, etc.) about specific 
properties of an economy system (like the income of foreign purchases into a 
central bank, the interruption of exports in a country, etc.) (see also Frigg and 
Nguyen 2017a; Morgan 2012; Vines 2000). We could claim, following Vines’s 
(2000) historical reconstruction of the case, that the use of judgments of similarities 
was decisive for the design of a model that represented an economic system 
“vividly”, in a way that was “immensely visible” (2000: 58). This allowed scientists 
to reason about money transactions at the same time that they were looking at 
water tanks rise (ibid.: 46-9), which triggered the exploration of new aspects of the 
target system investigated and stimulated further thoughts and conjectures about 
the functioning of economic systems.   
This observation can cast doubt on some recent accounts in philosophy of 
science that have strongly rejected the involvement of similarity in the 
achievement of successful representations, such as Frigg and Nguyen (2017b), who 
use the case of the Phillips-Newlyn machine in support of their idea. Frigg and 
Nguyen (2017b) argue that their DEKI account, which stands for Denotation-
Exemplification-Keying-Imputation, captures what the necessary conditions for 
representation are. Among them, the “keys”, which are codes that define how to 
translate properties of the model into properties of the target, are crucial to 
determine whether we would obtain successful representations (2017b: 49-51). 
Although Frigg and Nguyen (2017b) eventually acknowledge that similarity 
might be one of the many ways in which the “keys” could be specified, they would 
not recognise the importance of formulating judgments of similarity in the process 
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of designing and constructing models like the Phillips-Newlyn machine, despite 
the explicit references by Phillips in the quote above. Moreover, they argue that 
“introducing keys does not amount to smuggling in a mimetic conception of 
representation via the back door. On the contrary, keys can be as conventional as 
they like” (Nguyen 2016: 173). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Fisher’s Arithmetical and Mechanical Monetary Balance; and Phillips’s 
Plumbing Diagram. Extracted from Morgan (2012: 22). 
 
 
Moving to a different field, research with model organisms and animal-
based models is one of the areas where the use of judgments of similarity in 
representation has been more widely discussed. Ankeny and Leonelli (2011) define 
“model organisms” as non-human species that are studied in the hope that data and 
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theories generated through their use will be applicable to other organisms (2011: 
313). Common examples of model organisms are mice, rats, zebrafish, fruitflies, 
nematode worms, and thale cress. Of the assumptions underlying research with 
model organisms for the investigation of the human genome, it is claimed: “many 
genetic and biological similarities exist between various model organisms and 
humans; the model organisms will provide information that will aid in the 
interpretation of human genomic sequences” (Ankeny 2001: 255). It is important 
to stress that the reference to similarities in this context does not concern pre-
existent, objective measures of similarity between humans and model organisms. 
The issue at stake is the use scientists make of judgments of similarity concerning 
model-target relations for the goals pursued in the practice. For instance, scientists 
would perform certain judgments of similarity when comparing the genome of 
single-celled model organisms and the human genome, which might bring positive 
results at the end of the practice of representing in the form of fruitful inferences. 
But the huge difference in complexity between single-celled organisms and 
humans might in other circumstances not allow scientists to obtain particularly 
fruitful results at the end of the practice (Ankeny 2001: 258-9). Community 
agreement about what the relevant formulations of judgments of similarities are 
for the case at hand are without doubt fundamental, although that doesn’t prevent 
more than one judgment of similarity existing and disagreeing with others in the 
same representational practice. Disagreements between different judgments of 
similarity are not a reason to discard their epistemic significance in representation, 
but an additional motivation to argue that reaching agreements about them is 
important for the achievement of the epistemic goals of the community of 
researchers.   
The last point connects with an aspect of judgments of similarity that should 
be emphasized: relevant judgments of similarity exist in scientific practice in 
parallel to the formulation of relevant judgments of dissimilarity and distortion. 
Good illustrations of this can be found in Huber (2015),29 and Huber and Keuck 
(2013: 389) about research on the complex symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease; in 
Nelson (2012) about research on anxiety; and in Ankeny et al. (2014) about 
research on alcohol addiction. In all these cases, mice are used as animal-based 
models. The case of research on human alcoholism described by Ankeny et al. 
(2014), for instance, starts from the idea that “the similarity between addiction 
                                             
29 From Huber (2015). Talk “From Mice to Men: Homogeneity, Similarity and Relevance in 
Model-Based Reasoning” at the SPSP Conference, Aarhus (Denmark), June 2015.  
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behaviours in humans and in non-humans is particularly difficult to assess” (ibid.: 
489). Precisely for that reason, the weighting of different judgments of similarity 
and dissimilarity is fundamental in the process of deciding where to focus the 
attention of the modelling practice. The most striking question that this research 
has to face is: how can mice be adequate models of human alcoholism if they are 
reluctant to drink alcohol? One of the possible responses to this question has 
consisted in making judgments of similarity concerning the biological reactions 
that alcohol respectively provokes in humans and mice. If those reactions are 
judged relevantly similar to each other in important respects, then the aspect of 
investigation that needs to be further explored is the biological response of alcohol 
in the target and in the model (mice). This would also imply that it doesn’t matter 
if mice don’t like drinking alcohol, because they would be artificially induced and 
their biological response to alcohol analysed (ibid.: 495). Another possible response 
to the question has consisted in making judgments of similarity about the 
behaviour of humans and mice. If scientists agree that the behaviour is the key of 
the study of alcoholism, and that artificially induced mice would behave too 
dissimilarly from mice that voluntarily consume alcohol via oral self-
administration, then the modelling should focus on the comparison of human 
behaviour and mice that voluntarily drink alcohol (see Cicero 1980; in Ankeny et 
al. 2014: 495). A third possible response to the question has consisted in 
introducing judgments of similarity about the alcohol that humans and mice 
consume. In order to make mice self-administer alcohol, something has to be added 
to the alcohol – sugar usually – to attract them to consume it. In this case, scientists 
might judge that there is a risk of finding a prohibitively strong dissimilarity 
between the substances consumed respectively by humans and mice, therefore 
generating behaviours of addiction that are not considered relevantly similar to 
those of human addiction (see dispute between Gauvin et al. (1993) and Cicero 
(1980); in Ankeny et al. 2014: 494-5).  
The conclusion that Ankeny et al. (2014) reach from the complex case study 
of alcoholism is that representing is a fallible practice. So the question as to 
whether animal-based models “can reliably stand for human beings, and whether 
the experimental setting bears any relation to the social situations in which a 
putatively similar human behavior would be instantiated, remain open-ended” 
(ibid.: 501). Still, the practice of modelling alcohol addiction with mice has become 
more homogenous and consistent over time. Research communities reach some 
(temporary) agreements about the most fruitful ways of studying a phenomenon 
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like this, standardizing parameters for future research. And this is, importantly, 
due to the exploitation of various judgments of similarity and dissimilarities 
concerning the models and targets of the representation. 
Additional cases of scientific practices that philosophers of science have 
described, pointing out the role of judgments of similarity, are, for instance: Eigner 
(2009), who focuses on the history of psychology and refers to how scientists make 
judgments about relevant similarities supported by practical skills and previous 
theoretical knowledge; Parker (2009), who highlights the importance of relevant 
similarity judgments in the inferences scientists make from computer simulations 
of meteorological phenomena; Steel (2010), who uses examples like the study of 
the carcinogen aflatoxin B1 to refer to scientists’ similarity judgments, specifically 
in terms of mechanisms and causes involved in models and targets; and Downer 
(2007), who studies the similarity judgments engineers need to make to design 
airplane engines that adequately pass “birdstrike tests”, that is, tests in which birds 
(or artificial birds, rubber gelatine, or other materials considered relevantly similar 
to birds in different aspects) are launched into the engines to assess whether they 
will explode or not. 
After mentioning a range of examples, I hope to have made a reasonable 
case for the manifest presence of judgments of similarity in a broad variety of 
scientific practices. Putting together some of these works helps make more explicit 
the commonalities between them. The debate on scientific representation would 
benefit from being directly informed by works that analyse the role of judgments 
in concrete scientific practices like these. I have mostly referred to examples where 
the construction of physical models is involved (hydraulic machines, animal-based 
models), but it may be possible to explore the presence of judgments of similarity 
in practices that involve constructing diagrammatic, mathematical, or 
computational models too. Probably in those cases we would find judgments of 
similarity concerning the formal properties of models in comparison to the formal 
properties of the targets represented (as argued by Parker 2009: 493). Lastly, I 
hope to have shown that disagreements between various judgments of similarity 
within a practice, or the fact that judgments of similarity go together with 
judgments of dissimilarity and distortion, should not prevent us from thinking that 
they are important resources for the achievement of fruitful representations. The 
presence of disagreements precisely corroborates that finding a solution to them, 
in the form of an agreed relevant combination of similarities and distortions, is 
essential for the progress of the practice of representing. Some judgments of 
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similarity might prove to be ineffective or carry negative consequences for the 
construction of a model. But by then, we would have learnt which paths not to 
pursue: we abandon the use of those judgments, and exploit others that correct the 
negative consequences of the previous ones. Representational practices are 
processes of trial and error, where norms, skills, judgments, and values are in 
dynamic interaction with each other.  
 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that the study of judgments of similarity in 
representational practices is crucial to develop an account of the means of 
representation. An account of the means of representation requires a practical type 
of enquiry that allows us to observe how epistemic agents make successful 
inferences from models about the targets of the representation (Suárez 2003). The 
rationale of the projects of PSP (Philosophy of Science in Practice) and iHPS 
(integrated History and Philosophy of Science) offer an adequate methodological 
framework to develop the type of practical enquiry that an account of the means of 
representation requires. I referred to three particular methodological lessons to be 
incorporated from PSP and iHPS. One, an account of the means of representation 
should mainly focus on the study of science-in-practice, that is, the activities and 
resources involved in the production of successful representations, instead of on the 
final products obtained at the end of them. Two, an account of the means of 
representation should incorporate both a descriptive and a normative component. 
The analysis of judgments in scientific practice is the methodological tool that 
facilitates the integration of the two components, given that the consolidation of 
norms derived from the use of certain judgments should be the source of 
normativity of a philosophical account. Three, the advancement of an account of 
the means of representation doesn’t strictly proceed bottom-up or top-down, but 
is an interpretive endeavour by which general claims are adjusted to particular 
cases in the same way as cases are shaped by general claims.  
Afterwards, I briefly discussed the notion of “judgments in scientific 
practice”, and more specifically the implications of incorporating the study of 
judgments of similarity into an account of the means of representation. From the 
debates in epistemology and psychology, I resolved that judgments in scientific 
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practice are not mere opinions, but commitments regulated by standards and the 
agreements of the competent epistemic community. Judgments are fallible, and do 
not work as truth-preserving algorithms, but their importance in epistemic 
practices is demonstrated by their usefulness at contrasting, testing, calibrating, 
and correcting models in comparison to their targets. The specific role of  
judgments of  similarity in practices of  modelling has been addressed by Weisberg 
(2013) and Sterrett (2009, 2017a, 2017b) in recent philosophy of science. Their 
respective accounts are well motivated, but could be further developed as to 
explicitly address the issue of how to integrate descriptive and normative 
components in an account of the means of representation that studies judgments 
of similarity. I concluded by mentioning a series of examples from various scientific 
disciplines in which judgments of similarity concerning model-target comparisons 
visibly participate in the construction of epistemically successful representations. 
The debate on the means of representation demands to be directly informed by the 
study of examples and cases like these. The next chapter is an attempt to describe 
some historical case studies regarding the construction of scale models in 
engineering. I will particularly explore the connections between the uses of 
judgments of similarity and the epistemic success of the models. The conclusions 
obtained will motivate the outlining of a particular account of the means of 
representation in Chapter 5. 
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Not only size matters:  
Scale models and judgments of similarity  
Chapter 4: Not only size matters: Scale models 
and judgments of similarity  
 
In this chapter I develop a case study in support of the main arguments presented 
so far in the thesis, and more specifically in Chapter 3. I use the cases of the 
construction of the Mississippi Basin Model (1943) and the San Francisco Bay 
Model (1953) to illustrate how judgments of similarity pervasively and effectively 
intervene in practices of modelling. I concluded Chapter 3 by arguing that 
judgments of similarity (and dissimilarity) are present in numerous practices of 
representing, performing an epistemic role in the construction of successful 
models. Now I draw on some primary sources (reports, interview, technical 
manuals) to localize the various uses of judgments of similarity in the design, 
construction, and testing of the San Francisco Bay Model (SFBM) and the 
Mississippi Basin Model (MBM). From there I hope to show that a satisfactory 
account of the means of representation should emerge from the study of the actual 
representational resources employed in practices of representing. Later, in Chapter 
5, I will more specifically argue that the notion of “creative similarity” is suitable 
to support an account of the means of representation, as it captures the generative 
interplay of judgments of similarity and distortions that takes place in practices of 
representing. The case studies in the present chapter help support that account.   
The fact that I have selected two scale models in engineering as case studies 
is not accidental. Contemporary literature in philosophy of science has frequently 
undervalued the epistemic role of scale models, and linked it to the erroneous 
assumption that scale models are superficially and naïvely similar to their targets. 
The cases of the SFBM and the MBM examined here help to show that scale 
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models can have an extraordinary epistemic value, and that the judgments of 
similarity that scientists formulate in the process of constructing such models do 
not involve merely superficial or apparent similarities. To argue for the role of 
judgments of similarity in the construction of successful scale models in 
engineering, I first need to defend the genuine value of scale models beyond 
illustrative functions. I start Section 4.1 by discussing some of the literature in 
philosophy of science concerning the epistemic value of scale models, as well as 
some historical debates within the engineering sciences on the functions of scale 
models for research. Then, I focus in Section 4.2 on the role of judgments of 
similarity in the cases of the MBM and the SFBM. I show that judgments of 
similarity were present in the construction of these models in three different forms, 
as “standardized judgments of similarity”, “context-dependent judgments of 
similarity”, and “intuitive judgments of similarity”. In Section 4.3, I further 
characterize these judgments of similarity as being in constant interplay with 
distortions (idealizations, simplifications, abstractions). Lastly, in Section 4.4, I 
present a discussion on how the analysis of these case studies can inform specific 
aspects of the debate on representation in philosophy of science. 
 
 
 
4.1. The epistemic value of scale models 
Traditional accounts in philosophy of science have commonly attributed a low 
epistemic value to scale models, especially compared to how they have regarded 
mathematical and other highly idealized models. This idea might not be articulated 
in an explicit way very frequently, but it is manifest, among other things, in the 
little attention given to scale models in the literature on scientific modelling. 
Important exceptions to this are found in Sterrett (2002; 2006; 2009; 2017a), 
Pincock (2012), Weisberg (2013), Zwart (2009), and Parker (2009). Scale models 
have been usually recognized as one type among others of “material”, “concrete” or 
“physical” models30, but not many works were devoted to arguing for the 
                                             
30 I use the terms “concrete model”, “physical model”, and “material model” indistinctly. In the 
field of hydraulic engineering, to which I mostly refer to in the chapter, “physical model” is the 
term commonly used to refer to “scale models” (in contrast to numerical models and computer 
simulations). Except in the cases where I quote original work in hydraulic engineering, I use the 
term “scale model” to refer to a particular type of physical model that involves explicit processes 
of scaling. 
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possibilities of prediction and understanding they could afford until recently 
(Sterrett 2017a: 859-60). Moreover, when the value of scale models is recognized, 
it is often defined as illustrative of the physical phenomena represented, or 
pedagogical, in a similar way to toys and collectors’ miniatures. A classic definition 
of scale models in these terms was offered by Max Black (1962), who said that good 
examples of scale models were “the ship displayed in the showcase of a travel 
agency, the airplane that emerges from a small boy’s construction kit, the Stone 
Age village in the museum of natural history” (Black 1962: 219). A more recent 
example is found in the entry of the SEP for “Models in Science”, where the authors 
mention “wooden cars” and other “down-sized or enlarged copies of their target” 
as typical cases of scale models (Frigg & Hartmann 2018). The problem with these 
definitions is that, even without underplaying the pedagogical value that 
miniatures and toys might have, they presume a very narrow conception of the 
practice of scale modelling in science and engineering.  
Susan Sterrett (2002; 2006; 2009; 2017a) has first highlighted that 
philosophers of science have underestimated the role that scale models play and 
have played in modern science (2017a: 860). Not only have scale models been 
treated as mere didactic tools, but also architectural models have been frequently 
taken as a paradigmatic case of scale model (ibid.: 859a). The association with 
architectural layouts interferes with the understanding of how broadly the concept 
of scale model applies. 
 
There are of course some rather straightforward uses of scale modeling, 
such as the use of geometrical scale models in the architectural layout 
process, where the only purpose of the model is to represent spatial 
relationships. These are such special cases of scale modeling that they hide 
the extremely interesting and sophisticated methods involved in more 
general cases of scale modeling, in which fluid phenomena, mechanical 
phenomena that depend upon stress-strain or other material properties, and 
heat transfer phenomena are modeled by small objects whose behavior can 
be used to predict the behavior of larger machines and situations. (Sterrett 
2002: 57) 
 
The practice of scale modelling does not mean “simply built to the same 
geometrical proportions”; other quantities can be scaled too. There are many good 
historical examples of the use of the methodologies of scale modelling in 
engineering and geological sciences. Hydraulic physical models have been 
constructed from the times of Leonardo da Vinci and his experiments with currents 
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for the canalisation of the River Arno (around 1509)31 to Galileo’s tests with small 
vessels in water tanks around 1612,32 Froude’s experiments with small scale ships 
representing the H.M.S “Greyhound” in 1874,33 Monsieur Fague’s innovative river 
models in France in 1875,34 Reynolds’s tidal model of the Mersey estuary near 
Liverpool in 1885,35 up to the twentieth century, when modern techniques of scale 
modelling were consolidated. Sterrett (2017a: 860-1) mentions the physical model 
of Lake Superior in the 1970s as a fruitful contemporary case (Lien & Hoopes 
1978)36, and I will describe the well-known cases of the Mississippi Basin Model 
(MBM) (1943) and the San Francisco Bay Model (SFBM) (1953) throughout this 
chapter.  
Geology has been another field in which physical models have been 
employed for the purpose of prediction. For example, Koeningsberger & Morath 
(1913) and Hubbert (1937) applied the method of dimensional analysis to their 
models of tectonic structures; and the so-called “sandbox experiments”, which 
involve the deformation of piles of layered materials representing sedimentary 
rock, have been in use since the late nineteenth century (Cadell 1888) until very 
recently (McClay et al. 1991; Souloumiac et al. 2012).37 In volcanology and other 
subfields of geology that concern risk assessment, physical models have been 
particularly beneficial. Merle & Borgia (1996), Renschler (2005), Maceda et al. 
(2009), Norini & Acocella (2011), and Gabuchian et al. (2014) are examples of 
                                             
31 In Rouse and Ince (1963: 44-49). See more in: da Vinci, Leonardo (1924) Del Moto e Misura 
dell’Acqua, edited by Carusi, E., and Favaro, A. Bologna, 1924; and Duhem, P. (1913) Etudes sure 
Léonard de Vinci, Ser. 1, 2, and 3, Paris, 1906, 1909, and 1913.  
32 Van Fraassen (2008: 50-51). See more in: Galilei, G. (1974) Two New Sciences. Tr. Stillman 
Drake. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press; and Galilei, G. (2005) Discourse on Bodies in 
Water. Tr. Thomas Salusbury. New York: Dover Publications. 
33 Rouse and Ince (1963: 182-187). See more in: Froude, W. (1874) “On Experiments with H.M.S. 
Greyhound”. Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, Vol. 16, 1874.  
34 Price (1978: 26). 
35 Rouse and Ince (1963: 182, 206-212). See more in: Reynolds, O. (1888) “On Certain Laws 
Relating to the Regimen of Rivers and Estuaries, and on the Possibility of Experiments on a Small 
Scale”. Third International Navigation Congress, 1888. 
36 Lien, S. L., and Hoopes, J. A (1978) “Wind-driven, steady flows in Lake Superior” Limnology and 
Oceanography 23, 91-103. 
37 See: Koenigsberger & Morath (1913) “Theoretische Grundlagen der experimentellen 
Tektonik“. Zeitschr. Deutsch. Geol. Gesellsch. Monatshefte, Vol 65, 1913, pp. 65-86; Hubbert, M. K. 
(1937) “Theory of scale models as applied to the study of geologic structures”, The Geological 
Society of American Bulletin, 48, pp. 1459 – 1520; Cadell, H. (1888) “Experimental researches in 
Mountain building”. Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 35, 337–357; McClay, K., et al. 
(1991) “Physical and seismic modelling of listric normal fault geometries”. Geological Society, 
London, Special Publications 1991; v. 56; p. 231-239; Souloumiac, P. et al. (2012) “Bias due to side 
wall friction in sand box experiments”. Journal of Structural Geology 35 (2012) 90-101. 
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recent constructions of scale models complementarily (or alternatively) to the use 
of computer simulations.38 Even in physics, Sterrett (2017a) mentions Unruh’s 
(1981) scale model to study black holes in general relativity (ibid.: 870).39 
Sterrett’s criticism of philosophers of science for disregarding the 
importance of scale models as in the aforementioned examples is fully justified. 
However, there is some recent literature on the topic that should not be 
overlooked. Philosophers of science like Winsberg (2009) and Guala (2002) have 
discussed the epistemic value of scale models in experimentation with laboratory 
water tanks. Oreskes (2007), Schaffer (2004), and Bokulich and Oreskes (2017) 
have offered remarkable historical insights about the various uses of scale models 
in geosciences and civil engineering. And Weisberg (2013), Pincock (2012), and 
van Fraassen (2008) have thoroughly engaged with cases of scale modelling to 
advance their accounts of scientific representation.40 Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that the lack of serious consideration to scale models is not something 
exclusive to philosophers of science. Disagreements about the epistemic value of 
scale models have actually occurred within the engineering sciences first. We can 
for instance find disputes in the history of twentieth-century engineering research 
about whether scale models are indispensable tools for prediction or only 
illustrative tools. The case of the construction of the MBM and the origins of the 
creation of the WES (Waterways Experimental Station) in the US illustrate well 
the disputes within the community of engineers about the functions of scale modes, 
which were ultimately resolved in favour of attributing a high value to scale 
models. 
 
 
 
                                             
38 See: Merle, O. and Borgia, A. (1996) “Scaled experiments of volcanic spreading”, Journal of 
Geophys. Res. Solid Earth, 101, 13805-13817; Renschler, C. S. (2005) “Scales and uncertainties in 
using models and GIS for volcano hazard prediction”. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal 
Research, 139, 73-87; Maceda et al. (2009) “Experimental use of Models in Disaster Risk 
Management”. Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures. Volume 3, Number 
1; Norini, G., and Acocella, V. (2011) “Analogue modeling of flank instability at Mount Etna: 
Understanding the driving factors”, J. Geophys. Res., 116, 1-21; Gabuchian et al. (2014) 
“Experimental investigation of strong ground motion due to thrust fault earthquakes”, J. of 
Geophys. Res. Solid Earth, 119, 1316-1336. 
39 Unruh, W. G. (1981) “Experimental Black-Hole Evaporation?”, Phys. Rev. Lett., 46, 1351-1353. 
40 Other philosophers of science who have addressed the methodologies of scale modelling, and 
whose work Sterrett acknowledges are: Mattingly and Warwick (2009); Zwart (2009); Rothbart 
(2004); Kroes (1989); and Layton (1992). 
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Figure 4. Section of the Mississippi Basin Model. US Army Corps of Engineers 
(1970) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Detail of the Mississippi Basin Model. US Army Corps of Engineers 
(1970).  
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Figure 6. Water tanks at the Mississippi Basin Model. US Army Corps of 
Engineers (1970). 
 
 
The MBM is considered the largest small-scale model constructed in the world, 
occupying a surface of 200 acres near Clinton (Mississippi). It is intended to 
reproduce the entire drainage basin of the Mississippi River and its tributary 
system, from the Rocky Mountains to the Appalachian Mountains. The model had 
the appearance of a gigantic relief map with streams and floodplains moulded in 
concrete. It was built with the help of three thousand German and Italian prisoners 
of war during World War II, and was continued by civilian personnel of the US 
Army Corps of Engineers after the prisoners were transferred in 1946. It was 
completed in 1966, although individual sections were in operation by 1949 (Foster 
1971: 1; Robinson 1992: 290). In light of the consequences of terrible floods along 
the Mississippi River for centuries, the model was expected to help improve the 
coordination of flood control operations.  
After years of demands from engineers inside and outside the US Army 
Corps of Engineers, such as John R. Freeman in the twenties and General Reybold 
in the thirties, the plan for the construction of the ambitious MBM was finally 
approved in 1943 (Robinson 1992: 278; 281). This was an important year for the 
confirmation of the importance of small-scale in hydraulics within the Corps’ civil 
works. Following the narration of M. C. Robinson (1992), historian for the US 
Army WES and the Mississippi River Commission,41 the approval of the 
                                             
41 See biographical note about Robinson in Fowle (1992: 480); and about the “Michael Robinson 
Award” in the history of public works in his honour, see: Public Works History Society (Consulted 
April 2017): http://www2.apwa.net/About/SIG/PWHS/socact.asp#robinson  
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construction of the MBM was remarkable when one considers that, as late as 1930, 
many officers and civilian engineers at the Corps regarded models “as mere toys 
for youngsters of the profession” (Robinson 1992: 277).  
 
Most of the Corps was openly sceptical of the value of models and actually 
feared they posed a threat to traditional engineering practices based on field 
data and experience. Until the founding of WES (1929), rivers and harbours 
work was largely an empirical process and little attention was given to 
conducting model experiments using the fundamental principles of 
hydraulic similitude (Robinson 1992: 277). 
 
Civil engineer John Freedman was a prominent American structural engineer, who 
toured Europe in 1913. He was impressed by the contributions of European 
hydraulic laboratories in technical universities, especially those in Germany 
(Brown 2013: 42). Upon his return, he began to campaign for the creation of a 
national hydraulics laboratory (WES). However, the Corps was in clear 
disagreement with Freedman’s ideas. Their official position was clearly stated in a 
letter prepared by Secretary of War Dwight W. Davis in 1926 (Robinson 1992: 
278-9): 
 
The art of river regulation and control has heretofore been developed 
principally by practical experience in the solution of problems on a large 
scale […] Field experience in the solution of problems of this nature is 
undoubtedly of much greater value than laboratory experiments could 
possibly be, and the application of principles evolved in the laboratory to 
the solution of practical problems in the field must be difficult and 
uncertain… (Signed by Secretary of War Dwight W. Davis in 1926) 
(Robinson 1992: 278). 
 
The argument is directed against laboratory experiments, as they are presented as 
incompatible with, and of less valuable than, field work on a large scale. A year 
later, Major General Edgar Jadwin, Chief of Engineers of the Corps at that 
moment, also wrote to Freeman:  
 
I do not believe that many of the larger problems involved in the work of 
the Corps of Engineers, as, for example, flood control on the Mississippi, 
can be solved in a laboratory (in Robinson 1992: 278). 
 
More than substituting the empirical work traditionally done, the aim of a 
laboratory, of the kind Freeman had seen in German universities, was to build scale 
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models that could reproduce the dynamics of, for instance, the Mississippi River 
and its reservoirs in a way that the data collected from the full-scale physical 
system could not allow. In a scale model, extreme conditions of currents and flows 
can be tested, and future plans of dams and barriers could be evaluated. In 1929, 
and after a terrible flood on the Mississippi River, the plan for the foundation of a 
Waterways Experimental Station (WES) was finally enabled. Nonetheless, Major 
General Lytle Brown, Chief of the Corps after Jadwin, still thought that the 
potential benefits of the laboratory were going to be largely tangential: “specific in 
character… not for general informative purposes” (in Robinson 1992: 2).  
Years later, the scale models constructed by the WES proved to be 
extremely fruitful for prediction. This was demonstrated dramatically in April 
1952, in a field for which the MBM was not originally planned: the forecasting of 
the progression of a flood in the Missouri River section (Robinson 1992: 291-2). 
During fifteen crucial days that month, constant communication was maintained 
between engineers at the WES (based in Vickburg, Mississippi) and the Missouri 
River Division. Information furnished by the Missouri River section of the MBM 
“was of incalculable value in aiding evacuations and supporting flood-fighting 
activities” (Robinson 1992: 292). The model anticipated the progression of the 
flood days before it happened in the Missouri River, which allowed the 
identification of critical locations where levee raises were necessary. In Robinson’s 
chronicle, the achievements of the MBM in flood control “exceeded the 
expectations of its inventors”, and since it was built during World War II, partly 
by prisoners of war, he considered the model itself “a good and reliable soldier” 
(ibid.: 292).  
Civil engineer Margaret Petersen, who participated in the construction of 
the MBM in the late forties, also describes the benefits of doing research with 
physical models instead of using exclusively numerical data (US Army. Interview 
with Petersen 1997). Petersen recalls the experiments she and her colleagues 
carried out at the MBM station: they analysed the effects of levees on flood heights, 
studied the consequences of building dams in various locations, surveyed the 
variations in roughness of the bed, simulated the density of vegetation in the model 
with screen wire, etc. (ibid.: 7). Petersen affirms that these experiments involved 
conditions that could have been “routed theoretically for individual streams”, but 
for complex systems like the Mississippi River “it was more reliable to do it on a 
model where we could change variables one at a time and note the results” (ibid.: 
7). From Petersen’s account, it would be erroneous to conclude that the model was 
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a mere illustration of what the data was already showing, as it seems to have played 
an important role in obtaining successful predictive results about the Mississippi 
River.  
Since 1949 the epistemic value of hydraulic scale models was “officially” 
acknowledged by the community of engineers in the US. On that year the first 
conference specialized in Engineering Hydraulics took place at University of Iowa. 
One of the results of the conference was the publication of the principles of 
hydraulic similitude and flow measurements in the form of a manual, which became 
the basic reference book in the field for many years (Rouse 1950; in US Army: 
Interview with Petersen 1997: 10).42 In that manual, there are various allusions to 
the value of scale models in much more convinced terms than in previous years: 
  
Model-prototype comparisons have clearly demonstrated that, almost 
without exception, there is a correspondence of behaviour within and 
usually well beyond the expected limitations. […This] attests the real 
value of this modern tool of the hydraulic engineer. […] River-
improvement plans of tremendous magnitude have worked out successfully 
according to predictions based on model tests […] The improvements 
indicated by the models were invariably found to be real when the 
prototypes were constructed.  (Rouse 1950: 138) 
 
The use of scale models for prediction is presented here as successful, clearly 
demonstrated, and of real value, contrary to the idea of scale models “as mere toys for 
youngsters of the profession” defended years before (Robinson 1992: 277). Scale 
models have potential for prediction and understanding, beyond the illustrative or 
pedagogical roles they might play. In fact the MBM was also a visual illustration 
of the material properties of the Mississippi River, and a persuasive tool for 
educational and political purposes. All these functions were complementary to each 
other. General Reybold, Chief of Engineers at the Corps from 1941 to 1945, was 
                                             
42 Margaret Peterson (1997: 10), in her interview with the US Army Corps, claims: “The 1949 
conference was very special. It was attended by 425 people, and the 1000-page proceedings was 
published as a hardbound book by Wiley entitled Engineering Hydraulics edited by Hunter 
Rouse. The proceedings covered fundamental principles, hydraulic similitude, flow measurement, 
hydrology, ground water, steady flow in conduits, water hammer, channel transitions, gradually 
varied flow, flood routing, wave motion, sediment transportation, and hydraulic machinery. That 
book was the basic reference book for hydraulic engineering for many, many years”. The reference 
book in question is: Rouse, H. (1950): Engineering Hydraulics. Proceedings of the Fourth Hydraulics 
Conference. Iowa Institute of Hydraulic Research. June 12-15, 1949. Decades later, other manuals 
on hydraulic engineering were widely used for general consultation as well: Yalin, M. S. (1971) 
Theory of Hydraulic Models; Dalrymple, R. A. (Ed.) (1985) Physical Modelling in Coastal Engineering; 
Hughes, S. (1993) Physical Models and Laboratory Techniques in Coastal Engineering. 
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aware of the possible effects among public personalities that the construction of a 
model like the MBM could have: 
 
GEN Reybold stated that such a model would have great potential value for 
demonstrating flood-control measures to Government officials and laymen 
as well as to engineers. He said the model could be a means of convincing 
those responsible for flood-control legislation of the necessity for a central 
control of all reservoir operation during flood emergencies in the 
Mississippi River Basin. (Foster 1971: 2) 
 
The functions of “demonstrating” and “convincing” public authorities and lay 
people go hand in hand with the epistemic benefits for research that the model had. 
The capacity of persuasion of the MBM was largely due to the direct visual access 
it afforded, in comparison to numeral models of data. In a manual on Ocean 
Engineering Sciences (1990), coastal engineer Bernand Le Méhauté explains the 
“convincing” properties of scale models in relation to their materiality: 
 
Physical contact with the fluid element remains the best guide for intuitive 
discovery. It demonstrates visually, with credibility, what will happen. It 
stimulates the imagination and guides creative engineering solutions at a 
level that cannot be reached by theory and computer printouts, not even by 
computer graphics. (Le Méhauté 1990: 957) 
 
The work with scale models awakens our senses of vision and touch, what for Le 
Méhauté (1990) stimulates our intuitions in ways that differ from, but could be 
complementary to, mathematical and computational models. The physicality of 
scale models is linked to their credibility.  
Someone could perhaps affirm that the MBM indeed played a vital role in 
hydraulic research in the forties and fifties. But today, with the development of 
mechanisms for the computerization of data bases, the role of scale models is not 
crucial anymore. Moreover, one could say that the high costs and long periods of 
time that the construction of scale models entail make them rather dispensable. 
This is an argument offered among others by Oreskes (2007), who identifies scale 
models with “instruments of a past era”, when resources such as computers did not 
exist:  nowadays “a computer simulation can be used in precisely the same manner 
than a mimetic physical model” (Oreskes 2007: 113.). In response, Susan Sterrett 
(2017a: 861) has tried to show that in many circumstances the type of information 
and understanding about physical phenomena that scale models afford are 
irreplaceable.  
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Experimentation on physical models has not been supplanted by computer 
simulations for at least two reasons. The first is that experimental scale models 
often reveal phenomena that a computer simulation built using current knowledge 
cannot. For instance in aerodynamics, the demise of the wind tunnel – designed to 
study the effects of air moving past solid objects – has been predicted several times 
over the last century, but wind tunnels are still considered indispensable today and 
most research institutes in engineering have one in use (ibid.: 866). This idea 
connects with the thought that physical models can be surprising in a way 
computer simulations cannot (Morgan 2012: 294-296).43 The second reason is that 
most computer simulations “rely upon information gained by observation and 
experimentation, especially experimentation on analogue models” (Sterrett 
2017am: 866). To be able to design computer simulations, empirical data is 
necessary, and frequently scale models are required to obtain those data.  
I would like to add a third reason: computer simulations are less transparent 
than scale models regarding the distortions they contain.44 Civil engineer Petersen 
points out, concerning the work with the MBM and other physical models, that 
“everything changed completely with the inclusion of computers” (US Army 
Corps. Interview with Petersen 1997: 48), because “computers had a tremendous 
effect on hydrology, on forecasting, and hydrologic studies [because they…] 
greatly simplified sediment transport and backwater computations, which were 
terribly tedious” (ibid.). However, computers could not perform some of the most 
important work that needed to be done in research: 
 
Hydraulics is more an art than a science. Of course, it’s what today’s 
generation wants to put into equations and into the computer. I have 
reservations […] I think the biggest problem with computers today is that 
so many people don’t write the programs they use. They learn to use the 
programs, and they really don’t recognize all the approximations that go 
into them. (US Army Corps. Interview with Petersen 1997: 48)  
 
                                             
43 Morgan (2012: 34) distinguishes between surprise, that physical models, mathematical models, 
and computer simulation can afford, and confoundment, that only physical models can afford. 
Confoundment is a stronger term because it implies not only the production of unexpected results 
but also of potentially unexplainable results given the existing knowledge. 
44 The use of the term “transparent” here is inspired by a slightly different discussion about the 
differences between computer simulations and thought experiments. It is argued (di Paolo et al. 
2000) that while thought experiments are transparent with respect to the steps that lead to a 
certain result, computer simulations are usually epistemically opaque.  
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“Approximations” is the key word here, referring to the different idealizations, 
simplifications, and distortions included in all scientific models. If the implications 
of the inclusion of approximations are not fully and openly recognized, it is hard 
to evaluate the real epistemic value that models can have. Being aware of the whole 
process of construction of a representation is fundamental to understanding its 
potentials and limitations. I do not deny the possibility of being aware of the whole 
process of designing and programing computer simulations, nor do I deny the 
advantages of introducing computers in engineering sciences. Yet, I agree with 
Peterson’s observation that computer simulations are in some respect a way of 
distancing ourselves from the physical properties of the object studied, as well as 
from the manipulations involved in the modelling practice. Approximations and 
distortions are brought to the fore in scale modelling, while they remain partially 
occult in the programs’ codes in computer simulations. In conclusion, computer 
simulations might be preferred for various reasons, including costs, adaptability, 
and the ease with which they can be modified (Sterrett 2017a: 866). But that is 
different than claiming that they are satisfactory substitutes for scale models in 
general. The epistemic value of scale models should not be underestimated, neither 
by attributing them only illustrative functions nor by considering them replaceable 
by computer simulations.  
The founding of the WES and the subsequent construction of the MBM 
give us a glimpse of the development of the practices of scale modelling in the 
engineering sciences throughout the twentieth century. The broader epistemic 
potential of the MBM was not obvious, however, from the time of its construction. 
Instead, it unfolded through time, when the model continued to produce 
predictions and solutions to flooding problems that would carry over even to 
phenomena and geographical areas at which it was not initially directed. The 
model as a whole stretched to produce novel results beyond its immediate range of 
applications. In Chapter 5, I will describe this and other models that allow to 
perform novel research as fruitful, and explain how fruitfulness concerns the 
broader aim of gaining understanding from scientific models. 
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Figure 7. Postcard of the site. Visitors’ centre. At the back: “WES, Corps of 
Engineers, US Army, Vicksburg. Showing a portion of the Mississippi River scale 
model used for flood control purposes. Open daily to the public Monday through 
Friday, with free guide.  
 
 
 
4.2. Judgments of similarity in scale modelling 
After challenging the assumption that scale models have a low epistemic value, I 
argue in this section that philosophers of science who usually undervalue the role 
of scale models in science also recognize the presence of obvious visual similarities 
between scale models and the targets they represent. However, they frequently 
consider those similarities superficial, of mere appearance, and not playing a 
particularly relevant epistemic function. The miniature replica of an airplane, of 
the kind a collector would keep on her shelf, could easily be judged as similar to a 
full-sized airplane, as they probably share some of the same shapes and colours. 
My point is that, first, collectors’ miniatures should not be considered paradigmatic 
cases of scale models (as in Black 1962; Frigg & Hartmann 2018). Instead, the fields 
of engineering and life sciences provide abundant examples of fruitful scale models 
for the purposes of prediction and understanding, like the MBM. Second, 
similarities that play a role in fruitful scale models are not merely similarities of 
appearance or superficial. I introduce the case of the San Francisco Bay Model 
(SFBM) in this section to illustrate how judgments of similarity are constantly 
present in the practice of scale modelling, but also how these judgments involve 
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much more than superficial similarities. In Section 4.3 I show that they also involve 
dynamic similarities and various forms of distortion and idealization.  
To illustrate the attitude towards scale models and similarity that I try to 
dispute, consider this quote from Suárez: 
 
…an engineer’s toy bridge may be similar to the bridge that it represents in 
the proportions and weights of the different parts […] There are also 
important dissimilarities, such as size, which make the representation only 
a partially successful one. (Suárez 2003: 231) 
 
Similarity intervenes here, but only as a superficial feature of a “toy” that looks like 
a real bridge in appearance. The mere idea of an “engineer’s toy bridge” is rather 
unclear: it can be understood as a toy that works merely as an illustration of the 
modelling practice, or as an explanatory tool that models the behaviour of the real 
bridge. Suárez (2003) adds that the dissimilarities in size of the toy bridge makes 
it “only a partially successful” representation. I contend that the difference in size 
doesn’t render the model of the bridge a less successful representation, but allows 
the possibility of investigating the target with the help of a model. There is an 
implicit assumption here that if similarity has anything to do with scale models it 
is because scale models are supposed to be “naturalistic replicas” or “mirror images 
of the target” (following Achinstein’s [1968] characterization of scale models). 
Contrary to this conception of scale models as naturalistic replicas of their targets, 
similarity, I argue, is manifest in practice through a plurality of judgments of 
similarity that work as resources for the construction of models that can be used 
for prediction and explanation. 
There is a substantial record of the plans of design of both the MBM and 
the SFBM thanks to digitalized reports of the US Army Corps of Engineers (see 
US Army Corps 1963 and 1997; Foster 1971). The reports allow us to localize 
constant references to the notions of “similarity”, “similitude”, “analog”, and 
“resemblance” in the practice of constructing these models. Some of the judgments 
of similarity employed in the practice are very specific and context-dependent. 
Other judgments of similarity entail more standardized conceptions of the 
principles of physical similarity; still other judgments of similarity rely on previous 
experiences, and involve more intuitive, unspecified ideas about the similarity 
relation between the model and the target of the representation. I will illustrate 
the presence of these three types of judgments of similarity in turns, using the case 
of the SFBM.  
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In 1957 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers decided to construct a model 
that could reproduce the water flows of the San Francisco Bay. Initially the main 
goal was to study the ambitious plan to dam the Bay proposed by John Reber in 
the late 1940s (Weisberg 2013: 2). Reber believed that damming the Bay would 
supply San Francisco with nearly unlimited drinking water, and could also 
revolutionize the area’s transportation and industrial infrastructure.45 There were, 
however, opponents to the Reber Plan within the Corps. They worried that it 
might render the south of the Bay a cesspool, creating problems for the ports and 
having other unintended environmental consequences (ibid.: 2). The model finally 
built was an immense structure of around 1.4 acres (although much smaller than 
the MBM), located in a warehouse in Sausalito. It represented the San Francisco 
Bay, the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, and seventeen miles 
of the Pacific Ocean beyond the Golden Gate Bridge. It was constructed out of 
precast and lightweight concrete, and the bottom surface of the model was 
embedded with thousands of copper strips, which simulate the roughness of the sea 
bed (ibid.: 9-10). When the SFBM was finished and calibrated, a scaled version of 
the barriers of the Reber Plan was located in the model and its effects were 
evaluated. The final report of the Corps described the effects of the Reber Plan in 
the following terms: “the Reber Plan practically eliminated tidal current 
movements and associated turbulence, and thus changed the Bay oceanward of the 
barrier from a rapid to a slow dispersion and flushing system” (US Army Corps 
1963: 267). 
The potential changes in the currents and tides that the model predicted 
could indeed have had disastrous consequences for the Bay, as the movement of the 
flows would have been significantly reduced by the barriers, and the report finally 
discouraged the construction of the barriers proposed by Reber. The SFBM was 
also used to study other projects of barriers in the Bay, such as the Chipps Island 
Barrier, the Dillon Point Barrier, the Point San Pablo Barrier, and to test the 
quality of the water and waste diversion conditions of the Bay (Huggins and 
Schultz 1967).  
When looking at the technical reports of the US Army Corps on the 
construction of the SFBM, we observe the abundant presence of judgments of 
similarity in the phases of design, building, and calibration of the model (US Army 
                                             
45 See Reber, J. (1959) “Our perpetual gift to California and the nation: A master plan for the vast 
San Francisco region”. National Archives and Records Administration. Pacific Region, Papers of 
John Reber, Location 2126E-G, Accn. 77- 94-09. In Weisberg (2013: 2-3). 
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Corps 1963 and 1981). The most prominent type of judgments is what I have called 
“standardized judgments of similarity”. The use of standardized judgments of 
similarity concerns the laws or criteria of physical similarity, well-known in 
modern physics and engineering and commonly employed in the construction of 
hydraulic models. They are “standardized” because they have been systematically 
described in manuals and textbooks in hydraulic engineering and fluid mechanics, 
and are applied following very specific rules and standards (Rouse 1950; Rouse & 
Ince 1963; Hughes 1993) concerning how to obtain adequate “geometric 
similarity”, “kinematic similarity”, and “dynamic similarity” for the purposes of the 
models under construction. Geometric similarity is similarity in form; kinematic 
similarity is similarity in motion; and dynamic similarity refers to the 
correspondence of all homologous forces in model and prototype (Warnock 1950: 
138-9). Standardized judgments of similarity are easily transferred from one 
practice of modelling to another, contrary to what happens with the other types of 
judgments of similarity – intuitive and context-dependent, described below– where 
the concrete practice defines the specific implications of the use of the notion of 
similarity.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. San Francisco Bay Model. Visitors’ Centre. Sausalito, CA.  
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Figure 9. San Francisco Bay Model. Sausalito, CA. John Easterby, engineering 
specialist (left), and Col. John A. Graf check readings on June 12 (1957). The 
Chronicle.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. SFBM. Copper strips simulate the roughness of the sea bed (1986). The 
Chronicle.  
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Figure 11. Gen. A. Frye checks Dillon Point Barrier at the SFBM (1963). 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Park ranger Griggs pours oil into the SFBM while oil company 
representatives and legislators look on (1989).  
 
 
The study of the principles or laws of similarity has a very long history, derived 
from the analysis of ratios. Sterrett (2009) explains how the use of ratios in 
reasoning from similarity was already recognized by the Pythagoreans (2009: 1). 
Later, many proofs in Euclid’s Geometry employed the strategy of establishing the 
similarity between two figures in order to draw inferences about other geometrical 
entities (ibid.: 1). The notion of a “similar system” goes back to at least Newton, 
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and involves the possibility of generalizing from similarity of geometrical figures 
to similarity of physical systems. So instead of ratios involving only lengths, 
similarity of physical systems can involve other quantities such as time, mass, and 
force (ibid.: 3-4). Methodologies to establish physical similarity were not developed 
in detail and formalized until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
however. Buckingham’s (1914) article “On Physically Similar Systems: Illustration 
of the Use of Dimensional Equations” set out the methodologies engineers still use 
today to reduce the relation between physical quantities to a relation between 
dimensionless parameters, which in turn could be used to establish physical 
similarity (Buckingham’s theorem) (ibid.: 5). Dimensionless parameters go from 
very simple (such as Mach number, which is a ratio of two velocities), to very 
complex (such as Reynolds number, which contains density, velocity, length and 
kinematic viscosity) and are incredibly useful in hydraulics and coastal engineering 
(ibid.: 4).  
Some examples of the explicit application of standardized judgments of 
similarity in the construction of the SFBM are expressed in the reports as follows:   
 
In accordance with the laws of similitude, the measurements made on the 
model indicate the corresponding prototype quantities (U. S. Army Corps 
1963: 41).  
[Under the rubric “Model Design – Similitude Relations”]: Model laws 
commonly used for establishing the similarity of model and prototype are 
known as Froude’s, Reynolds’s, Weber’s, and Cauchy’s laws (U. S. Army 
Corps 1963: 43). 
The establishment of the similarity between model and prototype commonly 
makes use of laws of similitude expressed by [...] the Froude, Reynolds, 
Weber, and Cauchy numbers (U. S. Army Corps 1981: 6-1. In Weisberg 
2013: 154). 
 
The Froude, Reynolds, Weber, and Cauchy numbers are dimensionless parameters 
regarding the most relevant forces intervening in fluid dynamics. The Froude 
number expresses the correlation of inertial forces with the force of gravity; the 
Reynolds number the correlation of inertial forces with viscosity; the Weber 
number the correlation of inertial forces with surface tension; and the Cauchy 
number the correlation of inertial forces with elasticity (Rouse 1950: 142-4). The 
construction of adequate hydraulic models in principle requires that each of these 
numbers be the same in model and prototype, as above. However, it is also clear in 
the reports that, in practice, some parameters are neglected and others distorted – 
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for instance, in the construction of the SFBM, the Cauchy and Weber numbers 
were disregarded.  
Two clarification notes. In the literature on scale modelling there are 
mentions of “principles of similarity” (Rouse 1950; Robinson 1992; Ettema et al. 
2000; Sterrett 2006; 2009), “laws of similarity” (Rouse 1950; U. S. Army Corps 
1963), “criteria of similarity” (Rouse 1950; Hughes 1993; Ettema et al. 2000; 
Sterrett 2006; 2009) and “requirements of similarity” (Rouse 1950; Hughes 1993; 
Ettema et al. 2000; Sterrett 2009). Although it could seem that referring to “laws” 
has stronger implications than referring to “requirements” of similarity, they 
should be considered synonymous. All these terms refer to the regulated set of 
norms to achieve geometric, kinematic, and dynamic similarity. Also, there is a 
slightly different use of terminology in the literature when using the terms 
“similitude” and “similarity”. Some manuals only use the term “similarity”; others 
prefer “similitude”; others use either interchangeably (see Heller 2011); and others 
like Hughes (1993) assign different meanings to the terms similarity and 
similitude. Similitude refers (for Hughes) to the formal mathematical conditions 
that must be met by the scale ratios between prototype and model, whereas 
similarity is a condition that exists when a model gives a similar response to the 
prototype (Hughes 1993: 14). In Hughes’s account, it is possible to have model 
similarity without meeting similitude criteria. Conditions of similarity are chosen 
by the experimenter in order to make the physical model reproduce certain effects 
satisfactorily (ibid.: 52). Despite being an interesting distinction, there is no need 
to stress it in an account that focuses on “judgments of similarity”. Similitude as 
Hughes describes it would correspond to the “standardized type of judgments of 
similarity” in my account, before being applied to specific practical situation. I keep 
the mentions of similitude and similarity as in the original quotes, but will 
understand them as equivalent. 
Apart from standardized judgments of similarity, other types of judgments 
of similarity are also identifiable in the construction of the SFBM. In the process 
of operating and adjusting the model, specific, context-dependent uses of 
judgments of similarity appear too. The levels of salinity of the water tank of the 
model had to be adjusted to those of the Bay. It is affirmed in the report that “the 
model was operated until stable salinity regimens were obtained similar to that 
existing in the prototype” (U. S. Army Corps 1963: 56; also 68. My emphasis). 
What the use of a judgment of similarity here involves is quite specific: enough 
agreement between the salinity levels of the water in the tanks of the model and 
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those registered in the prototype on 21st September 1956 (ibid.: 68). There was a 
constant inflow of fresh water into the Bay that mixed with salt water from the 
sea, so the salinity levels varied a lot across the Bay. The calibration of the model 
regarding its salinity levels was a complex process that had to consider different 
locations and variables. Introducing judgments of similarity and dissimilarity 
happened to be useful in this situation because it allowed comparison of very 
specific aspects of the behaviours of model and prototype. When it is affirmed that 
“salinity regimens were obtained similar to that existing in the prototype” it is clear 
that “complete similarity”, “identity”, or “sharing of the exact same properties” is 
not what was pursued in the practice; rather, relevant features of model and 
prototype were stabilized so as to permit the pursuit of the goals of the practice.  
In a different section of the report, it is also claimed that “profiles were 
measured in the flume for comparison with similar profiles measured in the Bay 
model” (US Army Corps 1963: 165. My emphasis). On this occasion, the attention 
was on the study of the water-surface elevations of the model. A board of engineers 
had the task of collecting data from the profiles of the real flume and comparing 
them with the profiles of the model. The comparison did not involve an attempt to 
achieve perfect identity or duplication of the actual profiles of the Bay, but rather 
the use of judgments of similarity to determine which profiles in the flume to 
compare with which profiles in the model. Context-dependent judgments of 
similarity served as resources to direct and focalize the practice of scale modelling.  
Additionally, the use of some other judgments of similarity that we can 
identify as more “intuitive” and “unspecified” is also found in the reports of the 
construction of scale models. In the first phases of the construction of the MBM, 
for instance, engineers of the Corps had to provide a justification for building the 
MBM on a particular terrain near Clinton, Mississippi. They allude to a particular 
feature of the terrain in Clinton: it had “as close a resemblance to the natural 
features of the Mississippi Basin as could be found” in the area (Foster 1971: 10). 
“Resemblance” is a rather imprecise term here. There is almost no further 
clarification of what the requirements for the terrain exactly were, but the report 
still documents the selection of this terrain based on an imprecise judgment of 
similarity, as it informally intervened in the decisions made in the first stages of 
the construction of the model. My use of the term “intuition” in this context has 
no further implications regarding the rationality of the decisions made appealing 
to them. I call this type of judgment intuitive in the sense that they are more 
directly supported by the previous skills and background knowledge of engineers, 
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without detailed formulation of the justifications for them. In fact, there are 
relatively frequent references to the term intuition in manuals on scale modelling, 
when they refer to decisions engineers make based on their expertise and previous 
experiences (see Warnock 1950: 137; Le Méhauté 1990: 937; Hughes 1993: 52). 
Scientists and engineers master certain techniques and skills thanks to previous 
experiences. This allows them to adjust and apply model results in a non-
formalized, but usually satisfactory, manner.  
The classification into three types of judgments of similarity is supported 
by a classification of “kinds of similitude” that the classic manual in hydraulic 
engineering edited by Rouse (1950) offers. Warnock writes a chapter in the manual 
on “Hydraulic Similitude”, in which he refers to the existence of three pertinent 
similitude criteria employed in the practice of scale modelling (Warnock 1950: 
137). The first kind of similitude has a more “rational basis” and has been developed 
by “theoretical means”. That is, it is a standardized, systematic criterion of 
similitude, by which a set of transferences ratios can be applied to different model 
findings to predict prototype behaviours (ibid.: 137). The second type of similitude 
criteria is presented by Warnock as follows:  
 
In addition to those having a rational basis, there are other kinds of 
similitude which are developed by experiment in the model to be applied in 
special cases […] Although attempts are being made to develop a more 
rational basis for transference of experimental results in such cases, the 
current procedure is based primarily on empirical relations. (Warnock 1950: 
137. My emphasis) 
 
This second type of similitude criteria can be associated with the notion of “specific 
or context-dependent judgments of similarity” I proposed. They cannot be easily 
formulated in mathematical or theoretical terms, but they apply in special cases 
and play an important role in the adjustments of the experiments with specific 
models. Third, Warnock recognizes that “in still other cases the only basis for 
predicting prototype behaviours from model experiments is one compounded of 
experience and intuition” (Warnock 1950: 137). This description of how certain 
decisions are made based on experience with other scale modes fits well with the 
notion of “intuitive, unprecise, judgments of similarity”. Having the ability to 
effectively formulate convenient judgments of similarity appears as an important 
part of the practice of scale modelling. The agreement between Warnock’s (1950) 
characterization of different similitude criteria and the classification of judgments 
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I proposed based on the analysis of the reports of the SFBM and the MBM can be 
taken as a sign that this is a satisfactory way of studying the presence of similarity 
in the construction of representations like these.  
This classification does not intend to be rigorous or definitive, however. The 
aim was mainly to emphasize the plurality of forms in which similarity is actively 
involved in practices of constructing models like the MBM and the SFBM. Few 
philosophers of science have focused on the study of judgments of similarity in 
practice, and some who have done so, like Sterrett (2009, 2017a) have exclusively 
analysed the use of “standardized judgments of similarity”. I aimed to offer a more 
flexible way of thinking about the various applications of similarity in modelling 
practices. If we aim to advance an account of the means of representation, we are 
addressing a pragmatic question that needs to be informed by specific uses and 
definitions in manuals and handbooks like Rouse’s (1950), which connects 
practitioners’ work with the standardization of practices within a community.  
 
 
 
4.3. Not only size matters. The role of distortion 
The uses of judgments of similarity identified in the previous section can be 
characterized further. As pointed out in Chapter 3, making judgments of 
similarities usually involves the formulation of judgments of dissimilarity and 
distortion as well. The cases of the construction of the MBM and the SFBM 
exemplify this particularly well, as idealizations, simplifications, and other forms 
of distortion are directly involved in the uses of the three types of judgments of 
similarity. When engineers for example made standardized judgments of similarity 
based on the well-established principles of physical similarity, they also judged the 
deviations from the standards that they were willing to accept, as well as the 
potential benefit that inserting distortions could have for the modelling practice. 
Geometric similarity, for instance, usually goes hand in hand with geometric 
distortions in scale models. Robinson (1992) captures how the application of the 
principles of geometric similarity in the SFBM involved considerable distortions: 
 
To be whimsical, if one were a Lilliputian resident in this model conforming 
to its laws, he or she would be about ¾-inch tall, and because of the distorted 
scale, as thin as tissue paper. The normal 8 hours sleep would last but 2.4 
minutes, while lunch hour would be only 18 seconds. (Robinson 1992: 287) 
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One would be “as thin as a tissue paper” because some dimensions of the San 
Francisco Bay were reduced much more than others. The SFBM combines a scale 
of 1:1000 for the horizontal dimensions (length and width of the surface of the Bay) 
with a scale of 1:100 for the vertical (depth of the Bay); while in the case of the 
MBM, the model combines a scale of 1:2000 for the horizontal with 1:100 for the 
vertical. The distortion of the geometric proportions is clear in both cases, and also 
quite high (of x10 in a case and x20 in the other case). The application of the criteria 
of geometric similarity is a process of judging what dimensions are going to be 
scaled (enlarged or reduced), and how exactly each one is going to be scaled in 
relation to the others. In other words, when applying the criteria of geometric 
similarity to concrete scale models, not only size matters.  
Distortions should not be strictly understood as limitations of the practice 
of scale modelling. There are good reasons for the introduction of distortions:  
 
Distorted scales are used when a departure from geometric similarity serves 
some definite objective and the results are limited to this objective. 
Distortion is usually required in models of river channels, floodways, 
harbors, and estuaries, for which the horizontal dimensions are large in 
proportion to the vertical ones […] Many valuable studies have been made 
with distorted models. (Warnock 1950: 146) 
 
Here we see that the idea of geometric similarity can be traded off against the 
possibility of introducing well-reasoned, efficient distortions. For the case of the 
SFBM, geometric distortions were justified as a “compromise between two 
conflicting demands” for the scale model, to be “large enough to give faithful 
reproduction of flows […] and as small as is permissible in order to reduce cost, 
construction time, water supply, and space requirements” (US Army Corps 1963: 
41). Engineers know from experience that the vertical geometric scale for rivers 
and estuaries should not be reduced by more than 1:100, as the behaviour of the 
flows would otherwise be substantially different to that of the prototype. 
Meanwhile, there is more flexibility with reducing the horizontal scale, insofar as 
other important parameters concerning dynamic similarity are met. Warnock 
(1950) gives specific recommendations about the selection of scales in his manual: 
 
The following ranges of scales have been used successfully in many model 
studies and are recommended for use as a point of departure in the 
determination of scales. […] Spillways for large dams may be studied on 
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models with scale ratios in the range from 1:30 to 1:1000. […] Most river 
models vary in scale ratios between 1:100 and 1:1000. There is a minimum 
size for each type of model. […] When models smaller than these sizes are 
used, it is difficult to build them, to say nothing of the possibility of 
introducing similitude defects. (Warnock 1950: 144) 
 
Previous experiences are fundamental to decide what the most convenient scale is 
and what degree of deviation from the standard should be accepted. Warnock 
(1950: 144) adds that “it should be realized that the experienced investigator can 
venture beyond the above-stated limits and obtain satisfactory results, but this is 
not recommended as a general practice”. Engineers decide on the most convenient 
combination of judgments of similarity and distortion for the case at hand, taking 
into account the rules, standards, recommendations, and shared skills that are 
entrenched in the system of practices. 
In addition to geometric similarity, we find dynamic similarities 
accompanied by dynamic distortions in the practice of scale modelling too.46 
Scientists require empirical understanding of the physical systems to make 
appropriate idealizations and generalizations about the behaviour of those systems 
(Sterrett 2009: 25). I previously referred to the Reynolds, Froude, Cauchy, and 
Weber numbers. In theory, dynamic similarity requires that each of these numbers 
be the same for model and prototype, but in practice engineers do not aim to do so. 
This is because, for instance in the case of the SFBM, “the forces of surface tension 
and elasticity, represented by the Weber and Cauchy numbers, do not significantly 
affect conditions in the Bay, so it is not necessary to simulate their effects” (US 
Army Corps 1981: 6-1. In Weisberg 2013: 154). Instead of aiming at complete, 
perfect dynamic similarity between model and prototype, what is advantageous for 
the practice is to disregard the forces that only have a slight effect in the flow 
phenomenon, while stressing the effects of the more significant forces. In an 
estuary such as the San Francisco Bay, the features of flow are mostly controlled 
by the joint effect of inertial and gravitational force; thus, hydraulic quantities 
mainly vary according to the Froude number (ibid.). However, focusing on the 
variations of the Froude number and not considering the Reynolds number could 
generate some undesirable effects in the model. “Fortunately [the report of the 
                                             
46 There is also “kinematic similarity”, but since it is included in the notion of “dynamic similarity” 
I will only refer to the latter. Additionally, Sterrett (2009: 4) points out other kinds of physical 
similarity employed in experimental model testing outside hydrodynamics, such as elastic 
similarity, similarity of mass distribution, electrical similarity, magnetic similarity, thermal 
similarity (following Pankhurst 1964: 18 and 77-80). 
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SFBM reads] it is not necessary to duplicate the Reynolds Number, for the only 
important result of such distortions [can be] […] checked” and compensated by 
taking into consideration other parameters (U. S. Army Corps 1963: E-3). 
In a more recent paper, Heller (2011) suggests three common practices 
among engineers to deal with the undesirable consequences of scale effects or 
privileging certain adjustment of geometric and dynamic similarities over others: 
“avoidance”, “compensation”, and “correction” (2011: 299-203). Avoidance refers to 
the practice of avoiding scale effects as much as possible, by applying rules of 
thumb based on past experience (ibid.: 299). For instance, one could avoid 
distortions generated by kinematic viscosity by replacing the fluids used in the 
model (i.e. air for water). The idea of engineers using rules of thumb connects well 
with the thought that intuitive judgments based on previous experiences are 
occasionally employed in the practice of modelling. The second practice Heller 
(2011) mentions, compensation, refers to the inclusion of explicit distortions of 
parameters (i.e. distortion on the grain diameter, length scale) from the beginning 
of the process of designing a model, “in favour of an improved model-prototype 
similarity” (ibid.: 302). That is, significant distortions of the parts of the model are 
compensating in such a way that the whole results in a model that generally fulfils 
the requirements for adequate dynamic similarity. Nevertheless, in both avoidance 
and compensation, practical considerations more often than not limit the 
modeller’s choices (in Hughes 1993: 251). The third resource, correction, refers to 
the posterior adjustments of the model results by using available data from the 
prototype. When it is well-known that for instance waves would decay faster in 
the model than in the prototype, the results are corrected in the phase of evaluation, 
without necessarily modifying the physical model (Heller 2011: 303).  
Figure 13 systematizes the scales used in the SFBM to convert important 
features of the prototype into parameters in the model. The parameters included 
in the list are only a small selection of parameters that engineers considered 
relevant, among the many possible features of the San Francisco Bay that could 
have been included. The viscosity of the water, the colour and density of water and 
soil are for instance parameters not considered in the construction of the SFBM. 
Each of the parameters included was converted from prototype to model according 
to a specific scale. Apart from the various geometric distortions manifest in the 
chart (when looking at the depth and length of the model), we can see how the 
scale of the slope, instead of being reduced from prototype to model, was amplified 
on a scale of 10:1, while the time of the tidal cycles is reduced to a scale of 1:100, 
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and the salinity levels of the Bay are kept to a scale 1:1. The key to the production 
of a fruitful model is found in adequate integrations of the various parameters in 
the whole. This, I have tried to argue, is done with the help of the interplay of 
various judgments of similarity and distortion. The use of a scale 1:1 for the salinity 
levels means very little if we do not consider other parameters to which salinity is 
related, such as the tidal cycles, the vertical distribution of water and suspended 
particles in the tank, the roughness of the sea bed, etc. It could be claimed that 
perfect similarity or identity is the resource (of the means) used to translate the 
level of salinity in the Bay into the level of salinity in the water tank of the model. 
But once we consider the interaction between different parameters, the salinity 
level scaled at 1:1 becomes a distortive element for the whole, since it hasn’t been 
scaled as other parameters have. Judgments about how the different parts of the 
model work individually are always connected to how those parts are integrated. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Conversion of model data to prototype equivalents. San Francisco Bay 
Model. From US Army Corps (1963: 42). 
 
 
The idea that scale models are mere replicas of the objects represented, in the sense 
of miniature copies of their targets, must be rejected in favour of a conception that 
highlights the various judgments of similarity and distortions at stake in the 
process of constructing scale models. This is the basic idea behind the account of 
the means of representation, supported on the notion of “creative similarity”, 
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advanced in Chapter 5. Philosophers of science should seriously consider how 
concepts like similarity are defined and employed by practitioners who intervene 
in the construction of models, and who participate in the development of technical 
manuals that help direct a wide range of practices. Definitions of similarity like the 
following, offered by Warnock (1950), support the idea that similarity in the 
practice of scale modelling does not consist in achieving complete correspondence 
or copy images of the target. 
 
Similitude, as applied to hydraulic models, goes considerably beyond the 
superficial aspects of geometric similarity with which it is sometimes 
erroneously identified. Similitude can be defined as a known and usually 
limited correspondence between the behavior of a model and that of its 
prototype, with or without geometric similarity. The correspondence is seldom 
perfect, because it is generally impossible to satisfy all the conditions 
required for complete similitude; however, these conditions are known, as 
will be shown subsequently. The term similitude should hence be qualified to 
indicate the general limits of correspondence, or one might speak of various types 
of similitude, each of which has a definite set of limitations (Warnock 1950: 
136. My emphasis).  
  
Two key ideas are implied here. The role of similarity in scale modelling goes 
beyond geometric similarity: dynamic similarity is fundamental too. Also, 
similarity is identified with the limits of correspondence between a model and a 
prototype, and not with perfect correspondence. This idea supports the claim that 
similarity in the practice of representing is about the effective combination of 
judgments of similarity and distortions, and not imitating or copying the target. 
Accounts in philosophy of science, and more specifically in PSP and iHPS, should 
take definitions from manuals like this one more seriously. A characterization of 
similarity based on practitioners’ own definitions and recommendations on how 
the concept is applied in practice should work as the source of normativity of the 
discussion on similarity in the philosophical debate on representation.  
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4.4. Implications for the debate of scientific representation 
The cases of the MBM and the SFBM can inform the debate of representation in 
philosophy of science in interesting ways. In this concluding section, I discuss two 
particular ways in which the analysis in the preceding sections complements or 
challenges certain positions in the debate of representation. One, my own 
examination of the case of the SFBM can cast doubts on some of Weisberg’s (2013) 
assumptions in his weighted feature-matching account of similarity. Two, the study of 
various judgments of similarity in the construction of the SFBM and the MBM can 
bring to the debate on scientific representation the thought that similarity adopts 
a variety of forms in the practice of representing. Yet, this shall not involve the 
thought that similarity is a “problematically vague” notion, as for instance 
Goodman (1972) and Frigg (2006) have argued.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the weighted feature-matching account of similarity 
that Weisberg (2013) proposes is partly sustained on the idea that an analysis of 
representation should reflect judgments that scientists actually make (ibid.: 138). 
This differentiates his account from others in which the relation of representation 
“holds between inaccessible, hidden features of models and targets” (ibid.: 138). 
The weighted feature-matching account can be understood as an attempt to formalize 
the idea that a model is similar to its target when they share many , and do not fail 
to share too many, features that are thought to be salient by the scientific 
community (ibid.: 136). Weisberg offers a formula, derived from Amos Tversky’s 
(1977) contrast account of similarity in cognitive psychology, which assigns a 
‘similarity score’ to the relation between particular models and targets.47 First, the 
relevant attributes (i.e. properties or patterns) and mechanisms (i.e. generating 
processes) of model and target have to be identified and included in the formula 
(Weisberg 2013: 146). Then, a weighting function that ascribes a level of relevance 
to the various members of the feature set needs to be assigned to each of the terms 
in the equation (ibid.: 148). For instance, f is assigned to the attributes shared by 
                                             
47 Amos Tversky proposed a contrast account of similarity to capture everyday judgments of 
similarity made by his experimental subjects (Tversky 1977). His account assumes that the 
similarity between objects a and b depends on the features they share and the features they do not 
share. To measure this, Tversky begins with a set of features . We call A the set of features in  
possessed by a, and B the set of features in  possessed by b. Then, a weighting function f, which 
is context-sensitive, is chosen to assign a degree of relevance to the features selected, and to obtain 
a score that can be used in comparative judgments of similarity. Weisberg substitutes the a and b 
in Tversky’s account for model and target, and attributes the ability to identify relevant features 
and weighting functions to the scientific community (Weisberg 2013: 146-150). 
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model and target, f to the mechanisms shared by model and target, f to the 
attributes that model has but target lacks, f to the mechanism that target has but 
model lacks, etc. Weisberg (2013) makes explicit that there are no context-free 
definition of functions and selection of properties. They are the product of the 
deliberation of the scientific community (ibid.: 145). The following formula is 
obtained:  
 
 
 
 
 
S indicates the final similarity score, M and T are the sets of features possessed by 
model and target, f are the weighting functions, and the different Greek letters 
correspond to the weights attributed to each of them. The similarity between a 
model and a target increases when they share many features (attributes and 
mechanisms), when the model is not penalized for containing extraneous details, 
and when the model does not fail to capture important features of the target (ibid.: 
146). The score obtained ranges from 0 to 1. When model and target share many 
relevant features, S approaches 1 (ibid.: 148).  
Thus stated, the account seems to be able to successfully systematize the 
degree of similarity between a model and a target in terms of the number of 
properties, and the relative importance of the properties, that model and target 
share. Some difficulties arise though when Weisberg tries to fit the analysis of 
particular cases like the SFBM into his formula. It is not particularly clear how 
each feature of the SFBM is going to be classified in the weighted feature-matching 
account, either as a feature that model and target share, as an extraneous feature in 
the model, or as a feature of the target that the model fails to capture. This is how 
Weisberg proposes to do so: 
 
At this point, we can consider how the different terms would get filled for 
the San Francisco Bay model. We know that, within reasonable tolerance, 
the model is physically scaled to the Bay’s features, and the tidal cycle and 
salinity gradient are represented accurately (attributes shared by model and 
target, or Ma ∩ Ta). Mechanistically, the model has little in common with 
the forces producing tides (the moon) and salinity gradients (the ocean) in 
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the Bay (mechanisms possessed by the model but not the target or 
Mm−Tm). However, the ratios of physical forces as represented, for 
example, by the Froude number (ratio of body’s inertia to gravitational 
forces) are correctly represented (mechanisms possessed by the model and 
the target, or Mm ∩ Tm). (Weisberg 2013: 148-9) 
 
From this description it is not evident why some features of the SFBM are 
classified as shared, while others are considered non-shared. Weisberg (2013) 
seems to assume that, for instance, the salinity gradient should be classified as a 
shared feature of model and target, insofar as the scale used for the property of 
salinity is 1:1, and the salinity fluctuations in the Bay are adequately reproduced. 
However, I pointed out in Section 4.3 that the salinity gradient scaled at 1:1 
wouldn’t be exactly a shared feature if we consider that all the parameters are in 
interaction with each other, and that the rest of parameters that affect the 
geometric and dynamic qualities of the model have been substantially scaled. If we 
decide to consider the salinity gradient a shared feature of model and target 
(leaving aside the fact that it is in interaction with other features), then we have to 
acknowledge that it might be a shared feature that doesn’t necessarily augment the 
final similarity score of the SFBM. It seems to be the case that not scaling the 
salinity level of the water tanks, thus maintaining it identical in model and 
prototype, generated certain undesirable effects in the behaviour of the model that 
had to be compensated for with adjustments in some other parameters (US Army 
Corps 1963: 56-70). Accordingly, it would be more consistent to include the 
“shared feature of the salinity gradient” in the part of the equation that Weisberg 
describes as subtracting from the similarity score instead of in the one augmenting 
it.  
Also in the quote above, Weisberg classifies the mechanism that generates 
the tides in the SFBM as a non-shared feature of model and target; or more 
precisely, he considers the artificial system of pumps a mechanism possessed by the 
model but not by the target (Weisberg 2013: 148-9). There are two considerations 
here. First, it is not completely clear why comparing the mechanism that generates 
the tides in the Bay (the Moon) and in the model (artificial system of pumps) is 
relevant to evaluating the accuracy of the SFBM, as the SFBM, like many other 
models, is in itself an artificial tool for the study of a natural system we don’t have 
direct access to. Second, it is hard to see why the artificial mechanism in the model 
would reduce the final similarity score of the whole, when the goal of the SFBM is 
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to reproduce the behaviour of the tides in the Bay and that artificial mechanism is 
collaborating in reproducing such behaviour.  
To the first point, Weisberg would have a more straightforward response: 
if the SFBM is used for purposes other than the study of the causal mechanisms 
that generate tides, the comparison of the mechanism in model (artificial system) 
and target (Moon) would be indeed irrelevant. In that case, we would assign a 
function to the feature “sharing of mechanisms” and “non-sharing of mechanisms” 
that reduces the importance of these features to a minimum, so they don’t affect 
the similarity score of the whole (ibid.: 151-2). I believe Weisberg’s account would 
have more difficulty responding to the second point. The artificial system of pumps 
plays a key role in the adequate reproduction of the fluctuations of tides in the Bay. 
In a hypothetical case where engineers were interested in using the SFBM to study 
the mechanism of tides and their effects in the Bay – that is, a case of engineers 
using the SFBM as a “mechanistic model” (ibid.: 151-2) – they would certainly 
want to assign a high positive value to the artificial system of pumps that 
reproduces the tides. However, Weisberg’s formula would have problems in 
assigning a function that ascribes a high positive value to a feature that is non-
shared, such as the feature concerning mechanisms. Weisberg claims that when 
building mechanistic models, scientists are interested in generating a model that 
shares many mechanistic features with its target; that has few mechanisms in the 
model not in the target; and that has few mechanisms in the target not in the model 
(ibid.: 151-2). But it seems that scientists would want to say that a model like the 
SFBM, that “mechanistically has little in common with the forces producing tides 
in the Bay” (ibid.: 148), can nevertheless be adequate for the study of the causal 
mechanisms and effects of tides in the Bay. In other words, it looks like it would be 
difficult in some cases to accommodate Weisberg’s account with consideration of 
“judgments that scientists would actually make” in practice (ibid.: 138). This brings 
back the point discussed in Chapter 3 on the role that judgments of similarity play 
in Weisberg’s (2013) account. He explicitly acknowledges that scientists select and 
weigh the properties of a model depending on the epistemic goals of the practice. 
But it remains uncertain how his account can characterize cases in which features 
that are not really shared can nevertheless be judged as highly relevant for the 
epistemic goals at hand. 
With the difficulties just pointed out, I do not try to merely question the 
particular way in which Weisberg (2013) classifies the features of the SFBM. 
Weisberg (2013) concedes that his account works as a general framework that 
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needs to be filled in in particular cases, and that disagreements between scientists 
about how to weigh and select different properties arise all the time. The main 
issue with how Weisberg’s (2013) account applies to particular cases is, I believe, 
that weighing individual properties independently from each other does not offer 
unequivocal conclusions about the epistemic success of a representation as a whole. 
Following Parker (2015: 273-4), the perceived significance of a feature shared by a 
model and a target sometimes depends on which other features are shared. 
Following Fang (2017), Weisberg’s account is “atomistic” instead of “heuristic”. 
An atomistic account considers the number of features shared by model and target, 
and the individual importance of each of the features. In a holistic conception, it is 
not possible to weigh the value of individual features without considering the 
function they fulfil in the whole: “the essence of testing […] is not based on 
weighting each feature independently and then adding them together, but on the 
holistic relationship between the predicted data and the observed data as a whole” 
(Fang 2017: 1752. Original emphasis). The salinity gradient in the San Francisco 
Bay might be, strictly speaking, a shared feature if considered individually. But it 
would be counterintuitive to say that it can by itself increase the similarity score 
of the whole without considering how the salinity gradient interacts with other 
geometric and dynamic properties in the model. The importance of the interaction 
of features in the San Francisco Bay was acknowledged by the engineers of the US 
Army Corps that worked on the construction of the SFBM: 
 
None of these problems [the intrusion of salinity into the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta, the fluctuation of tides, and the currents and salinity levels 
of the Bay] can be studied separately, for each affects the others. And in an 
estuary so complex as San Francisco Bay, no formula could be found to 
encompass all the subtle changes that might occur in each of these areas 
were physical changes to be made in the regimen of the Bay. (Huggins & 
Schultz 1967: 12) 
 
A holistic approach that considers the interaction of parameters in complex 
systems like the San Francisco Bay is required to fairly evaluate the function of 
individual properties in a model like the SFBM. Further questions about 
Weisberg’s account arise from this observation. In particular, how does Weisberg 
(2013) understand the similarity score that is obtained from his formula? He seems 
to identify the similarity score with the level of accuracy of a model, so the higher 
the similarity score, the more accurate the model (2013: 148-150). But if that is the 
case, it is still unclear why some properties, such as the mechanism of tides in the 
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SFBM, might help improve the accuracy of a mechanistic model while being a 
feature that subtracts from (or is at best irrelevant to) the similarity score of the 
model. In Chapter 2 I argued that there are difficulties when identifying degrees 
of similarity with degrees of accuracy or overall faithfulness of a representation (as 
in Contessa 2007a, 2011). In Chapter 5, I will defend that we should adopt a 
framework where understanding, instead of knowledge (taken as the sum of true 
beliefs), is the measure of the epistemic success of scientific representations. Within 
that framework, values like fruitfulness – instead of accuracy, faithfulness, or 
truthfulness – would be more adequate when characterizing the epistemic 
achievements of models like these where similarity is the means of representation.  
The second way in which the analysis of the SFBM and the MBM in the 
previous sections can inform the debate of scientific representation concerns 
precisely the idea of “judgments of similarity”. After examining the reports of the 
construction of these models and different manuals used to guide the practices, one 
significant element stands out: similarity, manifested in various types of 
judgments, happens to be a central resource in the practice of constructing scale 
models. The analysis here, using historical and empirical sources, was limited to 
describing two particular scale models, in an attempt to illustrate the type of 
detailed analysis that an investigation of the role of similarity in practices of 
representing requires. I hope to have shown that judgments of similarity might 
play a key role as representational resources concerning model-target comparisons 
in a variety of other practices of representing as well, such as those described in 
Chapter 3: experimentation with model organisms (Ankeny et al. 2014; Ankeny 
and Leonelli 2011; Huber and Keuck 2013), research in synthetic chemistry 
(Bengoetxea et al. 2014), or the construction of physical models in economics 
(Morgan 2012; Vines 2000), among others. The classification into three types of 
judgments of similarity I suggested aimed at offering a flexible framework to think 
about the various participations of similarity as representational resource in 
modelling practices. Some of these judgments concerned the application of 
standardized principles of physical similarity, while others involved engineers’ 
decisions about the features of specific models and prototypes, and still others rely 
on intuitions based on previous experiences and skills. When discussing the 
general problem of representation in philosophy of science, we usually refer to the 
concept of similarity (as a means or as a constituent of representation). But in the 
practice of representing, similarity is only manifest through a range of different 
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judgments concerning model-target comparisons that epistemic agents employ 
with the aim of constructing successful models.   
From the idea that there are various forms of judgments of similarity in 
practices of representing, we should not conclude though, as Goodman (1972) and 
more recently Frigg (2006) do, that if similarity is context-sensitive and plural, 
then it is an overly vague or empty notion. In Chapter 3 I disputed the so-called 
“argument from vagueness” against similarity. Here, we have seen that some 
judgments of similarity actually have a very standardized meaning, as formal 
principles of physical similarity that are transferable across a variety of 
representational practices. Some other judgments of similarity might acquire their 
meaning in specific practices and contexts, but this does not mean that their 
meaning is empty or “that anything is similar to anything else” in particular 
situations (Goodman 1972: 443). Even intuitive judgments of similarity are 
sustained on agreements within the community of scientists about what works and 
what doesn’t in practice, according to their shared skills and experiences. As Giere 
(2004) and Teller (2001) have defended, representing does not require an objective 
measure of similarity, and the lack of such a measure does not introduce an 
undesirable amount of relativity to claims about the similarity of model and target 
(Giere 2004: 748). Engineers working at the SFBM and the MBM referred to 
“similar levels of salinity”, “similar profiles,” and “similar results in model and 
prototype” because making these judgments of similarity helped them capture the 
comparisons, approximations, and margins within which they were operating. 
These margins are rough, unprovable, and, more importantly, not aiming to an 
ideal complete correspondence between model and target.  
I hope to have shown that practices of representing can be better understood 
if philosophers of science attend to the use of judgments of similarity in the 
construction of scientific models. In the next and final chapter, I suggest a way to 
advance an account of scientific representation that is directly informed by the 
study of judgments of similarity in specific practices of representing like the one 
developed in the present chapter. More specifically, I will ground an account of the 
means of representation in the notion of “creative similarity”, as this term can help 
capture the dynamic interplay of various judgments of similarity and distortion 
that occurs during the construction of a relevant set of modelling practices in 
science. 
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In this final chapter I propose a specific account of the means of representation, the 
creative similarity account of the means of representation. To do so, I bring together 
central points discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 about the general problem of scientific 
representation, as well as the methodological considerations and examples 
examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Proposing a specific account of the means of 
representation has two purposes. It is firstly an attempt to elucidate what exactly 
an account of the means of representation is. There is general agreement in 
philosophy of science that the question about the constituents of representation is 
different from the question about the means. There is also certain agreement that 
studying the means of representation requires adopting some kind of practical 
enquiry or practice-based perspective. Very few other indications are found in the 
debate on representation on what it is required to advance an account of the means 
of representation though. Proposing the creative similarity account of the means of 
representation was in itself an exploration of what an adequate account of the means 
of representation requires. As outcome of this exploration and as a way of 
recapitulating the main arguments of the thesis, I offer in Section 5.2 four 
desiderata for any attempt to develop an adequate account of the means of 
representation.  
The second purpose of developing a specific account of the means of 
representation is to accommodate the role of similarity in scientific representation 
in a satisfactory way. The concept of similarity has been a constant object of dispute 
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in the debate of representation since the semantic turn and the shift of the attention 
to the study of scientific models. I discussed in Chapter 1 how some philosophers 
of science attempted to respond to R1, or the question about the constituents of 
representation, referring to a relation of similarity between a model and a target 
(French 2003; French and Bueno 2011; Bartels 2006). This proved to be 
problematic after considering Goodman’s (1968) logical argument against 
similarity and the argument from misrepresentation. In Chapter 2 I then claimed 
that, on the contrary, similarity has the potential to be, an adequate notion with 
which to respond to R2 or the question about the means of representation. 
However, not all characterizations of similarity are adequate to develop an account 
of the means of representation. An adequate characterization has to emerge from 
actual uses of judgments of similarity in scientific practices of representing. In 
Section 5.3 I will characterize similarity as creative similarity and explain why this 
is a suitable notion to help advance an account of the means of representation. The 
main reason suggested will be that creative similarity is a concept capable of 
capturing the very particular way in which judgments of similarity effectively 
intervene in the construction of a plurality of successful models in science: that is, 
they intervene in generative interplay with judgments of distortions towards the 
establishment of norms and uses that help epistemic agents pursue their 
representational aims. Finally, I will describe how the creative similarity account 
fulfils the previously mentioned desiderata, and therefore is an adequate account of 
the means of representation that advances insight on the problem of the epistemic 
success of representation.  
First, I open the chapter by arguing in Section 5.1 that understanding should 
be considered the overarching aim of scientific practices, and fruitfulness a 
fundamental value when characterizing epistemically successful representations. 
The creative similarity account of the means of representation and the view of 
understanding as the overarching aim of science support and strengthen each 
other.  
 
 
 
5.1. The quest for understanding 
Scientific models often idealize, simplify, generalize, or otherwise distort aspects of 
the world they represent. I have argued throughout this thesis that the question 
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about the means of representation concerns the epistemic success of 
representations. But how can scientific models be epistemically successful if they 
systematically idealize, simplify, or distort their targets? One response has been to 
claim that, despite the distortions they entail, epistemically successful models 
contain true descriptions of the world (da Costa and French 2003 refer to “partial 
truth”; French and Bueno 2011 to “quasi-truth”; and Chakravartty 2010a to 
“approximate truth”). Models might not be truth-apt in themselves but they are 
expressible in statements about the empirical world whose truth or falsity can be 
evaluated. Under this conception, a model entails or can be transcribed into truth-
apt propositions (see Bailer-Jones 2003: 60).  
This response is, as it stands, not entirely satisfactory. If truth is the 
measure of the epistemic success of a model, it is hard to explain why models that 
contain strong idealizations and entail few true propositions are kept when truer 
and less idealized alternatives are available. The ideal-gas law is an integral part 
of thermodynamics, even though it describes gases as comprised of dimensionless, 
spherical molecules that exhibit no mutual attraction, and even though there are 
truer alternatives available, such as the van der Waals equation (Elgin 2017a: 15; 
Woody 2015: 4). Likewise, making a model truer, that is, adding more elements to 
it that can be transcribed into true propositions, doesn’t automatically render it 
more successful at providing epistemic access to a target in the world. Some truths 
might be trivial and not worth knowing, while some falsehoods might be 
illuminating approximations and useful idealization that are not worth dismissing 
(Elgin 2002: 22). It would be unwise to say that a scientific model that reveals 
illuminating idealizations is epistemically idle, and it would be gratuitous to say 
that a model that only produces trivially true propositions is epistemically 
successful.  
In some cases, adding more true content to a model can even be detrimental 
to its results. We might want to construct a model that helps identify core causal 
factors that give rise to a phenomenon. In that case, we would have to build a 
minimalist model (following Weisberg and Elliott-Graves 2014). Schelling’s 
(1971) model of segregation isolates one essential aspect of racial segregation, 
namely, its link to individual perceptions of difference. If we add more true 
assumptions to the model, such as the heterogeneity in the perception of difference 
among individuals or socio-economic conditions of the city, we are definitely 
adding relevantly true elements to the model, as individuals perceive in 
heterogeneous and complex ways, and socio-economic conditions do determine 
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segregation. However, these assumptions would render Schelling’s (1971) model 
incapable of identifying a fundamental key factor that gives rise to segregation and 
that the original model managed to uncover, namely, individual perceptions of 
difference that are not linked to explicit preferences for segregated 
neighbourhoods. Truths, even if not trivial, can obscure the main aspects that a 
model tries to highlight. If we want to maintain the idea that some true 
propositions are involved in the success of scientific modelling, we have to 
recognize that it requires much more than that. Using Elgin’s (2017a) expression, 
models might have to be “true enough”, but not more than enough. She uses the 
term “felicitous falsehoods” to denote the set of literally false propositions, and the 
set of non-truth-apt instances, such as pictures, diagrams, physical models, that 
can contribute to expand our comprehension of the world despite not being 
literally true (Elgin 2002; 2004; 2017a). 
Following from here, an alternative way of addressing the question of how 
scientific models can be epistemically successful if they distort, idealize, simplify 
their targets is to characterize epistemic success in terms that do not mainly 
involve the increase or approximation to truth. I would like to suggest, following 
Elgin’s (1996, 2004, 2017a) non-factive view, that the epistemic success of scientific 
models should be primarily described in terms of the understanding they afford (see 
also de Regt 2017, Potochnik 2015, Grimm 2006, Kvanvig 2003, and Zagzebski 
2001 for alternative accounts of understanding). This idea has consequences for 
the characterization of an account of the means of representation, as I will spell out 
below. Understanding involves grasping together states of affairs, revealing 
connections and patterns, providing insight about facts that had remained 
unnoticed until then (Elgin 2004; Cooper 1995). To understand an aspect of the 
world, or of a domain, is to make sense of it, to ask questions about it, to connect 
it and apply it to other cases. Understanding is also a cognitive achievement, as it 
produces a sense of grasping, of mastery, of awareness of the object understood in 
the agents that possess it (Potochnik 2015: 72; see also Grimm 2012; Pritchard 
2010; Zagzebski 2001).48 Knowledge, rather than understanding, has been the 
                                             
48 It is not possible to go into the details of the numerous positions on understanding in 
contemporary epistemology here. I am mainly following Elgin’s (1996; 2004; 2017a) 
characterization here. But, briefly, Grimm (2012) emphasizes the sense of grasping that 
understanding produces; Pritchard (2010) claims that understanding is a cognitive achievement 
that is worth pursuing for its own sake, differently to propositional knowledge; Cooper (1995) 
argues that essential to understanding is epistemic ascent; and Zagzebski (2001) claims that 
understanding produces a state of conscious transparency: that is to say, it is impossible to 
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main focus of epistemology for a very long time. And knowledge, in its traditional 
definition, consists in amassing discrete pieces of true propositions that describe 
individual, separate facts (Elgin 2017a: 13).  
An advantage of defining epistemic success in term of understanding is that 
it can better account for the achievements of actual scientific research. Science has 
succeeded in the past and still succeeds today in producing effective 
representations that we can use, apply, further explore, and employ to generate 
new questions. If we focus on knowledge and the truthfulness of representations 
as the ultimate goal of science, we are forced to see the accomplishments of 
scientific practices as more limited. Scientific representations of the past are 
considered largely false today, and models in use today idealize and distort to a 
great extent. As Elgin (2017a) puts it: 
 
Actual science is cognitively reputable –indeed, estimable. So an adequate 
epistemology should explain what makes good science cognitively good. 
Too strict a commitment to truth stands in the way. Nor is science the only 
casualty. In other disciplines such as philosophy, history, political science, 
and economics, as well as in everyday discourse, we often convey 
information and advance understanding by means of sentences and other 
representations that are not literally true. An adequate epistemology should 
account for these as well. (Elgin 2017a: 15) 
 
The task of epistemologists and philosophers of science should be to bring light 
into actual epistemic achievements, into what real scientists, real practices, real 
tools have attained and continue to attain, instead of focusing on describing ideal 
states of enquiry in which complete knowledge is reached (Wimsatt 2007: 5; Elgin 
2017a: 15-6). Shifting the attention to understanding as the overarching goal of 
science and relaxing our commitment to truth can help accomplish this task.  
An additional advantage that Potochnik (2015: 72-4) identifies in 
considering understanding to be the overarching aim of scientific practices is that 
we don’t have to include an intermediate step to explain the epistemic success of 
representations that involve idealizations or other forms of distortion. That is to 
say, it is traditionally assumed that there is gap that needs to be bridged between 
the recognition of the idealizations that scientific representations contain and the 
successful pursuit of the aims of science (ibid.: 71). A traditional way of dealing 
                                             
understand without being aware that one understand, while one can know without knowing that 
one knows. 
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with this gap consists in affirming that science aims for truth, and that idealized 
models must be de-idealized in order to fulfil their epistemic aim. Another way of 
dealing with it does not hold that de-idealizing is necessary but it still affirms that 
there is a gap to be bridged to be able to use “false” models to achieve “truer” 
theories (Wimsatt 2007; in Potochnik 2015: 72). On Potochnik’s approach, though, 
“nothing has gone wrong with or is lacking from idealized models, and no 
intermediary step is needed for idealized models to achieve the aims of science” 
(ibid.: 72). What we need is to rethink what the aims of science are, other than 
truth, so that idealizations can directly contribute to science’s epistemic success 
(ibid.). There might be an open-ended list of particular scientific aims, Potochnik 
adds (2015), but considering understanding its central epistemic aim is a 
satisfactory way of not making models that contain falsehoods intellectually 
suspect. As Elgin argues, there is no contradiction in saying that felicitous 
falsehoods advance understanding (2010: 1). 
How do considerations of understanding as the central goal of science affect 
the debate on the means of representation? At the beginning of this thesis, I 
identified the question about the means of representation, or R2, with the problem 
of the accuracy or faithfulness of representation, following common 
characterizations by Contessa (2007, 2011), Frigg (2006), and Suárez (2003, 2010, 
2015). Then, I clarified in Chapter 2 that identifying the problem of the means of 
representation with the accuracy, faithfulness, usefulness, or fruitfulness of 
representations, among other values, has not exactly the same implications. What 
all these values attributable to representations have in common is that they involve 
some kind of epistemic success, characterized in one way or another. So for most 
of this thesis, I remained neutral about how I precisely understood the epistemic 
success of representations, and referred to the problem of the means of 
representation as broadly concerning the production of “epistemically successful 
representations”. I advanced a criticism of Contessa’s (2007a, 2011) account, as he 
identifies similarity as means of representation with the overall faithfulness of 
representation. I rejected this because it is attached to a conception of similarity as 
a relation between two terms, the vehicle and the target of the representation, and 
conceals an aspiration to perfectly copy the world. This view hinders the possibility 
of truly considering the role of epistemic agents in representational practices.   
Now I would like to argue that a broader difficulty with associating the 
means of representation with the faithfulness of representation is that faithfulness 
(also truthfulness and accuracy) are values too closely connected to knowledge – 
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taken as the sum of true propositions – as the overarching aim of science. If we 
adopt a perspective where understanding is the overarching aim of science instead, 
we should re-evaluate the specific way of conceiving successful representations, 
especially if we attempt to advance a similarity-based type of account of the means 
of representation. We just saw that models involve multiple falsehoods and that 
augmenting the amount of true assumptions entailed by a model does not 
necessarily augment the positive results that the model produces. If this is correct, 
truthfulness, faithfulness, and accuracy are not the main values that we are after when 
constructing models. I would like to argue that the epistemic success of scientific 
models should be more adequately characterized in terms of the fruitfulness, 
effectiveness, or usefulness of models. It is easier to see how fruitful, effective, and 
useful models can be epistemically successful,  affording understanding of their 
target, despite the falsehoods and non-truth-apt elements they might contain.49 
The creative similarity account of the means of representation, described in more 
detail in section 5.3, takes fruitfulness as a central value of epistemically successful 
representations. The notion of fruitfulness fits particularly well with the idea that 
understanding is the overarching aim of science. Fruitful representations usually 
produce a sense of grasping of the targets represented, of mastery of the models 
used to represent, in a way that allows epistemic agents to use those models to ask 
new question, open new paths of enquiry, and further apply the model results to 
other situations. The case studies I discussed provide some evidence in support of 
this claim. The MBM can be considered a fruitful model that advanced a great deal 
of understanding of its target, the Mississippi tributary system. It allowed 
engineers to make new predictions about the progression of floods in a way that 
even “exceeded the expectations of its inventors” (Robinson 1992: 292). Also, the 
MBM helped develop new modelling techniques in hydraulics that were later 
applied to the construction of other models. The SFBM was a fruitful model as 
well, that permitted the exploration of new engineering possibilities in the San 
                                             
49 Alternatively, we could argue that terms like accuracy or faithfulness do not necessarily have to 
implicate approximation to truth, but could be understood as the adequacy of models with respect 
to the particular epistemic goals of a practice of representing. However, this is not the common 
use of the terms faithfulness and accuracy in the debate of representation. For instance, Frigg 
(2010: 130) describes a faithful representation as one that produces true claims about a target; and 
Contessa (2011) defines a faithful representation as one capable of providing sound inferences 
about a target, that is, valid and true conclusions about it. The same is the case for accuracy. Toon 
(2010: 87) takes the accuracy and the realism of a model to be equivalent, and Suárez (2004; 2010) 
identifies “accurate, complete, and true representations”. I shall hence take the terms accuracy and 
faithfulness as equivalents to truthfulness, and focus the attention on other values more closely 
linked to the attainment of understanding to define the epistemic success of representation.  
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Francisco Bay. Apart from testing the Reber’s plan, the SFBM was employed to 
investigate the construction of barriers at Dillon Point and Chipps Island, among 
others, and opened new directions of research, such as investigation of pollution 
and shoring patterns, in the Bay (Huggins and Schultz 1967). This is not just a 
characteristic of scale models, or of models in engineering. The case of research 
with model organisms to investigate alcohol addiction is another good example of 
the close connection between fruitful models and understanding. Unexplored 
relevant features of human behaviour were disclosed in the practice of modelling 
alcoholism with mice, and further enquiries about the relation between conduct 
and biological response in organisms were developed as consequence of it.  
Some might want to argue that these and other examples of scientific 
models also entailed some truths, or can be transcribed into true propositions. I am 
not denying that. Following Elgin (2017a), these models have to be “true enough” 
to be effective. The argument that understanding should be favoured over 
knowledge as the overarching aim of science is that, to be able to make sense of the 
epistemic role that strong idealizations and rough approximations play in scientific 
models, paying attention to the true propositions they entail is not sufficient. In 
some sense, understanding is more demanding than knowledge, as it requires a 
broader appreciation of the phenomenon that is the object of study, as well as 
integration, organization of a topic, a domain, a network of instances (see Cooper 
1995). For this reason, an account of the means of representation that attempts to 
offer insight on how epistemically successful representations are achieved should 
take epistemic success as the enlargement of understanding, and successful models 
mainly as fruitful, effective, useful, among other possible values that are not 
exclusively attached to the approximation of truth. The creative similarity account of 
the means of representation conceives understanding as the overarching aim of 
science, and fruitfulness as the main value involved in the characterization of 
successful models that are have been produced with creative similarity as means of 
representation.  
There is an important additional consequence of taking understanding as 
the overarching goal of science and measure of epistemic success. The distinction 
between the cognitive gain obtained from science and from other domains such as 
the arts to some extent blurs. Fictions, metaphors, depictions, and exemplars are 
commonly used in the arts to help afford understanding of aspects of the world, in 
analogous ways as models and felicitous falsehoods in science. Goodman and Elgin 
(1988) have openly defended the idea that the arts function cognitively. Works of 
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art can be epistemically rewarding, as they reorient us, enabling us to see things 
differently from the way we saw them before. Encounters with artworks frequently 
leave us with the feeling that we have learnt something, not only about the artwork 
or the author but about the extra-aesthetic world (Elgin 2017b: 29-30). And this is 
not that different from what a laboratory experiment or thought experiment can 
do. They isolate some elements from their environment, modify them, even create 
new items that are nowhere to be found in nature. Then, when scientists look back 
at the natural environment, they identify new elements and connections (ibid.: 35). 
Putting it in Goodman’s (1968) words, “the arts must be taken no less seriously 
than the sciences as modes of discovery, creation, and enlargement of knowledge 
in the broad sense of advancement of the understanding” (ibid.: 102).  
Recognizing the parallels between the epistemic achievement of scientific 
and artistic representations presents some challenges for traditional theories of 
knowledge, as it demands a more flexible conception of the boundaries of 
epistemology. Placing understanding at the centre of epistemology’s interest can 
provide the flexible boundaries that knowledge cannot. In a different paper 
(Sánchez-Dorado 2017), I maintained that the integration of debates in philosophy 
of science and aesthetics, especially concerning the problem of representation, can 
be incredibly insightful. Yet, methodological clarity is required to justify the 
integration of concepts from the arts and the sciences into a single account, 
something that is not always accomplished in the literature (ibid.: 22). In the next 
section, I introduce some examples from the arts to help address the problem of 
the means of representation in science, in particular to characterize the notion of 
creative similarity. To justify the integration of elements from the arts into an 
account in philosophy of science, I adopt the methodological framework proposed 
by Goodman and Elgin (1988), which assumes that epistemology, as a normative 
discipline, should be equally able to account for the varied, and often non-
propositional, vehicles through which scientific and artistic representations 
succeed in affording understanding of the world. Understanding provides the foil 
against which a range of practices that have occupied philosophers of science and 
philosophers of art in separate debates can sensibly and productively come 
together. That doesn’t mean that artistic and scientific representations are 
equivalent, or have the same results and uses, but that “the difference between the 
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arts and the sciences is more practical than epistemic” (Elgin 2017b: 40).50 Fruitful 
representations, both in science and in art, allow us to perceive previously 
unnoticed connections in the world, address new problems and perform innovative 
actions as a result of the encounter with them. Creative similarity, I contend, is a 
central means of constructing such fruitful representations.  
 
 
 
5.2. Desiderata for an account of the means of representation 
As a way of summarizing the important ideas I have presented so far, and before 
presenting the creative similarity account, I would like to return to one of the initial 
questions addressed in the thesis: what is an account of the means of 
representation? In Chapter 1, I distinguished between the constituents and the 
means of representation. Then, in Chapter 2 I disputed the three main arguments 
against similarity as means of representation. And in Chapter 3 I argued that the 
projects of PSP and iHPS offer adequate frameworks with which to advance an 
account of the means of representation. Now I would like to re-examine these 
issues in more detail, with the additional aid of the conclusions achieved from the 
case studies investigated. There is little guidance in the contemporary debate in 
philosophy of science about what is required to address the problem of the 
epistemic success of representation in a systematic way. So I will propose four 
desiderata to develop an adequate account of the means of representation, either 
focused on similarity or other possible means. Then, in section 5.3, I show how the 
creative similarity account of the means of representation that I propose fulfils these 
desiderata, and can be therefore taken as a step forward in the pursuit of a solution 
to the problem of how epistemically successful representations are produced in 
science. 
A first important aspect that must be re-examined is Suárez’s (2003, 2010) 
original definition of the term “means”: 
 
Means: For any source–target pair (S, T) at a given time and in a given 
context: R’ is the means of the representation of T by S if some user of the 
                                             
50 See Elgin (2011) for a more nuanced specification of the differences between scientific and 
artistic representation, concerning the specific case of representation by exemplification. While 
density and repleteness are symptoms of aesthetic representation, they are not of scientific 
representation.  
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model employs R’ (at that time and in that context) to draw inferences about 
T from S. (Suárez 2010: 93) 
 
Here the means of representation are defined as the relation actively employed at 
a given time by epistemic agents to draw inferences about a target from a model. I 
would like to argue, in view of the practice-based approach to the problem of 
representation I developed throughout the thesis, that this definition is too narrow 
to characterize what the means of representation are, insofar as it only considers 
the relations established by agents at the end of a practice of representing. If the 
means are actively-employed relations between a model and a target, to be able to 
say something about what these relations are and how they allow epistemic agents 
to make fruitful inferences about aspects of the world, we have to examine how 
they came about. Therefore, an account of the means of representation should 
primarily concern the means of representation understood as the representational 
resources used in the construction of successful models. Models are themselves the 
product of employing those representational resources during their production. To 
put it in other words, to be able to offer a constructive account of the means of 
representation that tells us something about the relations employed by epistemic 
agents to make inferences from models about targets, we have to consider the 
representational resources used to construct such models in the first place. 
Moreover, a scientific model obtained at the end of  a practice might not manifest 
its means of  representation conspicuously (Suárez 2003: 229). A careful study of  
practices is necessary to discern what the means of  representation (as relations) are 
by paying attention to the representational resources used in the process.  
Under this expanded definition of “means”, offering a similarity-based type 
of account of the means of representation would entail claiming that similarity – 
in any form described – is primarily a resource of the construction of a series of 
scientific models. And, only as a result of that, such an account would also claim 
that epistemic agents employ similarity relations between certain representations 
and certain target systems to make inferences about the latter. Other possible 
accounts of the means of representation would for instance claim that convention 
or exemplification are resources used in scientific practice to produce successful 
representations. And, as a consequence of that, they would claim that 
exemplification or convention are relations employed at the end of the practice of 
representing between certain vehicles and targets to make inferences about the 
latter.  
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This revised characterization of the notion of means of representation, that 
captures and expands Suárez’s (2003) original definition, fits with van Fraassen’s 
(2008) occasional use of the term “means” in his proposal. Van Fraassen (2008) 
argues that similarity and distortion are not the “core” of representation but the 
“means to an end” used in the practice of representing (2008: 14-5). I take this to 
mean that similarity and distortion are for van Fraassen principally resources used 
throughout practice of representing with the aim of constructing accurate scientific 
models, and only derivatively relations employed between a model and a target. 
From this interpretation of the implications of van Fraassen’s claim, I argue that 
the weight of an account of the means of the representation needs to be moved to 
the study of the resources that allow epistemic agents to implement productive 
representational practices that eventually generate fully-formed models with 
which it is possible to make inferences. In the next section, it will become clear 
how these two elements, resources and relations, are interrelated in a specific account 
of the means of representation, namely the creative similarity account that I propose, 
but also how the focus of study should be the representational resources used to 
construct successful models. 
An additional aspect that should be clarified regarding an account of the 
means of representation concerns its scope. I have only partially addressed the 
issue of the level of generality that an account of the means of representation is 
supposed to have. In Chapter 2 I discussed the argument from variety, and claimed 
that the fact that there might be a plurality of means of representation was not a 
reason to abandon the project of advancing a specific (or various specific) account(s) 
of the means of representation. If there is for instance evidence, as I showed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, that judgments of similarity are used as representational 
resources in a variety of modelling practices in science, and thus advancing a 
similarity-based type of account of the means of representation is well motivated. 
Here, I would like to resist the idea that an account of the means of representation 
must aim to resolve the problem of the epistemic success of representation in general. 
What I tried to achieve with the practical investigation developed in Chapters 3 
and 4, and the advancement of the creative similarity account in this chapter, was to 
offer insight, with some degree of generality, on a problem that is complex and 
difficult to encapsulate under a single view, namely the problem of the epistemic 
success of representation in scientific contexts.  
Certainly, philosophers like Giere (2004) have maintained that similarity is 
in general the way or “the most important way” in which scientists produce models 
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that successfully represent the world, while others like van Fraassen (2008) and 
Contessa (2007a) have appealed to some form of structural similarity to explain the 
way in which representations produce faithful results. Although I have treated 
these proposals as accounts of the means of representation, and extracted some 
helpful lessons from them, these philosophers focus on similarity as the central if 
not the only way of resolving the problem of successful representation. My 
approach is more plural than that. The creative similarity account of the means 
representation that I summarize in the next section is meant to be one among other 
possible accounts of the means of representation, which can co-exist and 
complement each other. Although I do not expand on the characterization of other 
possible accounts of the means of representation in this thesis, the advancement of 
for instance an account focused on convention as means of representation, 
sustained on a practical enquiry on how scientists formulate judgments of 
conventions and stabilize the use of certain symbols and codes in a relevant set of 
modelling practices, could complement and enrich the conclusions achieved by the 
creative similarity account. 
It is important to stress that the fact that there might be a plurality of means 
of representation does not entail that that plurality is endless or impossible to 
tackle. This assumption was implicit in the formulation of the “problem of style” 
that Frigg (2006) and Frigg and Nguyen (2016) offered, especially when they 
argued that ultimately each scientific model might have been construed in a very 
specific, unique style. To this argument I replied in Chapter 2 that, even if it is 
right that in some sense every representation is unique and every practice 
unrepeatable, to bring light into the problem of the epistemic success of 
representation it is essential to highlight commonalities between different 
practices, establish comparisons, identify recurrent resources, and describe 
dynamics and patterns that appear in a variety of circumstances. It is indeed 
problematic to sustain a universal type of account of the means of representation, 
but it is equally problematic to give up on the attempt of offering any type of 
generalization about how successful representations are frequently produced in 
science.  
A further reason why an account of the means of representation has to be 
restricted in scope is that it deals with the problem of the epistemic success of 
representation, and success needs to be defined in relation to particular goals and 
values. Even if we take understanding as the overarching aim of science, epistemic 
success regarding scientific representations can be specified as fruitfulness, 
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precision, generality, capacity to predict, effectiveness. Also, we must consider 
non-epistemic goals and values that directly affect the characterization of what a 
successful representation is. It is neither possible, nor desirable, to offer a universal 
response to the problem of the epistemic success of representation, as the problem 
itself has to be narrowly framed to be meaningful. Moreover, there are trade-offs 
among desirable virtues of models, such as between generality and precision 
(Potochnik 2015). The scope of an account of the means of representation, I 
contend, must be that of offering some conclusions, even if partial, about how 
epistemic communities produce successful representations, by focusing on the 
functioning of a specific means of representation, and on the achievement of a 
particular kind of successful representation – that is, representations that are either 
predictively accurate, fruitful at opening new paths of investigation, useful at 
fulfilling some non-epistemic goals, etc.  
After clarifying these two important points about what an account of the 
means of representation is, I would like to suggest four desiderata for any attempt 
to develop an account of the means of representation. There is a certain agreement 
in philosophy of science that responding to the question about the epistemic 
success of representation requires adopting some kind of practice-based 
perspective (Suárez 2010; van Fraassen 2008; Weisberg 2013). But beyond that, it 
has not been sufficiently spelt out in the debate of representation what exactly 
advancing a satisfactory account of the means of representation comprises. These 
desiderata are not general conditions for representation or for accurate 
representation. They are instead important methodological or epistemological 
aspects that should be considered to approach the study of the means of 
representation in a satisfactory way. The investigation developed throughout the 
present thesis was itself an exploration of the requirements to advance such an 
account.  
 
1. An account of the means of representation requires the development of a 
practical enquiry. A practical enquiry would usually have the form of a 
case-by-case type of study (Suárez 2010: 91-3), but could also include the 
study of different examples in less detail and comparisons between practices. 
Developing a practical enquiry is crucial because it allows us to identify the 
representational resources used to construct successful representations, 
and, as a consequence, the relations actively employed by epistemic agents 
to make inferences about a target from a model. The conclusions achieved 
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from the practical enquiry will comprise the descriptive component of an 
account of the means of representation. Chapter 4 of this thesis works as an 
illustration of the type of study that needs to be done when developing a 
practical enquiry. Examining two scale models in hydraulic engineering 
afforded a great amount of information about the vehicles, targets, users, 
purposes, and contexts intervening in concrete modelling practices. More 
importantly, it allowed us to observe that the use of certain judgments in 
scientific practice – judgments of similarity and distortion – aided decision-
making about the design of the models, the features to be included and 
excluded, and the calibration and evaluation of the process concerning the 
model-prototype relation. Complementary to these case studies, in Chapter 
3 I pointed out various examples of modelling practices in which judgments 
of similarity and distortion played analogous functions in representing, such 
as in the use of models in synthetic chemistry, the construction of physical 
models in economics, and research with model organisms. These other cases 
would need to be analysed in further detail, but together with the case 
studies in Chapter 4 provide empirical evidence to advance some 
illuminating conclusions on the problem of the epistemic success of 
representation. In other words, the practical enquiry developed on actual 
examples from different scientific disciplines is the descriptive basis for the 
development of the creative similarity account of the means of representation. An 
alternative account of the means of representation, focused on 
exemplification or convention, for instance, would also have to develop a 
practical enquiry that allows its proponents to identify the representational 
resources used in modelling practices to construct successful 
representations.  
 
Presenting this point as the first desideratum is not trivial, given that for at least 
some philosophers of science in the debate of representation developing a practical 
enquiry is not treated as indispensable when addressing the question of the 
epistemic success of representations. I pointed out the limitations of Contessa’s 
(2011) proposal in Chapter 2 for not engaging with actual practices. He developed 
instead a rational reconstruction of scientific modelling, which concluded in a 
similarity-based account that, I argued, did not match some relevant observations 
of how similarity participates in actual practices. 
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2. A practical enquiry, as described in the first desideratum, is not enough to 
develop an account of the means of representation. An openly normative 
component should also be integrated in the account. Describing the 
particularities of individual models does not establish an account of the 
means of representation if a normative element is missing in it. 
Representational practices are more than the sum of individual actions. 
They are part of regulated systems that concern a community and their 
epistemic (and non-epistemic) goals, values, standards, skills. Any account 
of the means of representation, focused either on similarity, convention, 
exemplification, or other possible means suggested, would have to contain 
some normative claims about how those specific means participate in the 
production of successful representation through the entrenchment of norms 
and common uses in practice. The study of judgments in scientific practice 
is key to connect the descriptive and the normative components of an 
account of the means of representation. Judgments in scientific practice are 
not mere opinions, but commitments regulated by the agreement of the 
competent epistemic community. Offering some generic insight about the 
dynamics generated by the use of certain kinds of judgments – like the 
combination of judgments of similarity and distortion that I describe in 
Chapters 3 and 4 – is what constitutes the normative part of the account.    
 
Including this point as a second desideratum is not trivial either. It is frequently 
assumed in the debate of representation, more implicitly than explicitly, that there 
is a tension between a descriptive and a normative way of approaching the problem 
of representation. In Chapter 1 I mentioned that philosophers like Frigg (2006: 50) 
helpfully point out that there can be two variants of an account of epistemically 
successful representation: a descriptive or factual variant, which would typically 
offer a taxonomy of possible means of representation; and a normative variant, 
which would judge how scientific representations must be constructed to be 
successful (ibid.: 59). Yet, I claimed that the two variants should be rather taken as 
two important components of a comprehensive account of the means of 
representation. The descriptive part would not be a mere enumeration of models 
or styles, but a case-by-case type of study as well, as described in the first 
desideratum. And the normative part would not establish a single rule on how 
representations must be constructed, but rather advance some conclusions about 
how certain representational dynamics have allowed in the past (and there are good 
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reasons to believe that they could allow future practices)  to stabilize and promote 
successful ways of constructing representations. The projects of PSP and iHPS 
discussed in Chapter 3 can help define an adequate methodological framework that 
facilitates the integration of the descriptive and the normative components in an 
account of the means of representation, since these projects do not view the 
integration of particular cases and generalizations as a confrontational process but 
as an interpretive endeavour. 
  
3. An account of the means of representation would have to specify how the 
epistemic success of representations is specifically understood, and how 
the particular means studied help achieve that form of epistemic success. I 
argued earlier that an adequate account of the means of representation 
should focus on the functioning of a specific means of representation in 
relation to the achievement of a specific form of successful representation: 
that is, representations that are predictively accurate, fruitful, useful, 
general, precise, etc. The reason for this is that success needs to be defined 
in relation to particular goals and values, even if we take understanding as 
the overarching aim of science. Also, there are frequently tensions and 
trade-offs between different forms of epistemic success. The creative 
similarity account of the means of representation that I propose is an example of 
an account that recast epistemic success precisely in terms of fruitfulness, 
and takes the pursuit of understanding as the overarching aim of science. 
An alternative account of the means of representation could also recast 
epistemic success as usefulness, faithfulness, or accuracy in generating 
predictions. In any case, these different accounts should be able to explain 
how the means of representation studied – similarity, convention, 
exemplification – help achieve epistemically successful representations, in 
accordance with the specific characterization of epistemic success we decide 
to embrace. 
 
Making this third desideratum explicit is fundamental because proposals in the 
debate of scientific representation frequently avoid making open claims about how 
they understand epistemic success, or just assume it concerns the faithfulness 
(increase of knowledge) of representations. However, since there are different ways 
of characterizing epistemic success, some of which might be incompatible with 
others (i.e. precision vs. generalization), it is important to limit the scope of the 
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conclusions a specific account of the means of representation makes regarding 
epistemic success.  
 
4. An account of the means of representation should be able to accommodate 
the potential epistemic value of idealizations and other forms of 
distortions. This fourth desideratum follows from the previous point. 
Scientific models that we usually recognize as highly successful contain 
abstractions, idealizations, and simplifications. I argued above that defining 
the overarching aim of scientific practices in terms of understanding or in 
terms of the increase of knowledge has different consequences for an 
account of the means of representation. In the former case, an account of the 
means of representation would be able to accommodate the value of 
felicitous falsehoods more easily. Meanwhile, when truth or the increase of 
knowledge is considered the central aim of science, there are more 
difficulties in accommodating them, since felicitous falsehoods do not 
provide true statements about the target. In Chapter 1 I presented the 
argument from misrepresentation against similarity as constituent of 
representation, and in Chapter 2 I discussed the argument from 
misrepresentation against similarity as means of representation. Now, I 
would like to reiterate that an account of the means of representation, 
whether it is focused on similarity, convention, exemplification or other 
possible means, should be able to do more than claim that some 
representations are epistemically successful despite including distortions. It 
should also be able to elucidate how, in some cases, including more or 
stronger distortions can improve the epistemic success of models. Valuable 
distortions do epistemic work, so accounting for the phenomenon of 
misrepresentation includes describing how distortions can be highly 
valuable in certain scientific contexts.  
 
This desideratum has direct consequences for the characterization of, for instance, 
the concept of similarity to sustain an account of the means of representation. 
When epistemic success is identified with understanding, the idea of similarity as 
means of representation can be compatible with the acknowledgement of the value 
of distortions, whereas when epistemic success is identified with the increase of 
knowledge, similarity would have to help produce truthful statements. My own 
account, sustained on the notion of creative similarity, is much closer to the former 
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view, while accounts like Contessa’s (2007a) that connect similarity with epistemic 
success understood as the overall faithfulness of a representation are closer to the 
latter. 
This list of desiderata attempted to make explicit various important 
elements that should be considered to develop a comprehensive account of the 
means of representation. In the next session, I discuss the motivations to propose 
the creative similarity account of the means of representation, and specify how it fulfils 
the desiderata just listed.  
 
 
 
5.3. The creative similarity account of the means of representation 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to discussing a specific account of the 
means of representation, the creative similarity account of the means of representation, 
which I would like to propose as the result of the investigations developed 
throughout the thesis. Some details of this account would need to be spelt out fully 
in future work, especially regarding how the analysis of other case studies would 
complement or adjust the ideas presented here. Also, the creative similarity account 
is suggested as one specific account of the means of representation, which aims to 
illuminate part of the debate concerning the production of successful 
representations in science. But addressing the problem of the epistemic success of 
representation completely is an endeavour that requires the development of 
possibly various accounts focused on different means of representation, and on 
various ways of recasting epistemic success. 
In few words, the creative similarity account of the means of representation states 
that creative similarity is the means of representation in a significant set of 
modelling practices that we acknowledge for their epistemic achievements. Among 
those modelling practices, we have to include the case studies of scale modelling 
analysed in Chapter 4, as well as other analogous practices of constructing physical 
models in engineering or the geosciences; the various examples of representational 
practices suggested in Chapter 3, such as research with model organisms to 
investigate human conditions; and potentially other cases that I haven’t explored 
in this thesis, but that could be further investigated with the creative similarity 
account as framework of reference. The creative similarity account of the means of 
representation identifies the epistemic success of representation, broadly conceived, 
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with the growth of understanding, and more specifically defined, with the 
production of fruitful representations that afford understanding by opening new 
paths of enquiry, asking new questions and pursuing new strategies of 
investigation and methodologies. I have argued that an account of the means of 
representation primarily characterizes the representational resources used in the 
production of successful representations, and derivatively the relations epistemic 
agents actively employ between certain models and targets to make inferences. 
Accordingly, the creative similarity account of the means of representation claims that 
the formulation of a variety of judgments of similarity, in interplay with judgments 
of distortion, are the representational resources of the construction of successful 
representations in a range of practices of modelling like the ones studied in this 
thesis. Thus, concerning that range of practices of modelling, we can claim that 
the relation actively employed by epistemic agents to make inferences from a model 
about a target is a relation of creative similarity.  
But why “creative similarity”? In The Dappled World, Cartwright (1999) 
argued that “the whole point of the tradition that generates both the syntactic and 
the semantic views is the elimination of creativity – or whim – in the use of a 
scientific theory to treat the world” (1999: 184-5, my emphasis). The syntactic and 
(at least part of) the semantic views are equally cases of the “vending machine” 
approach, by which a scientific theory is fed with some input and drops out the 
desired output in the form of a fully formed model (ibid.). There is no place for 
genuine creativity in this approach because scientific models seem to be already 
contained in the theory, waiting to be extracted from it. On the contrary, 
Cartwright contends, producing epistemically successful models is a great creative 
achievement that goes well beyond the principles of any of the theories involved in 
their construction (ibid.). An adequate account of the means of representation 
should capture the hard work, creative imagination, and human fallibility that goes 
into the construction of successful scientific models, contrary to what many 
proposals in the syntactic and semantic view accomplish, following Cartwright’s 
criticism. Practice-based approaches to the study of scientific models certainly 
recognize some of these fallible, creative aspects of the process of modelling, but 
they frequently assume that similarity-based accounts of representation are 
somehow incompatible with practice-based approaches (e.g. Knuuttila 2009).  
What I would like to argue is that if similarity plays a role in the construction of 
epistemically successful scientific models, then that similarity has to be understood 
as humanly shaped and genuinely creative. And, since I showed that similarity 
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indeed plays a role, through the formulation of a plurality of judgments of 
similarity, in the process of design, construction, and evaluation of at least a 
relevant set of scientific models, the notion of creative similarity seems suitable to 
capture the nature of the similarity that emerges from the study of practices. 
Cartwright’s criticism of a well-known limitation of the syntactic and great part of 
the semantic view is one important motivation to use the concept of creative 
similarity (see also Cartwright et al. 1995; Cartwright and Suárez 2008). 
A second motivation to use the concept of creative similarity in the context 
of advancing an account of the means of representation is found in a recent paper 
by Marcos (2011: 195), in which he contends that, in both science and art, the 
“creative discovery of similarity” is fundamental for a variety of cognitive practices, 
including representation. Skilful interpreters are required for creative discoveries 
of similarity to take place, since “we are not talking about a given similarity and 
nothing else, like the one Goodman rightly criticizes, but one drawn up by the 
subject, the fruit of his creativity” (ibid.: 207). Marcos’s (2011) emphasis on the 
triadic relation of similarity, which is established between two objects (vehicle and 
target) and an active and skilful subject, resonates with the analysis of actual 
representational practices offered in this thesis. I described how resourceful 
epistemic communities employ a variety of judgments of similarity in 
representational practices, in combination with judgments of distortion, in a 
dynamic process from which uses, norms, standards, concerning model-world 
comparisons emerge and are stabilized. In that particular sense, we could talk 
about a creative discovery of similarity, or use the term creative similarity, adopting 
it from Marcos (2011), to describe the character of similarity as it emerges from 
actual practices of representing. 
A more careful examination of debates on creativity, and in particular on 
the function of creativity in scientific practice, could help advance a more refined 
characterization of the notion of creative similarity. I am not developing that line 
of investigation here, but there is a growing literature on creativity that combines 
problems traditionally discussed in aesthetics with approaches in philosophy of 
mind and philosophy of science that would complement the account I present in 
insightful ways. For instance, looking at these debates could help to spell out where 
creativity precisely lies (subjects, actions, products), what its value exactly is, and 
what different forms creative practices have (combinatorial, exploratory, 
transformational) (see Boden 2004; Gaut 2010; Kieran 2014; Hills and Bird 2018; 
Pérez-Ransanz and Ponce 2018). For now, I would like argue, drawing on the 
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common understanding of the notion of creativity, as well as on the 
aforementioned works that motivate the use of this term, that adding the adjective 
‘creative’ to the concept of similarity can help emphasize three important ideas. 
One, it stresses that similarity, as it effectively intervenes in the production of 
successful representations, concerns not a relation of sharing of properties between 
two terms (vehicle and target), but a three-term relation where resourceful 
epistemic agents define, through the formulation of various judgments of 
similarity, what relevant similarities are for the purposes of the practice. I identify 
conceptions of similarity as a two-term relations with accounts of “bare similarity”, 
and contrast them with the idea of “creative similarity” that I endorse. Two, the 
idea of “creative similarity” can help make sense of the fact that similarities are 
intertwined and compatible with distortions (idealizations, simplifications, 
abstractions) in the practice of representing in science. Three, the adjective creative 
helps emphasize that similarity as means of representation is generative. That is 
to say, when employed as resource (and consequently as relation model-target) in 
modelling practices, creative similarity can help reveal previously 
unnoticed features of the objects in the world under investigation. For this reason, 
creative similarity and the production of fruitful representations that afford 
understanding of the world are closely related. I discuss these three ideas implied 
by the notion of creative similarity in subsequent subsections. 
 
5.3.1. Creative similarity vs. bare similarity   
In contemporary philosophy of science the notion of similarity has been considered 
“repugnant” (Quine 1969: 117), “empty” (Frigg 2006: 61), “useless”, “a pretender, 
an impostor, a quack” (Goodman 1972: 443 and 437). Most of these critiques of 
similarity, I would like to argue, actually invoke a conception of similarity as “bare” 
or “pure” similarity. The idea of “bare similarity”, as I am describing it, recalls a 
two-term relation between an object and a representation-as-copy of that object 
that attempts to imitate it. I showed in previous chapters that, when we approach 
actual practices, we observe that representing does not consist in copying the 
object of the representation. The project of imitating reality is doomed from the 
start, since there is no objective way of doing so, no aseptic and innocent eye with 
which to look at things (Goodman 1968: 6-8). In representing the world, we need 
to select, reject, organize, discriminate, depending on the needs and prejudices that 
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regulate our use (ibid.: 8). In other words, copy theories of representation should 
be entirely rejected. Yet, the rejection of copy theories of representation should not 
impose the elimination of the notion of similarity from the debate on 
representation: only the idea of “bare” or “pure” similarity needs to be rejected.  
It is certainly true that many philosophers of science accept that the relation 
of representation is at least a three-term relation. However, fewer take seriously 
what it means to say that agency and the uses of a epistemic community are, together 
with vehicle and target, ingrained in what a representation is. In Chapter 1 I 
argued that, for instance, French and Bueno (2011), despite recognizing the 
existence of agents in the practice of representing (with intentions and goals), 
consider them mere external factors surrounding the relation of representation. 
They believe that it would be disastrous to build subjects’ intentions into the 
representational mechanism (ibid.: 886). One of the implications of this view is that 
French and Bueno (2011) implicitly conceive similarity as “bare similarity”, that is, 
a two-term relation between a vehicle and target, independently from the uses of 
the epistemic community. In addition, the conception of similarity as bare 
similarity hides an aspiration to mirror the world. That is, it conceals the ideal that 
representational vehicles should be as similar as possible to their targets.  
Probably Giere (2004), van Fraassen (2008), and Weisberg (2013) are, in 
opposition to this view, the clearest cases in recent philosophy of science that refuse 
to understand similarity as “bare similarity”. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
Giere (2004: 747) defends an intentional conception of representation that conveys 
also an intentional conception of similarity. Agents are, for Giere, responsible for 
selecting and employing relevant similarities in the practice of representing. For 
van Fraassen (2008), the use of representation by epistemic communities 
establishes the representational relation and defines similarity. And for Weisberg 
(2013), when studying scientific representation we have to direct our attention at 
actual judgments of similarity that scientists make in practice and not at 
inaccessible, two-term relations of similarity between vehicle and target. I believe 
that the idea of creative similarity is partially compatible with the views on similarity 
that these philosophers endorse. But it is proposed as an attempt to stress points 
that they don’t explicitly make. Namely, the idea of creative similarity is chosen, 
rather than “intentional similarity”, a notion that Giere would employ, or “use-
based similarity”, a notion that van Fraassen could use, because creative similarity 
is more than the selection of relevant similarities by epistemic agents. It embraces 
the idea that similarities are combined with insightful dissimilarities and 
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distortions by epistemic communities, in such a way that a productive interplay 
occurs. The result of the interplay is that unnoticed associations and relevant 
features are brought to the fore of the representational practice. In the next two 
subsections I develop these points in detail.  
An example from the engineering sciences can illustrate the difference 
between bare similarity and creative similarity. Elgin (2010: 11-12) describes the 
tragic explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986, because of a failure in its 
O-rings due to cold weather. The day before the accident, a report was sent to 
NASA containing data that pointed to the possible danger of launching the space 
shuttle. However, the evidence of the vulnerability of the O-rings in cold weather 
was obscured by a melange of other information that was also included in the 
report. The launch took place, the shuttled exploded, and the astronauts died (ibid; 
following Tufte 1997: 17-31). Elgin reads this example as a case of a representation 
that contained “the requisite resemblance between model and target”, but 
nevertheless did not allow scientists to produce a fruitful representation that 
afforded the required understanding about the target (ibid.). This case is therefore 
used to reject the role of similarity (or resemblance in Elgin’s terms) in the 
construction of epistemically successful representations, since even the existence 
of relevant similarity between the data in the report and the target was insufficient 
to produce adequate results. Representation, Elgin claims, also “must make the 
resemblance manifest” (ibid.). 
Yet, I believe that similarity (or resemblance in this example) is plainly 
understood as “bare similarity” here. It concerns only a vehicle and a target, that 
is, the data displayed in the report and the O-rings of the shuttle. The resemblance 
was not manifest in the representation as it was not even noticed or investigated 
by the agents involved in the modelling. Very differently, the notion of creative 
similarity, in the description that I am offering, has to be selected, tested, and 
manipulated by the relevant epistemic community throughout the practices of 
representing. In the case of the SFBM, we can observe that scientists capitalized 
on multiple judgments of similarity and dissimilarity to construct a model of the 
San Francisco Bay that could test the effects of the Reber’s plan. Tides were 
simulated by a mechanical system of pumps, the roughness of the sea bed by 
thousands of copper strips, and the Reber’s plan reproduced by the inclusion of 
concrete barriers throughout the water tanks. And in this process, the selection 
and integration of the various elements composing the model was in great part 
facilitated by the formulation of those judgments of similarity concerning model-
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prototype relations, in the phases of design, construction, and evaluation. The 
process resulted in a remarkably fruitful representation, which allowed engineers 
to foresee the elimination of current movements in the Bay if the Reber’s plan was 
implemented, and helped them to investigate additional engineering plans they 
hadn’t planned to study before (US Army Corps 1963; Huggins and Schultz 1967). 
If this is correct, creative similarity is the means of representation of the practice 
of constructing the SFBM, whereas it was not involved in the very unsuccessful 
representational practice concerning the functioning of the O-rings in the case of 
the Challenger. 
Bare similarity and creative similarity distance themselves with respect to 
the epistemic goals they can help attain too. There is a close link between 
knowledge – increase of true propositions – as the overarching aim of science, and 
faithfulness or truthfulness as the measures of the epistemic success of scientific 
models. I have doubts that creative similarity can be taken as the means of 
representation in an account of the means that recasts epistemic success in terms 
of truthfulness, as I discussed in the previous section. If adding new true beliefs to 
our corpus of knowledge is what we are after, it is difficult to see how creative 
similarity, which involves employing as resource a selective combination of 
judgments of similarity and distortions, can contribute to that endeavour. Bare 
similarity, mirroring, isomorphism, or identity would be in this framework more 
appropriate notions to sustain an account of the means of representation. However, 
I argue that the notion of similarity that emerges from the observation of actual 
practices of representation does not correspond to a conception of bare similarity, 
where a model ideally aspires to be as similar as possible – by sharing as many 
properties as possible – to the target. It is a conception of similarity that is 
intertwined with relevant distortions, to work as resources of epistemic 
communities with specific goals to pursue. Moreover, I have argued above that the 
conception of knowledge as the overarching goal of science, and consequently 
faithfulness as the measure of the epistemic success of representation, does not offer 
the most adequate framework to explain the achievements of actual scientific 
practices and the numerous felicitous falsehoods that models contain. A conception 
that takes understanding as the central goal of science, and fruitfulness, 
effectiveness, usefulness as ways of defining the epistemic success of 
representations would be better to account for the actual cognitive achievement of 
most scientific models. To use Elgin’s (2010) words: 
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Neither art nor science is, can be, or ought to be, a mirror of nature. Rather, 
[…] effective representations in both disciplines embody and convey an 
understanding of their subjects. Since understanding is not mirroring, 
failures of mirroring need not be failures of understanding. (Elgin 2010: 2) 
 
Failures of mirroring don’t need to be failures of understanding because 
representations that afford understanding of targets in the world don’t need to be 
highly truthful to those targets. Some scientific models might contain strong 
idealizations and be highly fruitful insofar as they allow scientists to connect that 
phenomenon with others, and apply the model to other situations and targets. 
Similarity as means of representation in this conception is quite different from 
mirroring or bare similarity: it is creative similarity, that is, it is selective, 
distortive, and generative. 
 
 
5.3.2. Creative similarity is distortive  
The claim that “similarity is distortive” might seem contradictory. However, this 
is only the case if we interpret similarity as “pure” or “bare” similarity. The term 
creative similarity can help capture the apparent tension of the assertion that 
similarity and distortion can be intertwined resources of the same practices of 
representing. In Chapter 2 I claimed that van Fraassen (2008) has been one of the 
few contemporary philosophers of science who has openly argued that the 
existence of distortions in the practice of representing is not a reason to undermine 
the role of similarity in it (2008: 15). It shouldn’t be puzzling, he claims, that adding 
distortions to a representation, such as a caricature, is needed for the success of the 
representation, since both selective similarities and distortions can be “means to an 
end” of the practice. In any case, van Fraassen (2008) ultimately maintains his 
preference for a structural version of similarity to offer a general response to the 
problem of successful representation, and does not explicitly incorporate the 
potential epistemic value of distortions in it. Introducing the idea of creative 
similarity to advance an account of the means of representation can help emphasize 
this point. In Chapters 3 and 4, I suggested that whenever we localize the use of 
judgments of similarity in scientific practices of representing, like the construction 
of scale models or research with model organisms, we also find judgments of 
dissimilarity or distortion. The presence of well-reasoned distortions motivates the 
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thought that similarity is not bare but creative when it functions as the means of 
representation. Defending the idea that creative similarity is the means of 
representation in a plurality of practices of representing does not automatically 
support any account of the means of representation based on similarity. On the 
contrary, proposing the creative similarity account is a way of offering some 
restrictions on the functions that similarity can play in representational practices, 
by emphasizing that it is an effective means when it appears in the right balance 
with insightful distortions.  
An example from the pictorial arts can help illustrate how practitioners deal 
with the constant interplay of similarities and distortions, as much in artistic as in 
scientific practices of representing. Earlier I said that the focus on understanding 
as a central epistemic goal blurs some of the traditional distinctions between the 
cognitive gain that can be obtained from scientific and artistic representations 
(Goodman and Elgin 1988; Elgin 2017b). Incorporating examples from the 
pictorial arts into the debate in philosophy of science can help bring together fertile 
points in common regarding the role of similarity in representational practices. 
The period of the artistic avant-gardes, in the last years of the nineteenth 
century and beginning of the twentieth century, was notorious for questioning 
traditional conceptions of representation. Avant-garde movements motivated 
aesthetic debates around the concepts of depiction and similarity, and new ideas 
(such as ‘abstraction’) challenged the status of realistic styles of representing. 
Wassily Kandinsky’s treatise Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1911) is a fundamental 
theoretical essay from that period, which emerges directly from the artistic 
practices of depicting of its author. Kandinsky believed in the genuineness of 
abstract art. However, he had doubts about the need to reject the use of visual 
similarities in artistic creation. He asked himself: “must we then abandon utterly 
all material objects and paint solely in abstractions?” (Kandinsky 1911: 100). 
Trying to give a solution to this question, he elaborated a response that I 
reconstruct in two parts. In the first part, Kandinsky presents a strong rejection of 
similarity understood as ‘conventional imitation of nature’ or mirroring: “Nature 
has her own language, and a powerful one; this language cannot be imitated. [...] 
The Stimmung of nature can be imparted by every art, not, however, by imitation” 
(Kandinsky 1911: 123).51 This is an open refusal of the idea of mirroring, imitation, 
                                             
51 In the original version of Concerning the Spiritual in Art this point is even clearer. While in the 
translation we read that Kandinsky rejected “mere representation” (1911: 54), the original states 
that he rejected the “Nachahmung der Naturerscheinungen", that is, the mere “imitation of the 
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or merely copying when explaining what the practice of representing in art 
consists in.52 Then, the second part of Kandinsky’s response to the question of 
whether artists should reject similarity altogether consists in a vindication of the 
role of similarity, although understanding it as something very close to the idea of 
creative similarity that I am proposing. Visual similarities with respect to objects 
and shapes in the world, Kandinsky (1911: 71-2) claims, could help artists reach 
the final purposes of their creations. So if we deprive art of the possibility of using 
similarities, we would be limiting its power of expression.53 Nonetheless, fertile 
similarities that can contribute to achieve the purposes of the artist’s creations 
always go, for artistic reasons, hand in hand with distortion and intentional 
manipulation: “features or limbs are for artistic reasons changed or distorted [...]. 
These apparently irresponsible, but really well-reasoned alterations in form 
provide one of the storehouses of artistic possibilities” (Kandinsky 1911: 73-4).  
A good example of the use of well-reasoned alternations for artistic reasons 
is found, following Kandinsky (1911), in Cezanne’s painting “Bathing Women” 
(1900). The depicted group of women in the painting was distorted in such a way 
that the geometric shapes of the bodies represented stood out and integrated into 
the triangular pattern formed by the arranged natural elements (trees and river) 
of the whole. Distortions had “perfect justification” in this case, Kandinsky said, 
given the “purely artistic purposes” motivating them (1911: 127, n38). Well-
reasoned distortions and alterations are as fundamental as well-reasoned 
similarities in the attainment of the purposes of the artist’s work. The result of the 
combination of selected similarities and distortions was a painting that enabled the 
viewer to perceive the integration of geometrical shapes forming individual figures 
and their natural backgrounds saliently, in a way that had not been perceived or 
appreciated before.  
                                             
appearances of nature”. The difference between the translation and the original is not trivial when 
part of the argument consists in claiming that representation is not equivalent to conventional or 
superficial imitation. 
52 In a similar vein, artists like Piet Mondrian (1919: 285) had also claimed that “the appearance 
of nature is far stronger and much more beautiful than any imitation of it can ever be”, or Rebecca 
West (1928: 131) affirmed that “a copy of the universe is not what is required of art; one of the 
damn things is ample”. The latter quote was erroneously attributed to Virginia Woolf by 
Goodman (1968). See Elgin (2017a: 250) for clarification. 
53 Kandinsky identified the ultimate goal of his own work with the provocation of the “inner 
vibrations of the spirit” (1911: 71-2). And given that the visual identification of objects could 
provoke intense emotions on the spectator, similarities could have a fundamental value in artistic 
representation (ibid.). 
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Although I contended, following Elgin (2011; 2017b), that scientific and 
artistic representations might not be equivalent in some critical ways (such as in 
terms of uses and practical outcomes), the debate in philosophy of science will 
especially benefit from reflections in aesthetics and artistic practice on the role of 
similarity in representation. Philosophers of science have repeatedly debated 
whether they should advocate or reject the notion of similarity, which they almost 
invariably understand as “bare similarity”. Little has been done, though, to 
investigate the interplay of judgments of similarity and dissimilarity in practice, in 
a way that could give rise to a better characterization of the actual role of similarity 
in the production of representations. Examples like Kandinsky’s attempt to explain 
the fertile interplay of similarities and distortions, from the perspective of 
practitioners’ work of depicting, can be stimulating for philosophers of science who 
usually present similarity and distortion as terms pulling in opposite directions.  
The case studies presented in Chapter 4 show significant parallels with the 
way in which the fertile integration of similarities and distortions happens in 
artistic practices. Concerning the construction of the SFBM and the MBM, I 
suggested that the use of geometric similarities was perfectly compatible with the 
inclusion of geometric distortions. Similarities and distortions were neither pulling 
in opposite direction nor diminishing each other, but showing that more than 
superficial spatial similarity was required to construct functioning scale models. 
Engineers know from experience that they can combine certain geometric 
similarities with certain distortions to build more tractable models. So they 
formulate judgments to find the right balance for the purposes of the practice. 
Furthermore, if we look into scientists’ definitions of the notion of similarity in 
manuals and technical reports, which are closely connected to their modelling 
practices, we will find stronger support to the idea that similarities and distortions 
can enrich each other. We saw that for instance the classic manual Engineering 
Hydraulics (Warnock 1950) claims that “distorted scales” and “departures from 
geometric similarity serve some definite objective”, so they should not be taken, in 
general, as shortcomings of models (Warnock 1950: 146). Similarity is a useful 
concept for the practice of constructing scale models, precisely because it is not 
defined according to an ideal of exact imitation, but as indicating “the general limits 
of correspondence, or one might speak of various types of similitude, each of which 
has a definite set of limitations” (ibid.: 136).  
Definitions like these should be taken seriously by philosophers of science. 
I suggest that the notion of creative similarity is satisfactory to capture the idea 
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that perfect matching is not what similarity is about in actual practices of 
modelling. It is about the limits of correspondence between a vehicle and a target, 
which are exploited by resourceful epistemic agents through the formulation of a 
balanced combination of judgments of similarity and distortion. 
  
 
5.3.3. Creative similarity is generative 
So far I have claimed that the notion of creative similarity helps capture the idea 
that epistemic communities are essential in determining what relevant similarities 
are, as well as the idea that in scientific practice similarities are effectively 
combined with distortions. But what ultimately characterizes the notion of creative 
similarity that I am using to advance an account of the means of representation is 
that it is generative, that is, it produces new associations that didn’t exist or hadn’t 
been noticed before. In other words, the notion of creative similarity attempts to 
encapsulate the productive interplay of judgments of similarity and dissimilarity 
that occurs in the process of constructing fruitful representations in science. The 
process in which new associations are generated is not automatic, but iterative, 
dynamic and shaped by the resourceful agents taking part in the practices of 
representing. An example from the pictorial arts can again help illustrate the 
generative character of creative similarity. 
Gombrich (1972) tells an anecdote of Picasso, who was commissioned to 
paint a portrait of Françoise Gilot. Picasso drew a series of sketches, some of them 
using realistic styles of depiction, others closer to abstraction. At some point he 
felt he had found the “equivalence for him”, the right balance of shapes, expressions 
and associations. The result was a portrait of Gilot with the contours, colours, and 
shapes of a flower (he titled it Femme Fleur, 1949) (Gombrich 1972: 30). Gombrich 
(1972) concluded that similarities evolve during artistic practices: “likeness needs 
the method of trial and error, of match-mismatch to trap this elusive prey. […It] 
must be tested and criticized, it cannot be easily analysed step by step and therefore 
predicted” (ibid.). Likeness is not fixed in advance of the practice of representing. 
It needs to be tried, challenged and reconfigured when needed, so that it eventually 
generates new insightful associations and features regarding the objects 
intervening in the representational practice. The adjective “creative” emphasizes 
the centrality of the use of the representation, the actions and manipulations 
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involved, and the resourceful epistemic agents that progressively stabilize fertile 
connections. 
Examples like this from the arts help us to see the dynamic and ultimately 
creative character of similarity in the construction of scientific representations as 
well. The results of the use of judgments of similarity in scientific practices is the 
place to look at if we want to observe this generative process. I briefly referred to 
the construction of Phillips’s hydraulic machine (Morgan 2012; Frigg and Nguyen 
2017a; Vines 2000). Various judgments of similarity regarding the comparison of 
economic systems and hydraulic engineering systems were exploited in this case. 
Combinations with judgments of dissimilarity and distortion were tested, adjusted, 
modified, discarded when inadequate, and eventually stabilized when they proved 
to work. As a result, Phillips managed to construct a machine that uncovered 
patterns of the behaviour of economic systems, and displayed them saliently, 
“immensely visibly” (Vines 2000: 46-9). Economists could reason about money 
transactions while looking at the water tanks rise, in such a way that new, vivid, 
and even surprising understanding of economic policies was advanced.   
Disagreements between different judgments of similarity and dissimilarity 
are evidence of this dynamic, generative character of creative similarity. In the 
example of the research on alcohol addiction using mice as model organism, we 
saw the importance of disagreements concerning what the relevantly similar 
aspects of humans and mice behaviours were (Ankeny et al. 2014). There was, for 
instance, a dispute about the significance of giving sweetened alcoholic drinks to 
mice – so that they would voluntarily consume alcohol and showed a (considered 
relevant) similar behaviour with respect to human alcohol consumption. 
Eventually judgments were balanced between those who argued that the 
dissimilarities between human addiction to alcohol and mouse addiction to 
sweetened alcoholic drinks was too significant, and those who argued that the key 
similarities between mice and human behaviours were captured, given that, for 
instance, human addiction usually starts with the consumption of sugary drinks 
(Ankeny et al. 2014). The importance of resolving disagreements like this, about 
the right combination of the most promising similarities and enlightening 
distortions, reinforces the idea that similarity is creative, the product of a process 
led by resourceful epistemic communities.  
Representational practices are processes of trial and error, so certain 
judgments of similarity might eventually lead to erroneous actions in practice. 
Still, scientists seem to keep employing judgments of similarity in many cases, like 
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the practices described throughout this thesis, modifying those that lead to 
undesirable results. Errors usually provide “incentives and resources for serious, 
focused, effective inquiry”, as they reveal not only that we have got something 
wrong, but also where we got it wrong, therefore pointing us in the direction of 
advancing our understanding (Elgin 2017a: 305-6). Research communities, after 
balancing and weighing different judgments, frequently reach agreements about 
the most suitable way of modelling certain phenomena. This requires training, skill 
and awareness of the crucial questions asked in the practice. If there is a functioning 
epistemic community, we can assume that there is an attempt to stabilize an 
adequate balance to produce the most fruitful models for the case at hand. The 
norms or criteria of physical similarity established in practices of scale modelling 
for instance were consolidated and formalized when they proved their efficiency 
for the construction of physical models. From there, engineers in subsequent 
practices were able to use “standardized judgments of similarity” applying the 
norms previously formalized. 
Earlier I mentioned that van Fraassen (2008) explicitly considers 
distortions compatible with similarities in the practice of representing. This was, I 
argued, an adequate starting point from which to develop a similarity-based type 
of account of the means of representation. But a limitation of van Fraassen’s (2008) 
account is that he doesn’t explicitly consider the generative, creative consequences 
that combining similarities and distortions has. In the light of the examples from 
the arts and sciences discussed, we can press this point further. Returning to the 
example of the caricatures, I said in Chapter 2, regarding Figure 1, that van 
Fraassen would argue that this caricature bears some resemblance to Trump 
(2008: 13-5).54 At the same time, he would say, the caricature also distorts Trump, 
as he is represented as something he is not, namely a creature made out of flames. 
It is no puzzle that distortions can accompany similarity, since similarity is not the 
core of representation but “the means to an end” (ibid.: 14-5). This description can 
be further developed as follows: the combination of similarities and distortions in 
the caricature triggers a particular way of seeing Trump (as an evil creature, a 
demon) from the moment the caricature is encountered by the relevant community 
to which it is directed.55 When looking at Trump after seeing the caricature, those 
                                             
54 In the original, van Fraassen (2008: 13-5) refers to a caricature of Margaret Thatcher 
represented as a dragon and of Otto Bismarck represented as a peacock. 
55 This applies even if one might want to argue that this is a metaphorical or ironical way of seeing 
Trump more than a literal one.  
177 
 
 
who have seen it may perceive evil in his attitudes, malevolence in his speeches and 
even a physical reminiscence of the devil. The community would even gain criteria 
for what it takes Trump-alike attributes to be, and appreciate those attributes in 
other subjects (in Elgin 2017a: 256-7).56 Creative similarity is more than the 
selection of some relevant similarities. It demands a combination of relevant 
similarities and distortions from which insightful connections arise. The definitive 
feature of creative similarity is its capacity to generate or reveal new associations 
or features in the world.57   
A possible objection to the idea that new associations or features are actually 
created in the world can be posed. Metaphysicians might want to claim that nothing 
really arises or is created in the practice (Elgin 2017a: 257). The attributes (of 
Trump in my example, Thatcher in van Fraassen’s, or Gertrude Stein in Elgin’s) 
existed all along: they were not brought into existence by the caricatures or the 
painting. This is true but, as Elgin responds, trivial, since there is little reason to 
care about many potential associations, extensions, that don’t have significant 
things in common (ibid.). What the caricatures and the painting bring out is that 
some particular attributes are associated with a subject – or some attributes with 
other attributes, or subjects with other subjects – in a meaningful, non-arbitrary 
way (ibid.). The associations and attributes are created in the most 
epistemologically relevant sense. Although Elgin (2017a), following Goodman 
(1968; 1978), rejects referring to the role of similarity in any form in the process 
of producing fruitful representation, the notion of creative similarity fits well with 
a great part of their project. Creative similarity, I have tried to argue, is a central 
means of representation in science, present in a significant set of modelling 
practices that produce epistemically successful results, as it allows us to bring out 
non-arbitrary and illuminating associations concerning the target investigated. 
                                             
56 This example is adapted from Elgin (2017a: 256-7), who follows Schwarz (1985) to describe the 
case of Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein. Picasso’s portrait allowed us to see, following Elgin 
(2017a), attributes in Stein that hadn’t been appreciated before: in the painting she was 
magisterial, imposing, someone to be reckoned with. Moreover, Elgin (2017a) claims, we gained 
criteria for what it takes to look and be like Stein. 
57 The discussion of caricatures can be further enriched by another view from the arts. Ernst 
Gombrich (1960; 1972) argued that “caricature had been defined [...] as a method of making 
portraits which aims at the greatest likeness of the whole of a physiognomy while all the component 
parts are changed”. For this reason, he adds, “it could serve me for a demonstration of equivalence, 
the proof that the images of art can be convincing without being objectively realistic” (Gombrich 
1972: 1). Gombrich offers an alternative way of explaining how the integration of similarities and 
distortions is possible, by considering the relation between the whole and the parts of a 
representation: none of the components of a caricature intend to be a copy of the target, and 
nevertheless there is a similarity of great epistemic value associated with the entire representation. 
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Not far removed from this idea is Goodman’s (1968: 7-8) metaphor of worldmaking, 
which links understanding with creation (see Ammon 2017: 94-5; Goodman 1978). 
In representing an object, we do not copy: we achieve a construal or interpretation 
(1968: 7-8). Achieving a fruitful, rewarding, illuminating construal of an aspect of 
the world is precisely what the resource of creative similarity can facilitate.  
 
 
5.3.4. The Creative Similarity Account is a satisfactory account of the means 
of representation 
Using the notion of creative similarity to develop a specific account of the means 
of representation was an attempt to rehabilitate the value of similarity in the debate 
of scientific representation, arguing that it plays a central role in practices of 
representing. Further, adding the adjective “creative” to the notion of similarity 
was an attempt to explicitly reject the associations of similarity with copy theories 
of representation and the idea of “bare similarity”. Not any characterization of 
similarity could satisfactorily capture the dynamics of the uses of judgments of 
similarity as representational resources in practice. Based on the examples and case 
studies analysed, I believe the term creative similarity can do so. The creative 
similarity account of the means of representation therefore advocates that creative 
similarity is the means of scientific representation in a relevant set of scientific 
modelling practices. Following the characterization of the notion of creative 
similarity offered above, I now spell out how the creative similarity account fulfils the 
desiderata to advance a satisfactory account of the means of representation. 
First of all, the creative similarity account of the means of representation is largely 
supported by a practical investigation of the construction of successful scientific 
representations. The historical analysis of the cases of the SFBM and the MBM 
presented in Chapter 4, as well as the more sketchy description of various examples 
of modelling practices in Chapter 3, was precisely a practical enquiry focused on 
particular cases that set the descriptive base to propose the creative similarity account 
of the means of representation. Adopting a practical type of enquiry allowed me to 
observe, among other things, how epistemic agents employ judgments of similarity 
and distortions concerning model-target comparisons as representational 
resources to construct fruitful representations. The study of judgments of 
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similarity helps me connect the descriptive component of the creative similarity 
account with its normative component. 
The normative component in an account of the means of representation is 
responsible for offering insight, with some degree of generality, about how certain 
representational dynamics have allowed in the past (and there are good reasons to 
believe they could allow in future) to promote successful ways of constructing 
representations. We saw that judgments of similarity in the cases of the SFBM and 
the MBM were of various types: some were standardized judgments, which proved 
to be efficient for the construction of models and got formalized in manuals; others 
were not systematically regulated, such as the case-specific judgments of 
similarity, but still were considered important by the epistemic community in the 
phases of calibration and testing of the models; and still other judgments of 
similarity were qualified as intuitive, that is, entrenched in practices of 
representing through common skills and experiences shared by members of the 
epistemic community. With the classification into different types of judgments of 
similarity, I aimed to offer a more flexible, plural way of thinking about the uses of 
similarity concerning model-target comparisons in modelling practices. Further 
studies of other modelling practices in different fields of research will help refine 
this classification, in such a way as to perhaps we attain more precise conclusions 
about pattern in the standardization of judgments of similarity. On this point, the 
creative similarity account claims that certain interplays of judgments of similarity 
and distortion historically proved to be productive and crystalized into norms, 
uses, or recommendations that helped guide a range of practices of modelling, 
sometimes beyond the fields where they were originally formulated, such as when 
criteria of physical similarity in engineering were transferred to the geosciences. 
Conclusions concerning the standardization of judgments within epistemic 
communities constitute the normative component of the creative similarity account 
of the means of representation. An alternative account of the means of representation, 
which for instance focuses on convention, should also be able to provide insightful 
generalizations about how the formulation of judgments of convention in a series 
of practices give rise to standards that guide the construction of successful models. 
Concerning the third desideratum for a satisfactory account of the means of 
representation, we can also claim that the creative similarity account fulfils it. The 
third desideratum states that an account of the means of representation has to 
specify how the epistemic success of representations is precisely understood, and 
how the specific means proposed help achieve that form of epistemic success. In the 
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creative similarity account of the means of representation, epistemic success is broadly 
identified with the growth of understanding, as particularly identified with the 
production of fruitful models. Recasting success into fruitfulness was a crucial step 
in my account to depart from “bare” similarity and focus instead on the relationship 
between creative similarity, which is generative and productive, and 
understanding. The account demonstrates that creative similarity as means of 
representation helps achieve fruitful scientific models by revealing paths that take 
us from the formulation of judgments of similarity and distortion to the production 
of new associations and fertile inferences through the use of models. More 
specifically, the creative similarity account of the means of representation offers at least 
two indicators of the path from creative similarity (or more precisely from the 
combination of judgments of similarity and distortion, which are the means 
understood as resources) to the production of fruitful models.  
One, the interplay of judgments of similarity and distortion usually 
consolidates norms, common uses, and recommendations. This is an indicator that 
creative similarity is considered an effective means of representation, because it 
becomes entrenched in epistemic systems to guide future practices of modelling. 
As in the cases of the SFBM and the MBM, those practices can be considered 
fruitful, as they gave rise to models that “exceeded the expectations of [their] 
inventors” (Robinson 1992: 292), allowing them to explore new technologies and 
methodologies, study some hydraulic projects that were not planned in advance, 
and open new research questions about the targets investigated. Two, a less direct 
but equally significant indicator that creative similarity leads to the production of 
fruitful representations is the persistent presence of disagreements about the 
importance of different judgments of similarity and dissimilarity in practices of 
representing. In the case of modelling human alcoholism with mice that I discussed 
in Chapter 3, we saw that there were disagreements about which exact 
combinations or balances between relevant similarities and dissimilarities were the 
most likely to produce successful models of alcoholism. The importance of 
historically resolving disagreements like this, making certain lines of research 
move forward, reinforces the idea that creative similarity is generative, that is, in 
an epistemologically relevant sense it creates new associations and features that 
were previously unseen (Elgin 2017a: 257). For that reason, it is employed in 
practices of representing to achieve fruitful epistemic results.  
If one proposes an alternative account of the means of representation 
focused for instance on convention or exemplification, these accounts would also 
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have to explain how these means help achieve fruitful representations (or useful, 
predictably adequate, general, precise representations, depending on how 
epistemic success is specified). At any rate, I contended in section 5.1 that 
conceiving epistemic success in general in terms of the increase of knowledge (and 
in particular conceiving successful representations as accurate, truthful, or faithful) 
entails some important shortcomings. Mainly, it is difficult to directly 
accommodate the value of idealizations, abstractions and simplifications in the 
epistemic success of representations, since these elements do not provide truthful 
statements about the world (Potochnik 2015; Elgin 2017a). For that reason, I 
argue that alternative accounts of the means should also be framed within a view 
of understanding as the overarching goal of scientific representation.  
Connected to this point, the creative similarity account of the means of 
representation satisfies the fourth desideratum for an adequate account of the means 
of representation because it can accommodate the potential role of 
misrepresentations in the achievement of successful models. This is because 
creative similarity is explicitly differentiated from “bare” or “pure” similarity. 
Replication is not what creative similarity is about; nor is it about obtaining the 
highest degree of similarity between a vehicle and a target, following an ideal of a 
perfectly mimetic copy. Instead, it is about the integration of appropriate 
similarities and distortions in productive interplay, in such a way that significant 
relations that were previously concealed are revealed.  
In summary, the creative similarity account of the means of representation 
advances a proposal with the aim of addressing the complex (insufficiently 
discussed in a systematic way) problem of how epistemically successful 
representations are produced in science. More specifically, the creative similarity 
account claims that in a significant set of modelling practices, including the 
construction of scale models in engineering and research done with model 
organisms in the biological and psychological sciences, creative similarity is the 
means of representation. Claiming that creative similarity is the means of 
representation in these, and possibly other, practices of modelling entails that a 
generative interplay between judgments of similarity and distortion has been 
employed as a representational resource by the relevant epistemic community to 
produce fruitful models. If the desiderata that I proposed earlier are accepted as a 
fair set of important requirements to guide the advancement of an account of the 
means of representation, then the creative similarity account can be taken as a 
satisfactory account of the means of representation. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
This final chapter has proposed a specific account of the means of representation, 
the creative similarity account of the means of representation. I framed this account 
within a broader discussion of the general aims of scientific practice. I argued, 
following Elgin (1996, 2017a) and Potochnik (2015), that understanding should be 
considered the overarching aim of science, and the measure of the epistemic success 
of scientific representations. This view contrasts with the conception of knowledge 
(understood as collecting true beliefs) as the overarching aim of science. An 
important limitation of views focused on knowledge is that they make models that 
contain falsehoods suspect and necessarily deficient with respect to their epistemic 
achievements. A view focused on understanding should be preferred because 
collecting true propositions doesn’t guarantee that we grasp the phenomenon 
represented, that we are able to make sense of it, or ask new questions about it, 
whereas understanding does. The creative similarity account is an attempt to 
elucidate how epistemically successful representations are produced, in the sense 
of how a series of fruitful models that afford understanding of aspects of the world 
are obtained. 
Then, I presented four desiderata for any project that attempts to develop 
an adequate account of the means of representation. One, an account of the means 
of representation should incorporate a practical enquiry that investigates the 
epistemic resources used in the production of a series of scientific representations. 
Two, such an account should include a normative component that offers some kind 
of generic insight on how certain representations achieve epistemically successful 
results, grounded in the descriptive work done on how certain judgments in 
scientific practice are regulated and entrenched within the relevant epistemic 
community. Three, such an account should specify how ‘epistemic success’ is 
understood (as fruitfulness, usefulness, precision), since, depending on the 
overarching conception of epistemic success adopted, the characterization of the 
resources to achieve that success could vary. Accordingly, an account of the means 
of representation should specify how the use of certain resources leads to the 
achievement of epistemically successful representations. And four, an account of 
the means of representation should explicitly accommodate the phenomenon of 
misrepresentation, in the sense of being able to explain the valuable role that 
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idealizations, abstractions, and other forms of distortions might play in the 
achievement of the successful representations.  
These desiderata were proposed as a guide for those attempting to address 
the problem of the epistemic success of representation from a philosophical 
perspective. It is implied in the desiderata that an approach in philosophy of science 
in practice (PSP) is desirable to advance such an account. Only when a practical 
enquiry that pays attention to particular case studies is developed, and when 
empirical evidence on how certain epistemic resources lead to the production of 
successful models is gathered, is it possible to offer insight on how epistemic 
success is achieved in a series of representational practices. The creative similarity 
account fulfils the desiderata. Therefore, it should be taken as an example of how a 
satisfactory account of the means of representation can be advanced.  
Then, I defined the notion of creative similarity, explaining why I believe it 
is a satisfactory notion with which to support an account of the means of 
representation. The notion of creative similarity emerges from actual practices of 
representing, and helps capture scientists’ uses of judgments of similarity when 
constructing representations. I first characterized creative similarity in opposition 
to “bare” or “pure” similarity, which is a conception of similarity that recalls a two-
term relation of representation and an aspiration to obtain perfect copies of the 
object represented. I then characterized creative similarity as compatible and 
combinable with distortions, based on the empirical observation that when 
judgments of similarity are used in modelling practices, they go hand in hand with 
judgments of dissimilarity and distortion. Lastly, I argued that what ultimately 
makes similarity creative is that, from combination with relevant distortions, new, 
insightful associations arise. The use of various examples from artistic practices 
helped illustrate the implications of the notion of creative similarity, and opened 
some grounds for further exploration on the commonalities between these two 
fields concerning shared goals and resources in their respective practices of 
representing.  
Additional accounts of the means of representation would be required to 
complement and further expand the insight offered by the creative similarity account. 
Other accounts of the means of representation might be able to highlight the role 
that conventions or exemplifications – through the formulation of judgments and 
the stabilization of norms – play in certain representational practices. These 
alternative accounts would not disprove the importance of creative similarity as 
the means of representation in a variety of modelling practices, but will help 
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achieve more nuanced comparisons and generalizations about the various means 
employed in the production of epistemically successful representations. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis tackled the role of similarity in the production of epistemically 
successful representations in science. Focusing on this problem differentiated my 
account from others in recent philosophy of science revolving around the 
identification of the constituents (necessary and sufficient conditions) of scientific 
representation (French 2003; French and Bueno 2011; Bartels 2006; Frigg & 
Nguyen 2017a). I started Chapter 1 by distancing my approach from accounts that 
have privileged questions about the constituents of representation, and focused 
instead on the problem of the means of representation from a practice-based 
perspective (following Suárez’s [2003, 2010] terminology). I regarded the 
problem of the means of representation (or the epistemic success of 
representations) as particularly relevant, since offering a response may advance 
insights on how we learn, make sense of, and understand aspects of the world 
through the construction of scientific models.  
I proposed to address the problem of the means of representation by 
appealing to the role of similarity in scientific practices of modelling. The role of 
similarity in representation has been recurrently discussed in contemporary 
philosophy of science, usually polarized between detractors and advocates of 
similarity. My goal was to show that there are good reasons to support an account 
of the epistemic success of scientific representation focused on similarity. However, 
I took criticisms of similarity seriously, and acknowledged that similarity has to be 
adequately characterized to address the problem of the means of representation.  
In Chapter 1, I agreed with detractors of similarity that it is indeed 
problematic to consider similarity a constituent of the relation of representation. 
The argument that Goodman (1968, 1972) offered, together with the argument 
from misrepresentation, should dissuade us from attempting to advance a 
substantive account of representation based on similarity. Then, Chapter 2 
recognized three central arguments against similarity as means of representation: 
the argument from variety, the argument from vagueness, and the argument from 
misrepresentation against the means. Although these arguments advance 
important points that an account of the means of representation focused on 
similarity should consider, none is conclusive enough to prevent us from trying to 
offer such an account. 
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The argument from variety pointed out the diversity of models and 
representational practices in science. This fact does not hinder developing an 
account of the means of representation focused on similarity however, if there is 
evidence that in a range of modelling practices similarity works as an effective 
means of representation. Still, the argument from variety reminds us that 
similarity might not be the only means of representation. Alternative accounts of 
the means of representation, for instance focused on convention or exemplification, 
could enrich and further expand the insight offered by the creative similarity account, 
and together help develop a more comprehensive approach to the problem of the 
epistemic success of representation. In Chapter 5, I suggested four desiderata that 
any attempt to develop an account of the means of representation should fulfil. 
This list of desiderata allows for the possibility of alternative accounts of the means 
of representation, provided they fulfil them as satisfactorily as the creative similarity 
account of the means of representation does. The first desideratum is that an account 
of the means of representation should develop a practical enquiry on particular 
modelling practices. The second is that the account should incorporate a normative 
component, as any genuine philosophical proposal, in connection to the descriptive 
component that results from the practical enquiry. The study of judgments 
concerning model-target comparisons in scientific practices in the key to connect 
the two components. The third desideratum is that an account of the means of 
representation should specify how ‘epistemic success’ is understood (as fruitfulness, 
usefulness, precision), and accordingly how certain means lead to the achievement 
of successful representations characterized in that particular way. Finally, the 
fourth desideratum is that an account of the means of representation should 
explicitly accommodate the potential value that idealizations and other forms of 
distortions might play in the epistemic successful of scientific representations. 
The argument from vagueness stated that similarity is an empty or utterly 
vague concept, because its meaning ought to be specified in every particular 
representational practice. I replied that a context-independent, objective definition 
of similarity is neither attainable nor desirable. An investigation of how similarity 
is actually defined in particular practices of representing can bring light to this 
problem. I observed, with the help of the case studies in Chapter 4, that some 
definitions of similarity might indeed depend on very specific contexts of 
modelling. Other characterizations of similarity, though, are widely shared by 
epistemic communities, as they are supported by common skills and experiences. 
Still others are deeply entrenched and consolidated in the form of standards and 
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norms that regulate representational practices. The classification into three types 
of judgments of similarity (standardized, context-dependent and intuitive) helped 
me offer a more flexible characterization of the role of similarity concerning model-
target comparisons in representational practices, while rejecting the idea that 
similarity is a problematically vague notion. Further empirical and historical work 
needs to be done to complement these claims. The continued study of specific 
practices of representing in different fields of research will help confirm, and maybe 
adjust, the classification into these three types of judgments of similarity that I 
identified for the case of scale modelling in engineering, as well as providing more 
general and robust conclusions about the plural character of similarity and the 
agreements of the epistemic communities that shape it.  
The argument from misrepresentation against the means stressed that 
scientific models distort, idealize, and abstract the targets they represent. If an 
account of the means of representation focused on similarity cannot accommodate 
this fact or explain why highly idealized models can be epistemically successful, 
such an account must be inadequate. I replied that an account of the means of 
representation focused on “bare similarity” is certainly incapable of 
accommodating misrepresentation. Bare similarity is a conception of similarity as 
a two-term relation between a vehicle and a target, where the former aspires to be 
a copy of the latter. In contrast to this conception, which I spelt out in Chapter 5, 
I proposed an account of the means of representation supported on the notion of 
creative similarity. The idea of creative similarity has to be framed in a triadic 
conception of representation, where resourceful epistemic agents, and more 
broadly the epistemic community that determines the use of representations, seek 
an adequate balance between relevant similarities and distortions according to the 
goals of the practice. Proposing a definition of similarity as creative similarity 
should not be understood as a strategy to evade the argument from 
misrepresentation against the means. This notion is deeply ingrained in the 
observation that, in actual practices of representing, judgments of similarity go 
hand in hand with judgments of dissimilarity and distortion. The generative 
interplay between them allows epistemic agents to construct fruitful 
representation, as in the case of the SFBM and the MBM that I examined in 
Chapter 4. 
The creative similarity account of the means of representation is the outcome of 
bringing together central points discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 about the general 
problem of scientific representation, as well as the methodological considerations 
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and case studies examined in Chapters 3 and 4. This account advocates that creative 
similarity is the means of representation in a relevant set of representational 
practices that we recognized for their epistemic achievements. It is supported by 
the study of concrete modelling practices, and specifically the analysis of 
judgments of similarity concerning model-target comparisons used in the design, 
construction, and testing of scientific models. The presence of  judgments of  
similarity in modelling practices has been addressed by Weisberg (2013) and 
Sterrett (2009, 2017a, 2017b) in recent philosophy of science. My research helps to 
further develop the conclusions of these works by showing that an account of the 
epistemic success of representation requires a descriptive and a normative 
component, and that the study of judgments of similarity permits the integration 
of the two. The source of  the normativity of  an account of  the means of  
representation should be the description of  norms, standards, and common uses 
consolidated in representational practices.  
An additional claim that this thesis has defended is that understanding should 
be taken as the overarching goal of science, and fruitfulness as a central value to 
describe the epistemic success of representations. A good reason to support a 
definition of epistemic success in terms of understanding is that it can better 
account for the achievements of actual scientific practices, where idealizations and 
other felicitous falsehoods are frequently involved (Elgin 2004, 2017a). 
Understanding concerns grasping the phenomena that are our object of study, 
revealing connections and patterns, generating new questions about them and 
providing insight about facts that had remained unnoticed before. The creative 
similarity account of the means of representation and the view of understanding as the 
overarching goal of science support and strengthen each other. A related subject 
that needs to be explored in more detail is the parallel between scientific and 
artistic representations. Many representations in the arts also seem to have 
understanding as a central goal (Elgin 2011, 2017b; Goodman and Elgin 1988), 
while creative similarity could be considered an efficient means to reach that goal 
in a variety of artistic practices, such as the pictorial works mentioned in Chapter 
5. Ultimately, bringing together important aspects of scientific and artistic 
practices of representing could help expand the scope and strength of the creative 
similarity account of the means of representation. 
The investigation developed in this thesis brings us closer to an elucidation 
of the problem of scientific representation because it helps characterize the actual 
role that similarity plays in the production of epistemically successful 
189 
 
 
representational. It shows that similarity, through the formulation of a plurality of 
judgments of similarity in generative interplay with judgments of distortions, 
allows us to construct fruitful scientific models that afford understanding of aspects 
of the world. 
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